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Introduction 
During the period covered by this report, the Commission's activities in relation to 
competition policy have been influenced by its concern, among others, to apply its 
best efforts towards a solution of the difficulties which confronted the Community 
as a result of inflation, of tensions affecting the markets for raw materials (especially 
oil), and of increasing sectoral and regional disparities. Indeed, the Community must 
mobilize all means available to it under Community legislation to contain inflationary 
pressures and to help bring about essential structural changes; in this connection, 
competition policy has an essential, though limited, role to play. 
The Commission has accordingly been especially watchful over the behaviour of 
undertakings so far as restrictive agreements and abuses of dominant positions may 
be concerned. Its object has been to prevent additional price increases by prohibiting 
horizontal and vertical price-fixing agreements, market-sharing agreements and 
agreements which voluntarily limit imports from outside the Community. 
Further, concerning state aids, the Commission has expressed its firm conviction that 
the Treaty provisions must be respected if national aids are to enable the Community 
to overcome effectively and at the lowest cost, our current economic difficulties, and 
also to avoid overbidding between Member States which would clearly lead to 
negative results. 
The general approach of the Commission in the competition policy field' and its 
individual measures and decisions should been seen in this context; and it is against 
this background also that the Commission, with the encouragement of the Council 
resolution of 17 December 1973, has undertaken its study into price variations 
recorded for a range of products in the different Member States. 
In a number of prohibition decisions the Commission broke new ground in 1974. 
, One case saw the first application of the views expressed in the Commission's state-
ment published in 1972 as to the position of voluntary restraint agreements. In the 
case in question the Commission decided that private agreements which prevent 
imports from third countries into the Community or which have the effect ofincreasing 
the prices of such imports, conflict with the competition rules. Another Commission 
decision prohibited an agreement between undertakings with the ostensible objective 
of maintaining 'fair trading rules'. It was found in the case in question that under the 
cloak of protecting fair trading, competition between the parties was in fact restricted 
in respect of prices, rebates and terms of sale, to the detriment of consumers. 
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Questions of selective distribution were probed in detail with the Member States' 
experts on restrictive trade practices. In a first decision of its kind, the Commission 
granted an exemption in this field to a motor manufacturer on conditions 'and for a 
limited period of time. In the case of selective distribution agreements in the perfume 
industry a widely applicable solution has been arrived at. In the light of the special 
circumstances in this market which is characterized by numerous manufacturers each 
with a relatively small market share, the Commission can accept a situation in which 
dealers are appointed under objective and non-discriminatory stand~rds of selection 
and in which the freedom of dealers in respect of pricing and sales to other dealers of 
the same distribution network remains unimpaired. 
The most important of the competition problems which can arise in connection with 
patent licensing agreements were reviewed in consultation with restrictive trade 
practices experts of the Member States. Views were exchanged on a number of 
commonly employed contractual provisions which restrict competition and which 
jeopardize the free movement of goods. 
The Commission for t4e first time issued a decision in the EEC field concerning the 
problem of joint enterprises, discrete economic entities, set up for the purpose of 
producing or distributing goods or services. Such bodies are a means through which 
undertakings can cooperate effectively, but the creation and management of the joint 
venture are of themselves likely to have the effect of encouraging the controlling 
undertakings to adopt a policy of mutual non-competition. When dealing with 
individual cases, the Commission must therefore have regard both to the positive 
aspects of joint subsidiaries as well as to any restrictive effects on competition. 
The Commission has actively pursued its enquiry into the oil market. Numerous 
investigations have been carried out into multinational _oil companies and their 
subsidiaries, as well as into independent enterprises. The next step is to examine and 
assess the behaviour of the oil companies in the light of the investigation results, and 
to reach conclusions. A report on this question will be submitted to the European 
Parliament. 
In cases under Article 66 of the ECSC, the existing policy was continued of authorizing 
critical concentrations only on conditions of partial divestiture. As applied for the 
first time in the Thyssen/Rheinstahl case, the Commission had adopted this approach 
to safeguard the independence of the large steel producing groups in the Community. 
The Commission's activities in the ECSC field included some notable new develop-
ments. Following the Court's decision in Miles Druce/GKN which confirmed that it 
was for the Commission to take all measures necessary to preserve the status quo 
pending its substantive decision, the Commission had recourse to the interim measures 
provided for in Article I 66(5), third paragraph, in Marine-Firminy SA/Schneider 
SA/Denain/De Wendel and Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd./BSCJDunford HadfieldsLtd. 
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These interim measures have proved to be a useful tool, because they ensure, especially 
in cases where a bid for the control of an undertaking is announced, that a balance 
can be maintained between the parties in question, until the Commission has been able 
to examine the applications for merger authorization in substance. 
During the period under review Community legislation was extended in an important 
. area. The Council approved Regulation EEC 2988/74 concerning limitation periods in 
proceedings and the enforcement of sanctions. This regulation assures a balance 
between the needs for legal certainty on the part of enterprises and the public interest 
in the prosecution of infringements. 
, 
Problem areas in the relationship between Community competition rules and national 
laws were closely reviewed at a conference with government experts. The Member 
States share the view of the Commission that it is not opportune at the present time 
to deal with this relationship by regulation and that double prosecutions and the 
dangers of conflicting decisions should be avoided through systematic consultations 
between the Commission and the competent national authorities. 
Concerning state aids, the year 1974 was marked by continuing activity on matters 
already initiated while action was also taken in new fields. 
As regards the general regional aid systems, of which the control and coordination 
constitute an essential element for the proper functioning of the Common Market, 
the work designed ·to lead to a new coordination solution was actively pursued. 
In spite of certain difficulties the Commission has succeeded in drafting the new 
solution which takes into account the individual circumstances of each of the large. 
regions, or large groups of regions, of the Community. 
The Commission also pursued the action it had begun in regard to general aid schemes' 
in order to ensure that all applications of such schemes be sent to it for examination 
and so that it could eliminate the negative effects that these might have in certain cases 
,-
, \ 
on the Common Market. . \ 
As regards new areas, considering that protection of the environment should be 
considered a priority objective for the Community, the Commission, faced by a 
multiplication of state aids designed to facilitate the adaptation of undertakings to 
the new requirements demanded by t~is protection, has considered the guidelines it 
will apply to these aids in the examination that will be made in the light of Article 92 
et seq. Adherence to these guidelines by Member States will/allow these initiatives to 
achieve their objectives without distorting trade or competition within the Community 
in a manner contrary to the common interest. 
Finally, it should be recalled once more that for some months the Community has 
been faced with the most serious economic and structural problems since its founda-
tion. The Commission accepts, as it is allowed to by the Treaty, that in certain cases 
where grave conjunctural problems exist, temporary aids may be given to ~afeguard 
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employment. However, it is necessary to remember that in certain firms or industrial 
sectors these conjunctural difficulties are the result of fundamental problems which in 
certain cases will sooner or later call for restructuring or redeployment. For the, 
Community rapidly to overcome these problems, the provisions of the Treaty as 
regards the aids that Member States grant must fulfil their task which is both to 
preserve an effective competition system and to encourage as far as possible -an 
orderly evolution of industrial and commercial structures within the Community. 
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Chapter I 
, 
\ 
Main developments in the 
Comm unity's policy 
§ 1 - Work relating to rising prices 
1." All Community countries have continued to be seriously affected by price rises. 
The Council Resolution of 17 December 197Y had in this 'context called for coopera-
tion between the Commission and Member States to adopt a number of measures to 
curb increases in prices. 
2. In the field of competition, the Commission accordingly set itself the task of 
examining cases of high price disparities, with the aim of applying the Treaty competi-
tion rules in appropriate situations. While it is more usual for investigations into a 
p~ssible breach of rules to be triggered off by some initial evidence of infri~gement, 
the work now in progress involves an analysis of symptoms to establish inferentially, 
and by taking other relevant causes into account, if and to what extent high prices are 
partly referable to non-compliance with the competition rul~s. In these circumstances, 
it is ,plausible to look into branches in which enterprises tend to have a high degree 
of price autonomy and where privately administered prices are likely to prevail in the 
. absence of effective competition. It is recalled that in relation to Article 86 the 
European Court of Justice has had occasion to rule that, while high price disparities 
do not necessarily p~rmit a finding of abuse in the case of a dominant position, they 
can, in the absence of objectively justifiable reasons, be a decisive pointer to an abuse.2 
. " 
3. ~y way of pilot survey, the Commission chose an approach of identifying, from 
numerous diverse types of products and services, such identical or closely similar 
products which are made or marketed in relatively highly concentrated product 
branches and which are retailed at high price disparities in different Member States. 
This approach has to allow for explicable and justifiably different characteristics as 
between Member States which may have a disparate impact on prices, such as differen-
tial tax ..rates, varying consumer behaviour and unlike distribution methods. 
1 OJ C,116 of 29.12.1973, p. 22; Third Report on Competition Policy, point 17. 
2 Judgments: 8.6.1971, Case 78/70, DGG/Metro and 18.2.1971, Case 40/70, SIRENA/EDA:_ 
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4. Follpwing consultation with price experts of the Member States1 the list of the 
products and services under review was reduced in successive stages to that shown in 
Tables 1 and 2. . 
5. Apart from high price disparities and relatively high concentration of product 
branth, the criteria of selection also included an assumed comparable demand 
pattern as between Member States and general strong public appeal of the products 
concerned. 
TABLE 1 
Prices of selected products sold in Member States - October 1973 
A - Prices inclusive of Value Added Tax 
Coefficient Prices in Bfrs 
Product of Variation I I 1 I I 1 I % G F I N B L UK D 
Paper tissues 32 15.57 30.05 29.90 18.85 18.40 15.44 .. .. 
Motor oil 35 199.48 114.59 192.67 127.62 102.50 92.00 81.75 112.36 
Toothpaste 29 34.00 16.56 29.75 26.83 19.00 15.77 28.03 .. 
Motor batteries 14 1524.79 . . 1794.79 1232.72 1604.33 1434.50 .. 1808.99 
Toilet soap 15 20.85 14.63 12.87 15.81 16.80 15.85 .. 16.95 
Electric bulbs 22 30.22 24.97 30.83 24.65 17.30 18.00 .. 24.40 
I 
B - Prices without Value Added Tax 
Coefficient Prices in Bfrs 
Product of \ Variation 
1 I I' I 1 1 I % G F I N B L UK D 
Paper tissues 28 14.03 25.04 26.70 16.25 15.59 14.04 .. .. 
Motor oil 32 179.71 97.44 172.03 122.71 86.86 83.64 81.75 97.70 
Toothpaste 29 30.63 13.80 26.56 23.13 16.10 14.34 25.48 .. 
Motor batteries 13 1373.68 .. 1602.49 1062.69 1359.60 1304.09 .. 1573.03 
Toilet soap 14 18.78 12.19 12.14 15.20 15.85 14.41 .. 14.74 
Electric bulbs 21 27.23 20.81 27.53 21.25 14.66 16.36 .. 21.22 
Source: SOEC findings and calculations made by Commission staff. 
1 In particular, two meetings were held in Brussels on 19.3.1974 and 30.7.1974. 
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TABLE 2 
Prices of selected products sold in Member States -'- October 1973 
A - Prices inclusive of Value Added Tax 
In comparison with the country in which the lowest price applied (X). 
the prices in other Member States were higher by ... % 
Product 
G I F I I I N I B I L I UK I D , , 
Paper tissues 1 95 94 22 19 X .. ., 
Motor oil 144 40 136 56 25 13 X 37 
Toothpaste 116 5 89 70 20 X 78 ., 
Motor batteries 24 .. 46 X 30 16 .. 47 
Toilet soap 62 14 X 23 31 23 .. 32 
Electric bulbs 75 44 78 42 X 4 .. 41 
, 
B - Prices without Value Added Tax 
In comparison with the country in which the lowest price applied 00. 
the prices in other Member States were higher by ••. % 
Product 
G I F I I I N I B I L I UK I D 
Paper tissues X 78 90 16 11 0 .. ., 
f 
Motor oil 120 19 110 50 6 2 X 20 
Toothpaste 122 X 92 68 17 4 85 -., 
Motor batteries 29 .. 51 X 28 23 .. 48 
Toilet soap 55 0 X 25 31 19 .. 21 
Electric bulbs 86 42 88 ' 45 X 12 .. 45 
Source: Table leA) and (B). 
6. The tables set out above contain price and price disparity data as of October 
1973. The prices in Table I (A) and (B) were converted into Belgian francs at the 
unit-of-account conversion rates ruling at that time. 1 They are weighted averages 
which take into account different characteristics of sales outlets as between location . 
(e.g. central urban and peripheral) and as between type (e.g. department stores and 
1 Rates of exchange: DM 0.066173; FF 0.114150; Lit 12.975300; PI 0.068953; B(L)frs 1.000000; 
£ 0.008563; Dkr 0.155750. Source: General Statistics. Monthly Statistics of the SOEC, 12/74 p. 81, 
Table 855. 
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specialist shops). The coefficient of variation expresses the average of relationships 
(shown as a percentage) between prices in individual Member States and the average 
of such prices in the Community; the higher the coefficient, the higher the price 
differences between Member States. Table 2(A) and (B), which draws comparisons 
between lowest-price countries and other Member States in terms of percentages, 
reflects the individual disparities more clearly. The particular listed products are all 
of specific brands and produced by manufacturers known to the Commissi<?n. 
7. While the above cases are not untypical, they are among the more striking in 
illustrating that some products are retailed at considerable price disparities between 
some Member States. Comparisons between respectively Table 1 (A) and (B) and 
between Table 2(A) and (B) suggest that the varying impact of Value Added Tax 
plays no substantial part. All available information points to the conclusion that 
significant price disparities remain to be examined after making due allowances for 
different distribution systems and for different special tax rates. While, for example 
in the case of motor oil, the incidence of particularly uneven national excise taxes in 
some Member States has a magnifying effect on the coefficient of variation, this effect 
can be regarded as marginal (the coefficient of variation, in this case, if based on 
prices from which special national excise taxes are excluded, would be 28, as compared 
with 35 and 32 respectively, as shown in Table 1 (A) and (B». 
8. Questions inevitably arise about the nature of any causes, influences or restraints 
which may be inhibiting inter-state trade from taking better advantage of ~gh 
disparities and, specifically, about a possible persistence of market division disciplines. 
The Commission is examining a number of these cases further along these lines. 
9. Apart from establishing a possible relevance of the Treaty competition rules to 
cases ofthe kind under review, the Commission sees a further objective of its work on 
prices in giving wide pUblicity to inter-Member State price disparities, in order to add 
impetus to cross-frontier buying in the Community. 
10. Independently of the work outlined above, the Commission is also considering 
other feasible methods of creating a deeper understanding on the part of consumers 
within the Community of time-to-time price levels and price disparities between 
Member States. Accordingly, the Commission and Member States are currently 
examining the practicality of organizing price surveys in specially selected and 
limited product areas and the possible publication of survey results, with a view to 
giving further incentive to inter-state buying in the cheapest Community markets. 
Any such surveys would be conducted and results would be published following con-
sultation and in cooperation with the authorities of affected Member States. The 
surveys in question would be intended to concern themselves with prices between 
manufacturers and dealers at different stages of production and distribution and also 
with actual selling prices charged to ultimate customers, and not with any other 
information which touches upon the internal costs or costing methods of enterprises. 
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§ 2 - The oil industry 
11. The shortage in supplies of crude oil and the resulting reduction in the availability 
of oil products, which had reached an acute stage at the end of 1973, continued into 
the early months of 1974. Uncertainty and instability continued to dominate the 
supply of crude oil as groupings of both producer and consumer nations pursued their 
varying proposals aimed at achieving, respectively, pricing and supply policies which 
would accommodate the continued demands of producer nations while restoring 
equilibrium to the energy sectors of the economies of consumer nations. 
12. The oil crisis has emphatically brought home the important role which the oil 
companies, and particularly the large multinational corporations, play in worldwide 
economies and commerce. At a national level, the governments of some Member 
States took the view that certain activities of some companies in the oil sector might, 
be at variance with their respective competition policies and instituted enquiries and, 
in some cases, legal proceedings. 
The differing attitudes of Member States to the introduction of regulations or less 
formal means of controlling supplies and prices rendered the situation more complex 
and tended to contribute to the possibility that supplies of oil products would be 
diverted to Member States where the absence of regulations imposing maximum 
prices for oil products opened up opportunities for higher profits from such trans-
actions. This possibility gave particular concern to the Commission because of the 
implication that in a situation of continued shortage of supplies, such a policy could 
be pursued to the disadvantage of other countries where controlled prices operateJ 
and to which such redirected supplies might otherwise have been destined, thus 
affecting trade and discriminating between Member States of the Community. 
13. Throughout the year certain parliamentary questions had reflected the concern 
which was being felt over the future of the smaller 'independent' oil firms and at the 
possibility of larger companies intentionally withholding supplies, or building up 
large stocks, with a view to reaping undue profits. As was announced in the Third 
Report on .competition Policy, 1 the Commission decided that the circumstances 
merited the opening of investigations into producers and dealers in the oil industry. 
14. In planning their programme of investigations, the Commission aimed to 
include companies concerned with the handling of oil and oil products at all levels 
within the Community, including members of large multinational groups with refine-
ries, independent distributors as well as small dealers. It was recognized that such a 
representative series of enquiries into a complex industry would necessitate many 
months but that this was inevitable if the enquiries were to be comprehensive. Some 
twenty investigations have been undertaken throughout the Member States and data 
obtained from these are being analysed and studied. The Commission's task is to 
1 Point IS. 
COMPo REP. 1974 
18 POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES 
examine the extent and quality of competition between the various types of firms 
serving the oil market within the Community and in particular to see whether the, 
comportment of any of the companies involved, especially during the period of crisis, 
amounted to an infringement of the rules of competition of the Treaty. 
This could occur, for example: if agreements or concerted practices were found to, 
exist or to have existed between undertakings which fixed purchase or selling prices, 
limited or controlled production or shared markets; if any firm or firms enjoying a 
dominant position abused that dominant position in any way; if, for example, any 
discrimination in respect of prices or supplies had been practised as between Member 
States or towards different purchasers. 
15. Mention was made above of 'independent' oil firms. These may be defined as 
firms, be they of small or medium size, whose turnover depends chiefly on the sale of 
oil products and who enjoy freedom of supply, outlets and prices (in conformity with 
any current national legislation); they have no legal links with the oil majors other 
than by such supply contracts as they may have concluded in the course of normal 
commercial practice and these will normally be of limited scope and of fixed duration. 
The incidence and role of such firms varies throughout the Community, and according 
to product. By way of indication however, independent firms are responsible for the 
distribution in France of about 21 % of light fuel oil, in Belgium it is 55% whilst in 
Italy it is as high as 90%. The individual shares of particular independent distributors 
in other countries and in respect of other oil products are generally modest but 
nevertheless the aggregate share of the independents in the total oil market probably 
approaches 20%. 
Apart from the general enquiry into the oil sector, the Commission followed up a 
number of specific complaints which it received from such independent firms. The 
tenor of these complaints was that the firms concerned, who over the years had built 
up their own distribution networks for oil products and had provided a valuable 
competitive element to the industry, had experienced extreme difficulties in obtaining 
supplies adequate to their needs and indeed had in some instances been refused sup-
plies by the larger companies to whom they had turned for delivery. Moreover, where 
, supplies of oil products had been made available to these independent firms, it was 
claimed that the prices asked had been so high that, taking into account the maximum 
retail prices which were in operation in certain Member States, no viable margin of 
profit remained. The independent firms concerned feared that a prolongation of such 
circumstances would end their existence. The Commission, after examining the 
details, has in one case sent statements of objections to seven large suppliers ip, the 
Netherlands on the grounds that they had abused their collective dominant position by 
refusing supplies of oil products to an independent network in that country and having 
charged prices which, in view of the maximum regulated prices in force, made it 
impossible for the independent complainant to carry on business in a normal fashion. 
This case is now pending. 
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16. Whether the supply of oil and oil products is stabilized for the future or whether 
one can expect alternating periods of shortage and of at least adequacy of supplies, 
in the Commission's view there remains a role for the independent distributors as 
well as for larger national and international firms in oil markets throughout the 
Community. Accordingly, the Commission will apply the means available to it under 
the Treaty to any restrictions on competition between these enterprises. 
§ 3 - The proposed regulation on the control of mergers 
17. In its Third Report on Competition Policy,l the Commission explained why it 
believed there was a need for more systematic Community control of large-scale 
mergers between undertakings and described the proposed regulation in detail. 
Having been consulted by the Council, Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee approved the Commission's proposal of 20 July 19732 by large majorities 
on votes taken respectively on 12 February3 and 28 February 1974.4 
In the course of the discussions preceding the two votes, the Commission stated that 
it was prepared to accept the following amendments: 
1. the inclusion of a provision whereby the competent authority would have to 
take account of competition on the world market when reviewing concentration 
cases (second subparagraph of Article 1 (1)); 
2. the inclusion under the provisions for compulsory notification of cases of the 
formation of joint subsidiaries by independent undertakings or groups of under-
takings which would otherwise have fallen within the exemption in Article 4(2); 
3. the replacement of 1 000 million units of account by 1 250 million as the threshold 
turnover above which mergers of undertakings in the distribution sector were to 
be subject to compulsory notification (Article 5 (2)). 
18. Discussion of the proposed regulation began within the Council Working 
Party on Economic Questions at its meetings on 14 June and 25 July 1974. The Council 
had to postpone a further meeting which was to take place towards the end of the 
year. The most controversial questions discussed at the meetings concerned possible 
problems of reconciling national industrial, social and regional policies with any 
decisions taken by Community authorities on individual concentrations. However, 
questions of consistency between national and Community measures are not confined 
to the area of competition policy and no insuperable difficulties have been encountered 
in the past. In any event, the fact that there could be possible divergences between. 
Community policy and the individual policies of Member States does not relieye the 
1 Points 22 to 38. 
2 OJ C 92 of 31.10.1973, p. 1. 
3 OJ C 23 of 8.3.1974, p. 19. 
4 OJ C 88 of 26.7.1974, p. 19. 
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Community of its obligation to take whatever action may be necessary for the Com-
munity as a whole. 
With regard to the specific issue of a parallel application of Community and national 
merger controls, a consensus of views is particularly important since significant social 
and other substantial interests could be at stake. The Commission's view is that while 
the Community should take proper account of national requirements, this should not 
be allowed to jeopardize the Treaty objectives of undistorted competition or of 
maintaining the institutional balance sought by the Treaty. 
§ 4 - Patent licensing agreements 
19. The assessment of patent licensing agreements under the Treaty rules calls upon 
a consideration of interests and issues which go beyond the field of competition policy. 
Patents conferred by national laws as incentives and rewards to inventors have tradi-
tionally created monopoly rights which restrict competition. Against this, the 
evolution of rules based on policies which underlie the establishment of the Com-
munity is designed to stimulate competition so as to achieve an integrated common 
market. It is the Commission's continuing concern to set standards for permitted 
licensing provisions which can reconcile a legitimate exercise of the monopoly rights 
conferred by patent grants with the requirements of a unified market. 
20. On a legal plane, the Commission faces the problems of definition exposed by 
the Court of Justice in its distinction between the existence of nationally protected 
industrial property rights, which is not to be affected by Community law, and the 
\ exercise of these rights, which can be subject to the Treaty rules.! Accordingly, any 
appraisal of particular patent licensing provisions requires prior differentiation 
between terms which are germane to the existence, and those which relate to the exer-
cise, of patent rights, in order to establish upon which provisions the Commission may 
properly rule. While the differentiation remains to be more fully worked out by future 
decisions of the Court, it is clear that patent licensing agreements are not automatically 
within Article 85(1) if the agreements simply confer rights to exploit patented inven-
tions against payment of royalties, but that questions of applicability of Article 85(1) 
arise if a grant is accompanied by terms which go beyond the need to ensure the 
existence of an industrial property right, or where the exercise of such right is found to 
be the object, means or consequence of a restrictive agreement. 2 
21. At a conference held in December, the Commission and government experts of 
Member States exchanged views on the following common types of patent licensing 
provisions: 
1 Case 78/70, DGG/Metro, Recueil de la jurisprudence de la Cour (hereafter 'Recueil') 1971, 
p.487. . 
2 Ibid. and Case 40/70, Sirena, Recueil1971, p. 69. 
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(a) Export restrictions; 
(b) Field-of-use restrictions; 
(c) Restrictions on duration of agreements; 
(d) Non-competition restrictions; 
(e) Quantitative output restrictions. 
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. 22. The most controversial of the above types of restriction are those which affect 
exports from one or more to other Member States, in view of their apparent incon-
sistency with the essential character of a unified Community market. 
23. The December meeting considered in particular restrictions designed to protect 
a licensor in his 'reserved' territory against direct imports made by one of his licensees 
and restrictions designed to protect a licensee in his ~reserved' territory against direct 
imports made by another licensee whose rights are derived from the same licensor. 
In this context, it should be noted that a licensor cannot in any circumstances protect 
his 'reserved' territory by binding his licensees to impose export restrictions· upon 
their customers. 1 
24. The question whether a licensor should be able by contract to prohibit licensees 
from rpaking direct imports into territories he wishes to reserve to himself can be 
approached from different premises which lead to conflicting conclusions. 
Views in favour of permitting export restrictions for the protection of a licensor's 
. territory rest mainly on grounds of preserving the attribute of patent rights as an 
, incentive to inventiveness and to licensing. If a patentee's rewards were reduced to 
unacc~ptable levels by exposing him to competition from his foreign licensees, he 
could be discouraged from granting licences altogether. In particular, small and 
medium-sized licensors should be protected against being 'swamped' by competition 
. from their more economically powerful licensees. Moreover, any considerable dis-
couragements to the granting of licences could induce large enterprises to retain their 
innovations and enter foreign markets themselves, rather than by licensing to dissem-
~nate innovations and to help the promotion of alternative production and marketing 
units. 
25. However, seen against the background that a licensor is in a position'to choose 
whether to grant licences or not, that licences are subject to royalties in his favour and 
that a licensor normally enjoys advantages in time and in cost when competing with 
1 Case 15/74, Centrafarm/Sterling Drug Inc. See point 61. 
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his licensees, it is open to doubt that an export restrictiqn should in these circumstances 
be regarded as essential for the protection of a licensor's property rights. Special 
concessions to licensors in particular circumstances could in any appropriate cases 
rank for consideration for exemption under Article 85(3). In principle, however, a 
reservation to a licensor of a defined area within the Community, possibly an area 
where price levels are highest, appears to create problems of conflict with the objectives 
of market unity. 
26. Views in support of permitting contractual restrictions to protect a licensee from 
direct imports into his territory from other licensees are generally based on the pro-
position that a licensee needs sole marketing rights in his territory in order to safeguard 
his investment in the initial promotion of production and sale. It is argued that, in the 
absence of such protection, there would be a disinclination to accept licences and 
that patentees would therefore be in danger oflosing their rewards. Any such particular 
situations can be considered for exemption under Article 85 (3). However, in cases of 
some important inventions, it has been practice for licensors to grant several concur-
rent non-exclusive licences without restrictions as to territory. Moreover, it is 
improbable that export prohibitions to protect licensees inter se can affect the existence 
of patent rights, since these are vested in patentees and are not the property rights of 
licensees. 
27. Patent infringement claims by licensors to protect their own or their licensees' 
reserved territories from imports of licensed products are subject to the jurisdiction 
of national courts on the effect of national patent rights, subject to preliminary ruling 
from the Court of Justice of the European Communities under Article 177 on any 
point of law raised in relation to such claims. Where in such cases the exercise of 
patent rights is not the object, means or consequence of a restrictive agreement, the 
competition rules do not apply. It appears however that the enforcement of such 
individual national patent rights may tend to promote fragmentation of the Com-
munity market, contrary to the Treaty provisions concerning the free movement of 
goods. 
Field-of-use restrictions 
28. When patented inventions are capable of use in different applications, a licensor 
may, in the Commission's view, normally limit a licence to a distinct field of use. In 
these circumstances, he may give several licences to different licensees for respectively 
different applications. It is, however, possible that Article 85(1) could bear on such 
cases in which a segregation of different fields of use is shown to be the result or 
means of implementing an agreement to eliminate competition between licensees or 
between the parties. 
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Restrictions on duration of agreements 
29. In the view of the, Commission, Article 85 (1) does not in principle touch upon 
the contractually fixed duration of a patent licence agreement, if this is for the life of a 
single licensed patent or a shorter term. 1 The question whether the duration of an 
agreement which covers more than one patent can be fixed beyond the life of the first 
to expire of licensed patents is still open. This is likely to involve consideration of the 
nature of the conditions of the agreement and the economic and technical importancy 
of the different licensed patents concerned. 
Non-competition restrictions 
30. A non-competition restriction could prevent a licensee from extending his 
product range and closely bind his future to that of a licensed patent. Consequently, 
a licensee so tied might have to go out of business when the licensed technology 
becomes obsolete. Non-competition prohibitions can have the effect of not only 
strengthening a monopoly position of a patentee, but also of weakening competition 
between manufacturers of substitute products. A licensee might no longer have 
worthwhile prospects in carrying out independent development. Accordingly, the 
Commission regards non-competition provisions as covered by Article 85(1). Possi-
bilities of exemption under Article 85(3) could only arise in special situations, 
particularly cases relating to specialization agreements. 
Quantitative output restrictions 
31. In the Commission's view, Article 85(1) applies to contractual obligations 
imposed on a licensee which restrict his production to specified quantities, since the 
normal result of such restrictions would be to prevent a licensee from increasing his 
output and to make him less effective as a competitor. It is also possible for such 
restrictions, if imposed on a number of licensees, to have similar effects as export bans. 
32. It appears from the foregoing that for any assessment under Article 85(1) the 
most problematical of provisions in patent licensing agreements concern export 
restrictions which affect trade between Member States. While, in the Commission's 
view, lasting rules are generally best evolved through decisions in individual cases, 
the Commission is also considering possibilities of approach by way of block exemp-
tion. For this, there remain 'the difficulties of arriving at appropriate criteria which are 
capable of reconciling some of the principal conflicting issues. 
1 In exceptional circumstances, it is, however, possible for Article 86 to apply to cases of abusively 
fixed short periods of duration. ' 
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§ 5 - Selective distribution 
33. The main problems relating to selective distribution in the motor vehicle and 
perfumes industries, consideration of which had begun in 1973,1 were on the agenda 
of a conference held with Government Experts on Restrictive Practices in September 
this year. The main lines suggested by the Commission were as follows: 
34. In the motor vehicle industry, the manufacturers generally select their dealers 
without employing predetermined and uniformly applied quantitative criteria. 
This method of selection should be regarded as a restriction of competition under 
Article 85(1), which however could exceptionally qualify for exemption under 
Article 85 (3) in the light of special economic and technical factors. A case for consid-
eration of exemption could particularly arise in circumstances in which dealers, apart 
from their functions as retailers, perform certain services which necessarily depend on 
constant close cooperation between producer and seller. A motor car is an expensive 
product of great technical complexity which needs repair services; constant checks are 
therefore necessary. The requisite after-sales service must be of high quality, not only 
in order to satisfy the individual interests of each driver in the proper functioning of 
his vehicle, but also, as a matter of general public interest, in order to ensure road 
safety and environmental protection. The quality of this service is best assured when 
manufacturer and seller have a close relationship of mutual confidence and could be 
difficult to achieve if manufacturers had to maintain trading relations with an excessive 
number of dealers. In this context the need for continuous exchanges of information 
is important. A dealer should be in a position to benefit from the manufacturer's 
most up-to-date techniques and at the same time, a manufacturer should be in a 
position to be informed of technical problems which come up in the course of 
servicing and repair, with a view to applying quick solutions. These advantages are 
also in some considerable measure in the interest of consumers. 
Such favourable results of selective distribution might not be achieved in the same 
measure or with equal chances of success by means such as general servicing instruc-
tions issued by manufacturers to purchasers. 
35. Examination of selective distribution systems in the luxury perfumes industry 
showed that most perfume manufacturers organize their distribution networks in the 
EEC in similar manner. The sales patterns are based, on the one hand, on exclusive 
franchise contracts between manufacturers and their general agents in individual EEC 
countries and, on the other hand, on distribution contracts entered into by the 
manufacturers themselves, or alternatively by their general agents, with retailers in 
their respective territories. In these sales patterns there is no wholesale stage and only 
a limited number of approved retailers. These are chosen not only on the basis of 
1 Third Report on Competition Policy, points 7 to 12. 
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qualitative selection criteria, such as their professional qualifications and those of 
their staff, the dlass and siting of their shops. but also on quantitative criteria whose 
aim is to adapt the number of approved sales outlets to the size and purchasing power 
of a particular town or region. 
Concerning the compatibility of these selective distribution systems with Article 85, 
the Commission reached the conclusion that the luxury character of a product could 
not in itself be regarded as an adequate ground for exemption under Article 85(3). 
A more flexible attitude could however be considered under Article 85(1) in view of 
the special nature of the market in 'perfumes and beauty and toiletry products in the 
EEC, such as the large number of competing undertakings of similar size, each with a 
relatively small marketshare. 
Accordingly, the Commission felt that it need not intervene in respect of the selection 
of sales outlets in this sector, provided that all restrictions which could result in market 
fragmentation were removed. Consequently, the patterns of selective distribution 
systems in the perfumes industry will no longer be such as to maintain state-to-state 
consumer price differences for the same product. As long as the relevant enterprises 
take this approach, a general uniform solution for the whole industry can be adopted. 
,36. The Commission gave practical form to these general points in a Decision on the 
German distribution system applied by BMW and in the settlement of tHe cases 
involving the Dior and Lanc6me undertakings. 1 
§ 6 - Joint ventures 
37.' A joint venture is generally defined as an enterprise subject to joint control by 
two 'or more undertakings which are economically independent of each other. Joint 
ventures can pose problems in relation to decisions to what extent respectively the 
rules on restrictive practices or those on mergers apply. 
Cases in which problems can arise are generally those in which joint ventures operate 
as genuine economic entities for the purpose of producing or distributing goods or 
services, with the likely effect of inducing the controlling undertakings to adopt a 
policy of mutual non-competition by reasons of the actual creation or management 
of a joint venture. 
'38. Article 85 is clearly applicable to joint arrangements which, however these may 
be referred to by the parties, amount to cooperation agreements in given areas and 
which take forms recognized by company law or which have the effect of creating a 
joint company. The Commission has so far given decisions in ten such cases: a 
limited company with a variable share capital under French law for the joint opening 
up of export markets (Alliance des constructeurs fran9ais des machines-outils); a 
limited company under French law for the investigation of foreign sources of supply 
1 Points 86 and 93. 
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of food and other products (SOCEMAS); a cooperative company under Belgian law, 
responsible for sales in Belgium and in non-Community countries (COBELAZ); 
a limited company under French law for sales in France and in non-Community 
countries (Comptoir francais de l'azote); a limited company under Italian law 
responsible for sales in Italy and in non-Community countries (SElF A); a limited 
company under French law responsible for exports to non-Community countries 
(SUPEXIE); a company under German civil law empowered to take decisions on 
cartel rebates (Interessengemeinschaft der deutschen Keramischen Wand- und 
Bodenfliessenwerke); a limited company under French law responsible for exports 
(SAFCO); a limited company under Swiss law for joint development (HENKEL-
COLGATE); a limited company under Netherlands law responsible for joint sales 
(Nederlandse Cement Handelmaatschappij NV). 
Numerous decisions under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty have had the same effect 
where they authorized coal or steel undertakings to establish joint sales agencies .. 
39. In its 1966 memorandum on the problem of concentration in the common 
market, l the Commission stated, particularly in relation to joint ventures, that careful 
attention should be paid to whether the parties concerned were applying agreements 
or concerted practices, especially in cases in which economically independent under-
takings remained in the market following a concentration. In other words, where the 
formation of a joint venture amounts to a concentration between each of the parties 
and the new undertaking, without the founding parties being concentrated as between 
each other, the latter may end up by regulating their conduct in accordance with 
policy lines jointly determined in the interest of the operation of the new joint venture. 
Even in the absence of particularized agreements or concerted practices, it can be 
assumed that restrictive arrangements are more likely to be made in cases in which the 
parties involved are in effect competitors. A restrictive effect which could in such 
circumstances jeopardize the economic independence of the parties is also referred 
to as 'group effect'. 
40. When undertakings transfer all their assets to a joint venture and become 
management holding companies, they lose their economic independence. Such 
operations amount to total integration and must be regarded as concentrations. The 
Commission has already expressed views to this effect in relation to the Afga-
Gevaert and Dunlop-Pirelli operations (formation of a series of joint ventures of 
different nationalities by total transfers of assets). 
41. In its recent decision giving negative clearance in the case of SHY and Chevron,2 
. the Commission took the same view in circumstances of a partial integration, where 
the parties retained their own economic activities, although not in the same fields as 
1 Competition series, Study No 3 (Brussels, 1966) Part III, paragraphs 14 and 15. 
2 Point 114. 
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their joint ventures. The parent companies took the form of holding companies after 
transferring to the joint ventures their distribution networks, that is to say, the 
necessary infrastructure for the supply of the relevant product. They thereby lost 
their economic independence on the markets concerned, where they could subsequently 
act only through their joint subsidiaries, which had been created through transfers of 
assets needed for their operations. 
It will however always be difficult to assess a creation of joint ventures which effect a 
partial integration, and a uniform approach cannot necessarily be taken .in all such 
cases. The importance of the relevant undertakings and of their markets, the economic 
significance of the integrated activity as compared with the residual activities of the 
founding parties, the nature of the market structures, the general context of the 
relations between the parties in such transactions will all have to be assessed from case 
to case so as to decide whether there is in fact a concentration or restrictive agreement. 
42. A number of decisions have been taken under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty 
in'relation to undertakings which have become joint ventures following the establish-
ment of joint control or joint formations. 
From its experience in such cases, the Commission has concluded that, in heavy 
industries, where investment expenditure is considerable, the joint formation of a 
major production unit may not be covered by the rules on concentration as long as the 
new joint production capacity remains below the capacity of each founding party and 
as long as the joint production or joint products are sold separately by the sales 
departments of each of the parties. The recent Thyssen-Solmer decision is an illustra-
tion of this. 1 
A number of pending cases raise problems relating to joint ventures. The Commission 
will therefore be able to continue to develop its approach to these issues. ' 
§ 7 - Relationship between the competition rules in Community law 
and in the laws of the Member States 
43. This question was examined in 1974 in collaboration with national experts on 
restrictive practices. Discussion centred on practicai methods of avoiding conflict" 
between national and Community competition law. 
The danger of conflict arises from the fact that Community and national rules on 
restrictive practices may overlap in both their territorial and their substantive fields 
of application. Where both Community and national rules are applicable to the same 
set of circumstances, differences can arise from the way in which the law is applied. 
These may derive from the dissimilar ways in which matters of fact and of law are 
approached by the various authorities required to take decisions, and also from dif-
ferences between the applicable legal systems. The fact that the different legal systems 
1 Point 121. 
COMPo REP. 1974 
28 POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES 
may in certain respects pursue different objectives is not enough of itself to preclude 
conflicts. In a judgment handed down on 13 February 1969 in Case 14/681 the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities confirmed this in the following terms: 
'Community restrictive practices law and national restrictive practices laws do not 
approach these practices from the same angle. Article 85 poses the question 
whether a restrictive practice may affect trade between Member States, whereas 
each of the national sets of legal requirements is based on policy considerations 
which are particular to the country concerned and assesses restrictive practices on 
the basis of these considerations only. Yet the economic circumstances and legal 
situations involved in individual cases may be very closely related; thus the 
distinction between the Community and the national aspects of a case is not 
always a relevant criterion for deciding who should have jurisdiction. ' 
, Solution to conflict situations under the law as it stands 
44. Under the law as it now stands conflict situations must be resolved on the basis 
of the general legal principles of Community law. The judgment handed down by the 
Court ofJustice on 13 February 1969 simplifies matters in so far as it outlines the kind 
of case where conflict arises and indicates possible ways of resolving it. 
In the Court's view, there is a conflict where application of national law would stand 
'in the way of the unimpeded and uniform application of Articles 85 and 86 of the 
EEC Treaty or would reduce the effectiveness of measures taken or to be taken for 
the implementation of these Articles. In such cases the conflict is resolved by applica-
tion of the principle that Community law prevails. This principle, taken together with 
Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, means that the Member States must refrain from taking 
or must revoke any measures which might have the effects referred to above. 
This obligation arises from the general concept of the Community legal order: 
'It would not be compatible with the nature of this legal system to allow the 
Member States to adopt or maintain measures which might impede the practical 
effectiveness of the Treaty. The force of the Treaty and of implementing measures 
must not differ from State to State because of the varying effect on them of 
national measures; otherwise the operation of the Community system would be 
impaired and the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty would be jeopardized. ,2 
The competition rules are of particular importance for the attainment of the objectives 
of the Treaty: 
'Article 85 of the EEC Treaty applies to all undertakings in business in the 
Community; it regulates their conduct partly through the prohibitions contained 
in it and partly by exempting, subject to specified conditions, such restrictive 
practices as contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
1 Recueil 1969, p. 13. 
2 Court of Justice, Recueill969, p. 14 (point 6); cf. Judgment of 15.7.1964 in Case 6/64, COSTA v 
ENEL: Recueil 1964, p. 1149. . 
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promoting te9hnical or economic progress. In this way the Treaty seeks, as a 
primary objective, to remove obstacles to the free movement of goods in the 
common market and to strengthen and guarantee the unity of this, market; 
however, it also allows Community authorities to take positive although indirect 
action to promote harmonious development of economic life within the Com-
munity as called for by Article 2 of the Treaty.'1 
45. It is the Commission's view that the points made in these two paragraphs should 
serve also as the key criteria for resolving conflicts. The scope of a Community rule 
or decision should therefore be examined in terms of its function. Here a distinction 
must be made between directly applicable prohibitions under Articles 85(1) and 86 
and exemptions from the ban on restrictive practices granted under Article 85 (3). 
The objective of the prohibitions in Articles 85 (1) and 86 is to guarantee the unity of 
the common market and the preservation of undistorted competition on that market. 
To this end, the Treaty provides for direct applicability of these c1aus~s. They must be 
strictly complied with, if the functioning of the Community regime is not to be 
endangered. For this reason, Member ~tates are required to abstain from any measure 
which might jeopardize either the full and uniform application of the prohibitions 
throughout the common market, or the effectiveness of measures taken or to be taken 
in implementation of the prohibitions. 
On the other hand, national authorities are free to apply their national laws along the 
same lines as Community law is applied, although the application of this rule is to 
some extent restricted by the general equitable principle that the same offence ought 
not to be penalized twice. Even so, the possibility of double penalization does not 
prevent parallel proceedings, one by the Commission under Community law and the 
other by national authorities under domestic law: but it does mean that the authority 
taking the later, decision should take account of any penalty imposed in earlier 
proceedings when deciding what penalty, if any, to impose itself. 2 If Community and 
national sanctions are dealt with in this reciprocal way, it will usually be possible to 
reconcile the need to avoid double sanctions with the principle of full and uniform 
application of Community law. 
The primacy of Community law is equally valid as a principle in relation to exemp-
tions from the ban on restrictive practices granted pursuant to Article 85(3). In the 
judgment of 13 February 1969, the Court rejected the argument that exemption, by 
the Commission withdraws only the Community barrier to a restrictive practice under 
Article 85(1), leaving unimpaired the national authority's power to prohibit such a 
practice under its own law (double barrier theory). 
This is in accordance with the principle that the provisions of Article 85 must be seen as 
a whole and therefore applied as uniformly as possible. 
1 Judgment of l3.2.1969 in Case 14/68, Recueil 1969, p. 14 (point 5). 
2. Court of Justice, Ju4gment of l3.2.1969 - Case 14/68, Recueill969, p. 15 (points 10 and 11). 
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Even so the Court's judgment of 13 February 1969 leaves open the question whether 
the primacy of Community exemptions constitutes a strict rule, or whether it should 
be regarded rather as a flexible principle in the application of which it is permissible 
to take account of the respective interests of the Community and of Member States. 
Possible methods of preventing conflicts from arising 
46. The Court's judgment in Case 14/68 shows how conflicts can be avoided or 
overcome in practice. 
'- In a case where a national decision regarding a restrictive practice would be 
incompatible with a decision adopted by the Commission upon the conclusion of 
proceedings initiated by it, the national authorities are required to respect the 
effects of the Commission decision. 
- In cases in which, during national proceedings, it appears possible that the 
decision whereby the Commission will put an end to proceedings in progress 
concerning the same restrictive practice, may conflict with the effects of the , 
decision of the national authorities, it is for the latter to take the appropriate 
measures. ' 1 
In the first example, the national authority must ensure that the decision to be taken 
under national law will not prevent the Community decision from being fully effective 
both in law and in practice. This does not mean that the national law may not be 
applied, but only that national measures which are incompatible with the Commission 
decision may not be taken. 
In the second example, the Court of Justice assumes that proceedings in respect of a 
restrictive practice are being conducted in parallel under national and Community 
law, but that neither has yet resulted in a final decision. In such a case national authori-
ties must 'take the appropriate measures' to avoid conflict between the decision they 
propose to take and the decision which the Commission is expected to take. The 
Court does not state what measures might be considered here; this is a question 
requiring an interpretation of Article 5(2) of the EEC Treaty. The following are the 
two most likely solutions: 
- Suspension of national proceedings until the Commission has given its decision. 
This would enable the national authorities to wait until they have received the 
Commission's decision and then align the decision which they are to take under 
national law with the decision taken under Community law. 
- Consultation with the Commission before adopting the national decision. 
This would establish obligations for the authorities of the Member States similar 
to those incumbent upon the Commission under Article 10 of Regulation No 17. 
An essential function of the consultation would be the mutual provision of 
. detailed information on content and scope of the decisions which are expected to 
1 Judgment of 13.2.1969, Case 14/68, Recueil 1969, p. 14 (points 7 and 8). 
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be taken. The authorities of the Member States would thus be in a position to 
take account of the Commission's views without having to wait until the Commis-
sion had actually adopted a decision. / 
Both solutions would help to avoid conflict. The Member States would retain discre-
tion to decide which of the two alternatives to select. 
The legal obligation for national authorities to respect the primacy of Community 
law also applies, however, where an earlier decision of the national authorities 
subsequently turns out to be incompatible with Articles 85 or 86. Here the primacy of 
Community law can be upheld only at the cost of legal and practical difficulties. So 
long as the national proceedings have not reached a final legal conclusion, it should not 
be too difficult to take account of a subsequent Commission decision. If, on the other 
hand, the decision of the national authority has already acquired legal force, there 
will be considerable difficulty in overcoming the conflict. 
It is for this reason that it would be desirable, where consultation with the Commis-
sion has not completely eliminated the danger of conflict, for national authorities to 
keep their proceedings open until the Commission has taken its decision. 
47. The Commission and the Governments of the Member States feel that it is not 
necessary at present to adopt a resolution pursuant to Article 87(2)(e) of the EEC 
Treaty defining more precisely the relationship between the Community competition 
rules and the national legal provisions. Instead, it seems more appropriate to improve 
the exchange of information between the relevant national authorities and the 
Commission, to proceed to mutual consultation where both Community and national 
competition laws apply, and generally to reduce the risks of conflict in individual 
cases by improving harmonization of national and Community policies on competi-
tion. In collaboration with the Member States, the Commission will work out rules 
designed to achieve this objective. 
§ 8 - Limitation periods 
48. On 26 November 1974, the Council adopted Regulation (EEC) No 2988/74 
concerning limitation periods in proceedings and the enforcement of sanctions under 
the rules of the European Economic Community relating to transport and competi-
tion.! This Regulation, which entered into force on 1 January 1975, fills a gap in 
Community law, since the EEC rules on transport and competition give the Com-
mission the power to impose fines on undertakings and associations of undertakings 
for infringement of the rules, but do not provide for any limitation period. The Court 
of Justice, endorsing the Commission's view, held that no specific Community rules on 
1 OJ L 319 of 20.11.1974, p. 1; the text of the Regulation is given in the Annex. 
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limitation periods could be inferred from the legal systems of the Member States, and 
that the problem should be solved by Community legislation. 1 
With the adoption of Regulation (EEC) No 2988/74 the Council fulfilled this legis-
lative task. The Regulation sets a time limit to the Commission's power to impose 
fines (limitation periods in proceedings). Similar limitations will apply in future to the 
enforced collection of fines and to periodic penalty payments (limitation period for the 
enforcement of sanctions). The Regulation specifies the limitation periods which are 
to be applied, the time when periods begin to run and the actions which interrupt or 
suspend the running of the periods. 
49. The Council's solution meets the major requirement of ensuring legal certainty 
without impairing the effectiveness of actions against infringements. The provisions 
of the Regulation aim to achieve an appropriate balance between the individual 
interests of the undertakings concerned and the general interest that Community 
law should be complied with. 
This aim is particularly reflected in the provisions governing limitation periods in 
proceedings: 
1. The limitation periods have been fixed according to the nature and seriousness of 
the infringements and in accordance with the requirements of administrative 
practice. The Regulation provides that infringements in respect of information 
supply and investigations are subject to a limitation period of three years and 
infringements against substantive rules to a limitation period of five years. 
2. The provisions governing the commencement of limitation periods are based on 
the general principle that the benefit of the limitation rules can be claimed only in 
respect of infringements which are no longer being committed. In order to take 
account of the differing types of infringement, the Regulation provides that the 
limitation period will begin to run on the day on which the infringement is 
committed but that, in the case of continuing or repeated infringements, the 
limitation period will begin to run on the day on which the infringement ceases. 
3. In order to ensure the effective prosecution of infringements, the Regulation 
further provides that any measure taken for the purpose of preliminary investiga-
tions or proceedings in respect of infringements will interrupt the limitation 
period as soon as the measure is notified, at least to one of the parties concerned. 
The interruption of the limitation period applies to all undertakings or associations 
of undertakings involved in a particular infringement. However, the Commission 
can impose fines only within a period not exceeding twice the original limitation 
period. This provision is to protect undertakings from inordinately protracted 
proceedings, and is to be an incentive to the Commission to expedite its work. 
1 Second Report on Competition Policy, 1972, point 24. 
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4. The Re~lation finally provides that the limitation period in proceedings will be 
suspended for as long as a Commission decision is the subjeCt of proceedings ' 
pending before the Court of Justice of the European Communities. This provision 
is to ensure that the Commission can resume proceedings in respect of an infringe-
ment, ifits original decision to impose a fine is set aside by the Court of Justice for 
procedural reasons. It is based on the general legal principle that the parties 
concerned should not' benefit from prescription rules in respect of periods for 
which the authority responsible for instituting proceedings is prevented from 
taking action for justifiable reasons and on grounds beyond its control. 
The rules governing limitation periods for the enforcement of sanctions follow the 
same principles. However, the essentials of the enforcement procedure as governed by, 
,Article 192 of the EEC Treaty are clearly set out in the Regulation: 
1. The limitation period is to be five years. 
2. Time begins to run on the day on which a decision becomes final. 
3. The limitation period is interrupted by any decision which varies the original 
amount of a fine or of periodic penalty payments or which declines to grant such 
variation, and any action taken to enforce payment. 
4. The limitation period for the enforcement of sanctions is suspended for so long 
as time to pay is allowed or enforcement of payment is suspended pursuant to 
a decision of the Court 'of Justice. 
50. Seen as a whole, the Regulation concerning limitation periods is based on 
principles underlying the laws of the Member States. However, in view of the dif-
ferences between national rules on limitation periods and in view of the special 
features of Community rules on the enforcement of decisions, the Commission and the 
Council had to find new solutions to some aspects of the problems. Regulation (EEC) 
No 2988/74 is therefore a new measure in its own right. 
The Regulation will apply only in respect of EEC rules relating to transport and 
competition. However, the new provisions are framed in such a way that they can 
serve as a model for other areas of Community law. Working from the principle of 
Regulation (EEC) No 2988/74, the Commission is shortly to draw up rules on 
limitation periods in proceedings and for the enforcement of sanctions under the 
ECSC Treaty. 
§ 9 - Court of Justice case-Iaw l 
51. In 1974 the Court of Justice handed down a number of important judgments on: 
- the applicability of Article 85 to members of the same corporate group and to the 
1 Eighth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities, Chapter VII: Community 
Law, points 478 and 480 to 488. 
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combined effect of an exclusive dealing agreement and of national legislation 
relating to certificates of authenticity; 
- the applicability of Article 86 to the exploitation of copyrights and to a refusal to 
supply, and the applicability of Article 86 within the framework of Article 90; 
- the procedure to be followed in attaching conditions and obligations to exemption 
decisions, the powers of national courts as regards application of Articles 85 and 
86, and the adoption of interim measures of protection in the case of concentra-
tions which require the Commission's prior consent; 
- the exercise of industrial property rights. 
Applicability of Article 85 
52. In a judgment delivered on 31 October! the Court stated that Article 85 is not 
concerned with agreements or concerted practices between undertakings belonging 
to the same corporate group and having the relationship of parent company and 
subsidiary, if the undertakings form an economic unit within which the subsidiary has 
no real freedom to determine its course of action on the market, and if the agreements 
or practices are concerned merely with the internal distribution of work as between the 
undertakings. 
The Court thus confirmed the line already taken both by the Commission in 
Christi ani & Nielsen and Kodak cases and by the Court itself in Beguelin (Case 22/71 V 
However, in the Commission's view, this does not exempt from the prohibition in 
Article 85(1) agreements concluded within a corporate group if they have wider 
implications, for instance agreements which restrict the scope for non-member 
undertakings to penetrate a given market. 
53. Any assessment of exclusive dealing agreements, and particularly of their effects 
on parallel imports, in relation to Article 85 of the Treaty, must take account of the 
Community's judgment of 11 July 1974.3 Here the Court held that the fact that an 
agreement merely authorizes the dealer to make use of a national law relating to 
certificates of authenticity in order to prevent parallel imports does not suffice in 
, itself to render the agreement null and void. However, an exclusive dealing agreement 
may be caught by Article 85 if the dealer is able to prevent parallel imports by means 
of the combined effects of the agreement and of a national law requiring authenticity 
to be proved exclusively in the manner which it specifies. For this purpose it is neces-
sary to consider not merely the terms of the agreement itself but also its legal and 
1 Case 15/74 (Centrafarm and De Peijper v Sterling Drug Inc.). 
2 Commission Decisions of 18.6.1969: OJ 165 of5.7.1969, p. 12 (Christiani & Nielsen); and 30.6.1970, 
OJ L 147 of 7.7.1970, p. 24 (Kodak); Judgment of 25.11.1971 in Case 22/71 (Beguelin Import Co): 
Recueil 1971, p. 949. First Report on Competition Policy, point 5. 
3 Case 8/74 (procureur du Roi v Benoit and Gustave Dassonville), European Court Reports (here-
after [E.C.R.]) 1974, p. 837. 
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commercial context ihcluding, in particular, the question whether there are any 
agreements concluded between the same manufacturer and dealers established in 
other Member States. 
This jUdgment extends the Court's finding in its judgment of 25 November 1971 1 to 
the effect that an exclusive dealing agreement is caught by Article 85 where the dealer 
is in a position to prevent parallel imports from other Member States into his territory 
as a result of the combined effects of the agreement and of national laws relating to 
unfair competition. 
Applicability of Article 86 
54. In its judgment of 21 March 19742 ' the Court, dealing with a copyright 
dispute, gave an example of an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of 
Article 86 of the Treaty. Such an abuse can consist in the fact that an undertaking 
entrusted with the exploitation of copyrights and occupying a dominant position 
within the meaning of Article 86 imposes on its members obligations which are not 
absolutely necessary for the attainment of its object and which thus encroach unfairly 
upon the members' freedom to exercise their copyrights. A compulsory assignment of 
all copyrights, both present and future, no distinction being drawn between the dif-
ferent generally accepted types of exploitation, may appear an unfair condition for 
the purposes of alternative (a) of the second paragraph of Article 86. In the same judg-
ment the court also ruled that Belgium is a substantial part of the common market 
within the meaning of Article 86. 
The Commission regards this judgment as confirmation of the line which it took in 
1971 in relation to Gema's management of copyrights and which it maintained in 
1974 as against Sacem and Sabam,3 particularly as regards the applicability of 
Article 86 to internal relations between societies of this type and their members. 
55. In its judgment of 6 March,4 the Court confirmed a number of new principles 
established by the Commission. The Court stated that an undertaking enjoying a 
dominant position as regards the production of a raw material and therefore able 
to control its supply to producers of products manufactured from that material, 
cannot refuse to supply a customer which is itself a manufacturer of these products with 
the effect of eliminating all competition from that customer. In this case a monopoly 
(a company and its subsidiary regarded as a single undertaking) had decided to begin 
1 Case 22/71 (Beguelin Import Co): [19711 Recuei1949. See also First Report on Competition Policy, 
point 47. 
2 Case 127/74 (BRT v Sabam, BRT Il): [1974] E.C.R. 313. 
3 Commission Decision of 2.6.1971: OJ L 134 of 20.6.1971, p. 15; see point 112. 
4 Cases 6 and 7/73 (Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corporation 
v Commission): {19741 E.C.R. 223. 
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production of the manufactured products and to become a competitor of the pro-
ducer, itself a customer of the monopoly and one of the main producers in the common 
market of certain drugs used to treat tuberculosis. The Court held that the monopoly 
had abused its dominant position within the meaning of Article 86. It accepted that in 
relation to their customers the two companies in question were to be considered as a 
single economic unit and that they were jointly and severally responsible for the 
conduct complained of. 
Further, the Court decided that as well as covering abuses which may directly pre-
judice consumers, Article 86 also covers abuses which indirectly prejudice them by 
impairing the effectiveness of a competitive structure in the common market. If an 
undertaking in a dominant position abuses its position in such a way that a competitor in the common market is likely to be eliminated and if that elimination will have 
repercussions .on the competitive structure, it is immaterial (for the purpose of 
establishing whether trade between Member States is affected) whether the conduct 
relates to the competitor's exports or to its trade within the common market. 
The judgment also confirmed the line taken by the Commission, which, having estab-
lished that there was a refusal to supply contrary to Article 86, ordered certain 
quantities of products to be supplied as an immediate palliative in addition to 
requiring proposals to be presented for preventing the abuse from recurring. The 
application by the Commission of Regulation No 1.7 Article 3 may take various forms 
according to the nature of the infringement in question and may include an order to 
execute certain measures or provide certain advantages which have been wrongly 
withheld as well as prohibiting the continuation of certain actions or practices. 
56. In Case 155/73,1 the questions put by the Italianjudge on the rules of competition 
led the Court to declare, on the basis of a joint reading of Articles 86 and 90 of the 
EEC Treaty, that the fact that an undertaking to which a Member State grants 
exclusive rights enjoys a monopoly is not as such incompatible with Article 86. In 
tele-{.ision in general, and in cable television in particular, the Member States are free 
to confer or extend such exclusive rights on grounds of public interest, of a non-
economic nature. However such undertakings remain subject to the rules against 
discrimination and, as regards their commercial activities, to Article 90(1). By 
virtue of Article 90(2), the same rules apply in the case of television companies which 
Member States organize, even as regards their commercial activities and especially 
their advertising business, in the' form of 'undertakings entrusted with the operation 
of services of general economic interest' within the meaning of that pa~agraph, 
unless it is shown that those rules would be incompatible with the exercise of the 
duties entrusted to the undertakings. 
At the same time the Court noted that even within the framework of Article 90, the 
rules of Al ticle 86 are directly applicable, and confer rights on firms and individuals 
1 Judgment of 30.4.1974 (Sacchi): [1974] E.C.R. 409. 
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which national courts must uphold; the Commission' should also use its powers to 
remedy any abuses. 
This is what the Commission is doing in monitoring the market conduct of public 
undertakings and undertakings on which the Member States confer exclusive or 
special rights within the meaning of Article 90. 
Procedural matters 
57. In a judgment given on 23 October 1974,1 the Court clarified the procedure to be 
followed by the Commission in applying Article 85(3). The Court took the view that, 
in order to attach conditions or obligations to an exemption granted under 
Article 85 (3), the Commission must, before taking its decision, notify the facts and 
_ its intentions as to the conditions or obligations and give the firms concerned the 
. opportunity to present their views. Regulation No 99/63 applies the general rule that 
the addressee of a decision adopted by a public authority must, if his interests are 
liable to be affected to an appreciable extent by the decision, be given a proper 
opportunity to make his views known. 
In annulling the obligation imposed upon the members of the Transocean Marine 
Paint Association in the Commission's Decision of 21 December 1973, which in the 
Court's view was in breach of procedural requirements, the Court did noCsimply 
declare the obligation null and void but explicitly severed it from the -rest of the 
D~cision, annulled it and referred the case back to the Commission. 
The Commission has taken account of the Court's requirement, not only in its review 
of the case in question, but also in other pending cases where conditions or obligations 
were to be attached to exemption decisions. 
58. In a judgment of 30 January 1974,2 the Court again considered the expression 
'authorities of the Member States' in Article 9(3) of Regulation No 17.3 Articles 85 
, and 86 are directly applicable in relations between individuals, and these Articles 
therefore create rights for the individuals concerned which the national courts must 
uphold. So it is clear that, if this protection is to be ensured, the fact that in some of 
the States the expression 'authorities of the Member States' includes courts, cannot, 
debar a court before which the direct effect of Article 86 is pleaded from giving judg-
ment on the point; such a court may, if it, considers it necessary, stay the proceedings 
so as to await the outcome of any action taken by the Commission. On the other hand, 
it should generally allow proceedings before it to continue when it finds either that 
the conduct in dispute is manifestly not liable to have an appreciable effect on 
competition or on trade between Member States, or that there is no doubt as to the 
incompatibility of that conduct with Article 86. 
1 Case 17/74 (Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission). 
2 Case 127/73 (BRT v Sabam, BRT I): [1974] E.eR. 51. 
3 The Court only recently considered this question in its judgment of 6.2.1973 in Case 48/72 (Brasserie 
de Haecht v Wilkin Janssen): [1973] E.C.R. 77. 
COMPo REP. 1974 
I 
38 POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES 
This is an important judgment in that its main emphasis is on protecting the rights of 
individuals who seek to rely on Articles 85 and 86 before national courts. It proposes 
in effect that the national court should not stay proceedings pending the Commis-
sion's decision except in cases where it is doubtful whether the Community competi-
tion rules apply. Moreover, the judgment makes clear that the right of a national 
court in such a case to ask the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling is not affected 
by Article 9 of Regulation No 17. The Court thus resolved the doubts arising from 
its judgment of 18 March 1970.1 
This case-law should enable the Community rules of competition to be applied more 
extensively and on a more decentralized basis in all cases of restrictive agreements or 
abuse of dominant positions in respect of which Court rulings and the Commission's 
administrative practice have established clearly the present state of the law.2 
59. In two decisions3 on interlocutory applications for interim measures under the 
third paragraph of Article 39 of the ECSC Treaty, the Court provided guidance as to 
the cases in which this procedure is available. The applicant, Miles Druce (MD), 
an English firm, had asked the Commission, and then the Court, to take interim mea-
sures for its protection by ordering another firm, Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds (GKN) 
to desist from a particular course of action. GKN had acquired a minority share-
holding in MD and had asked the Commission to authorize the concentration under 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty. The Commission refused MD's application, since 
GKN had undertaken not to alter the status quo until the Commission had given its 
decision. In his Order of 11 October 1973 the President of the Court confirmed the 
Commission's approach and dismissed MD's application. However it was clear 
from the Order that both the Court (under Articles 83 and 84 of the Rules of Proce-
dure) and the Commission (under Article 66(5), third subparagraph, of the ECSC 
Treaty) could take interim measures to protect MD if the status quo appeared to be 
threatened. 
By Order of 16 March 1974, the President ruled on a fresh application from MD. By 
Decision of 14 March the Commission had authorized the concentration. The same 
day, GKN had issued a takeover bid for the remainder of MD's shares. As MD's 
management could, in this way, have been prevented from bringing proceedings in the 
Court against the Commission's Decision, the President of the Court ordered the 
Commission to provide that its Decision should not enter into force until three 
weeks had elapsed and to take the necessary measures to ensure that the status quo 
remained unchanged until the end of the three-week period.4 
The Order made reference to the importance of the interests at stake and to the devel-
opments which could intervene before the takeover battle was finally resolved. 
1 Case 43/69 (Bilger v Jehle): Recueil 1970, p. 127. 
2 Third Report on Competition Policy, point 5. 
3 Joined Cases 160, 161 and 170/73 Rand R II: Order of 11.10.1973: (1973) E.C.R. 1049; Order of 
16.3.1974: (1974) E.C.R. 281. 
4 Point 137, footnote I. 
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Since then, the Commission has on a number of occasions had to take interim mea-
sures of protection under the third subparagraph of Article 66(5) in exercising its 
merger control powers. 1 
Industrial and commercial property rights 
60. The scope of Article 36 of the EEC Treaty and the restrictions imposed on the 
exercise of industrial and commercial property rights by the principle of the free 
movement of goods were examined, in relation to trademarks, in a judgment of 
3 July 1974.2 The problem here was whether the holder of a trademark in a Member 
State could lawfully oppose the import into that State of products lawfully manu- . 
factured under the same trademark in another Member State. Originally the two 
trademarks had been held by the same person; the original holder, established in 
German territory, had assigned his trademark rights in Belgium to a subsidiary 
formed and controlled by him, but which became independent following an act of a 
public authority (expropriation). There was thus no link between the two existing 
holders so that Article 85 was not in question. The Court considered the matter in the 
light only of the rules on free movement of goods. The judgment follows that of 
8 June 1971,3 which had stressed that the free movement of goods is a fundamental 
principle. 
Under Article 36 of the EEe Treaty, it is possible to prohibit or restrict imports in 
order to protect industrial and commercial property rights. But when the Courf 
interprets this provision it makes, as is well established, a clear distinction between the 
existence of rights attaching to industrial .and commercial property and the exercise 
of such rights. Measures permitted by virtue of Article 36 of the EEC Treaty must be 
justified by the need to protect the specific object of the relevant industrial or com-
mercial property right. National laws conferring such protection may not go further 
by enabling the holders to segregate markets on national lines, and so impeding the 
creation of a single market which is one of the main objectives of the Treaty. 
Thus the primary object of legislation relating to trademarks is to protect the legiti-
mate holder of the trademark against infringement by persons lacking legal title. On 
the other hand, the Treaty provisions relating to the free movement of goods within 
the common market do not permit trademark rights to be exercised as a means of 
prohibiting the marketing in one Member State of goods lawfully produced under an 
identical trademark of the same origin. Nor does the need to inform consumers of the 
origin of trademarked products justify such restrictions. Although it is useful to 
inform consumers on this point, the information should be given by means other than 
such as would affect the free movement of goods.4 
1 Point 141. 
2 Case 192/73 (Van Zuylen v Hag). 
3 Case 78/70 (Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft v Metro SG GroJ3miirkte) [1971] Recuei1487. 
4 Point 68. . 
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61. Two judgments of 31 October1 confirm this case-law in relation to rights con-
cerning patents and, again, trademarks. The first of these two judgments marks a 
major development in the Court's approach to exclusive rights, in this case in relation 
to patented goods. The judgment confirms the Commission's view that the principles 
laid down in the DGG/Metro judgment as regards rights akin to copyrights must also 
be applied to patent rights.2 
The Court stated that, in relation to patents, a main objective of industrial property 
rules is to reward the creative effort of the inventor by guaranteeing to the patentee, 
in addition to the right to oppose infringements, the exclusive right to use an invention 
for the purpose of manufacturing industrial products and putting them into circulation 
for the first time, either directly or by the grant of licences to third parties. But the 
exercise by the patentee of the right he enjoys under the legislation of a Member State 
to prohibit the sale, in that State, of a product which is protected by the patent but 
which has been marketed in another State by the patentee or with his consent is 
incompatible with the rules of the EEC Treaty relating to the free movement of goods 
within the common market. If it were otherwise, the patentee, particularly where he 
held parallel patents, would be able to partition off national markets and thereby to 
restrict trade between Member States, even though no such restriction was necessary 
to guarantee to him the essence of the exclusive rights flowing from the parallel 
patents. 3 
1 Case 15/74 (Centrafarm and de Peijper v Sterling Drug Inc.); Case 16/74 (Centrafarm and 
de Peijper v Winthrop). 
2 First Report on Competition Policy, point 67. 
3 Point 22. 
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Main decisions and measures taken 
by the Comm'ission 
The decisions and measures taken by the Commission in 1974, of which the main 
one,s are summarized below, illustrate a number of aspects of the Commission's 
competition policy with regard to restrictive agreements, dominant positions and 
mergers. 
Implementing Article 85(1), it has acted against agreements and restrictive practices 
involving market-sharing and price-fixing. For instance, it has stated that the establish-
ment by business associations of rules which, although allegedly designed to prevent 
unfair competition, in fact gave the parties thereto the ability to take joint action 
against normal forms of competition, was incompatible with Article 85 (Manufacturers 
of glass containers, Chapter II, § 1, point 62). It imposed fines in respect of a collective 
boycott of a dealer who refused to comply with the private marketing rules setup by 
a prqducer grouping, in particular as regards prescribed prices (Papiers peints de 
Belgique, Chapter II, § 1, point 65). It also took decisions prohibiting a market-
sharing agreement based on recourse to a trademark in order to prevent imports into 
one Member State of products lawfully marketed in another Member State' (Advocaat 
Zwarte Kip, Chapter II, § 1, point 68), and took a decision against terms in an agree-
ment which restricted the freedom of traders to obtain supplies at auction sales of 
imported citrus fruits in the Netherlands (FRUBO, Chapter II, § 1, point 71). 
In an agreement between two producers, one in a member country and one in a 
non-member country, the Commission gave a decision following up its earlier view 
that private agreements between undertakings, even if their object is to promote order-
ly marketing, still came within the scope of Article 85. The agreement here was 
, " designed to restrict the growth of imports of products from a non-member country 
, into a Community country, by aligning import prices on domestic prices (Ballbearings, 
Chapter II § 1, point 74). 
, ' . 
In line with its oWn long-standing practice, endorsed by the Court of Justice the 
, Commission broke up a number of national market protection arrangements involving 
aggregated turnover rebates, collective mutually exclusive commitments, the imposi-
tion or recommendation of common prices and other collective restrictions on supply 
and marketing arrangements (Records, Electrodes, Flat glass, Chapter I, § 1, points 
76, 78 and 79). 
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Continuing the development of its policy on cooperation between undertakings, the 
Commission made use of the exemption provisions in Article 85 (3) to 'encourage 
transnational cooperation in advanced technology industries. For instance, it author-
ized an agreement for joint R&D, ma~ufacturing and distribution between two 
manufacturers of precision optical equipment, after the two firms had agreed to 
abandon restrictions relating to the management of the parties' industrial property 
rights and following the establishment of a satisfactory guarantee and after-sales 
service system as part of the mutual exclusive concession arrangements (Rank/ Sopelem, 
Chapter II, §2, point 80). 
It also declared its intention of giving favourable decisions on two agreements 
concerning the marketing of irradiated nuclear fuel reprocessing services (Chapter II, 
§ 2, point 84). 
Concerning the application of Article 85 to the distribution of goods, the Commission 
had its first opportunity to discuss the compatibility with Article 85 of a selective 
distribution system in the motor industry. The main ground for justification in the 
Commission's view was the establishment of permanent close cooperation between 
producer and dealer which went beyond that of a normal distribution arrangement 
. (Bayerische Motoren- Werke, Chapter II, §3, point 86). This individual decision is of 
general relevance as regards motor vehicle distribution in that it shows how far" 
restraints of competition, in such arrangements, can be allowed. 
In the perfume industry, the Commission considered that it could withdraw its 
intervention in respect of the selection of sales points by two manufacturers, after the 
manufacturers had agreed to abandon restrictions whose effect was to partition 
markets at the distribution stage and to maintain major retail price differences for 
identical products within the common market (Dior and Lancome, Chapter II, 
§3, point 93). As a result, perfume manufacturers now know what changes they may 
need to make to their sales arrangements to comply with Commission requirements. 
The Commission also adopted two exemption decisions which made clear its inter-
pretation of the law as to exclusive dealing agreements which are not covered by 
Regulation No 67/67. One of these cases concerned a contract between two companies 
in a single Member State for the retail sale of products within that State (Good-
yearfEuram, Chapter II, §3, point 98) while in the other case the contract conferred 
exclusive selling rights throughout Community territory (Europair/Duro-Dyne, 
IChapter II, §3, point 102). 
After representations from the Commission a number of other trading agreements 
were brought into line with Article 85 without a decision being necessary. In one of 
these cases the Commission confirmed that export bans imposed by one firm on 
another cannot be justified by country-to-country differences in safety fC,!quirements 
(AEG-Telefunken, Chapter II, §3, point 106). The Commission also continued its 
action against supply terms restricting sales between dealers, in cases where trade 
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between Member States could be affected (Sperry Rand GmbH, Chapter II, §3, 
point 107). It also considered the need to guarantee satisfactory after-sales service 
in a case ,of parallel imports so as to make such imports actually practicable (Con-
strueta, Chapter II, §3, point 109). 
Applying Article 86 in a new case, the Commission decided to impose a fine in respect 
of an infringement of this Article, which prohibits abuses of dominant positions 
(General Motors Continental, Chapter II, §4, point 110). GMC had charged an 
excessive price for the issue of certificates of conformity in respect of vehicles not 
sold through its own distribution network but brought into Belgium as parallel 
imports from other countries in circumstances in which GMC was the only body 
authorized to issue such certificates under the relevant national law. A decisive 
consideration in this decision was that abusive inspection charges were likely to hinder 
parallel imports. The Commission considers that such imports deserve special protec-
tion in the interests of competition and of consumers within the common market. 
In its first decision in another area, the Commission considered that it was not 
necessary to intervene in relation to the formation of joint subsidiaries under a general 
, cooperation agreement which contained a non-competition clause between the parent 
compa'nies in respect of products covered by the agreement. The Commission con-
cluded, in all .relevant circumstances, that the operation did not amount to an in-
fringement of Article 85(1) and that the market shares involved were too small for 
Article 86 to apply (SHV - Chevron, Chapter II, §5, point Q4). 
In exercising its prior control powers under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty, the Com-
mission authorized Thyssen to acquire not more than 25% of the share capital 0 
Solmer, so that Solmer then became jointly controlled by Sacilor, Usinor and Thyssen. 
The transaction was authorized mainly because Solmer as a production cooperative 
did not itself market its flat products; and at the same time the bulk of the three 
groups' production was still accounted for by their own factories; in addition, they 
processed and marketed their production side by side with their shares in Solmer 
production. Conditions were attached to the authorization in order to ensure that the 
separate groups remain completely independent of each other, particularly in their 
marketing policies (Chapter II, §6, point 121). 
The Commission also authorized the British Steel Corporation (BSC) to acquire 
control of Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd. (JFB), on condition that within one year 
BSC divested itself of two companies of the JFB Group. In view ofBSC's position on 
the British market for forged ingots and blooms and wire rod, control over these two 
companies would have enabled it to prevent effective competition (Chapter II, 
§6, point 125). 
The Commission also authorized the Federal German Government to acquire a' 
majority shareholding in Gelsenberg AG, Essen, which it was proposed to integrate 
in VEBA, already under state control. Since other undertakings already directly or 
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indirectly controlled by the Federal Government were managed as independent 
economic enterprises, the only issues to be considered here concerned the effects on 
competition of integrating Gelsenberg into VEBA. In the Federal Republic, VEBA 
and Gelsenberg each accounted for some 33% of the wholesale coal trade. The 
acquisition was authorized because the relevant firms would not be in a position to 
determine prices for solid fuels in a substantial part of the market, nor to control or 
restrict production (Chapter II, §6, point 128). 
In relation to the distribution of steel products, the Commission authorized a number 
of mergers designed to streamline and strengthen existing distribution networks 
(Restructuring the Sacilor trading network, GKN/Miles Druce, BSC/Lye Trading, 
Chapter II, §6,points 131,135 and 138) or to make it easier for producers and stock-
holders to enter new markets within the Community (GKN/Cassart, Kl6ckner/Perry, 
Chapter II, §6, points 139 and 140). 
1974 was the first year in which the Commission had to take interim measures of 
protection so as to ensure the maintenance of the status quo between enterprises, 
before the Commission could take its decisions on matters of substance. The cases 
concerned takeover bids aimed at gaining control over undertakings and the relative 
applications for authorization under Article 66. Interim decisions were made under the 
third subparagraph of Article 66(5) (Marine-FirminyJSchneider/Denain/De Wendel 
and Johnson & Firth Brown/BSC/Dunford Hadfields) (Chapter II, §6, points 142 
and 143). 
The bulk of the Commission's market supervision work, aimed at verifying com-
pliance with previous decisions, was accounted for by inquiries into fertilizer selling 
agencies and the prices situation on the dyestuffs market (Chapter II, §7, points 
and 146). 
§ 1 - Elimination of agreements prohibited under Article 85 
Pricing and market-sharing agreements 
Agreements between glass container manufacturers 
62. Under Article 85(1) the Commission addressed a decision1 to the major hollow 
glass manufacturers in five Member States: Boussois-Souchon-Neuvesel and Saint-
Gobain Emballage (France), Gerreisheimer Glas and Veba-Glas (Germany), Bou-
teilleries Belges Reunies and Verlica-Momignies (Belgium), Vereenigde Glasfabrieken 
Schiedam (Netherlands), Bordoni-Miva, Avir and Vetri (Italy). In the decision. the 
1 Commission Decision of 15.5.1974 in case IV/400: OJ L 160 of 17.6.1974, p. 1. 
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Commission declared illegal a series of agreements based on an underlying agreement 
referred tb as 'Fair Trade Practice Rules',! or the IFTRA Rules (International Fair 
Trade Practice Rules Administration, Vaduz, Liechtenstein). The underlying agree-
ment was supplemented by subsequent detailed agreements between the parties which 
facilitated the implementation of the IFTRA rules through exchange of information 
on prices, application of a common formula for calculating prices and the collective 
application of the delivered prices system. 
63. Following investigations in 1971 and 1972, it was clearly established that, while-
it was claimed that certain clauses of the agreement were aimed at preventing unfair 
p~actices as between the parties, their real object was to eliminate normal competition 
on prices, rebates and terms of sale to the detriment of glass container buyers in the 
common market. 
For instance, it was considered unfair to undercut a competitor's prices and that 
alignment with a competitor's prices in his regional market was the only 'fair' 
approach. The main purpose of these arrangements was to ensure that a glass manu-
facturer, who was a party to the agreement, and who made deliveries outside his 
normal business territory, did not undercut the prices of that party to the agreement 
who ,was regarded as the national or local price leader in the relevant area. This was 
achieved by a number of other clauses concerniqg publication and notification to 
competitors of individual gross price lists and rebates and concerning obligation not 
to deviate secretly from listed prices. 
The Commission's investigations also revealed that a number of arrangements had 
been made to implement or supplement the initial agreement on trade practice rules. 
For instance, by a number of procedures varying from year to year, an exchange of 
information system had been established between members on prices, rebates and 
selling terms which they applied in their respective countries. This included amend-
ments which members were to make from given dates, and individual exceptions 
granted to' certain customers. 
1 In a number of countries there are legally binding trade practice rules whose aim is to clarify 
national law and judicial decisions on unfair competition as regards individual industries. These 
rules are drawn up and promulgated either by a governmental agency (as is the case in the United 
States relative to the Trade Practice Rules of the Federal Trade Commission) or by a private I 
organization with governmental approval, as is the case in Germany relative to the Wettbewerbs-
regeln which economic and trade associations can draw up for their own branches and which are 
registrable by the Kartellamt (Section 28 of the law against restrictions of competition). 
'Unfair competition' generally means any competitive conduct which conflicts with principles of 
fairness, notions of honesty or professional etiquette. There is no universally acceptable definition 
since the law of an individual country may regard as unfair a form of competitive conduct which 
is not so regarded in a neighbouring country. In the case in point, the Commission decision 
challenged only rules which clearly had nothing to do with the concept of fairness. The decision did 
not attempt to answer the question whether it would be desirable to adopt certain of the rules not 
explicitly challenged by the decision, whether in national legislation or otherwise. 
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The enterprises had also prepared a joint cost calculation formula applied uniformly 
by the manufacturers of bottles and by some of the manufacturers of flasks. This was 
to enable users of the formula to produce parallel cost price curves and to .fix their 
selling prices accordingly. Although no particular rates for calculation were incor-
porated, the formula, by forming part of a whole restrictive agreement, also constituted 
an infringement of Article 85 (1). It could not be regarded as having neutral competitive 
effects in the light of the provisions set out in the Communication on Cooperation 
between Undertakings.! 
Finally, the parties had agreed that they would all apply the delivered prices system 
so as to restrict the distribution area of each party and to avoid glass container 
purchasers from comparing prices offered by nearby and distant factories. 
64. Moreover, the interrelated arrangements resulting from the rules agreement 
and from supplementary agreements relating to price formation, tended to perpetuate 
existing situations and to partition off the common market in an industry where the 
products supplied showed considerable consistency. The bottles, jars and flasks 
concerned were largely standardized and manufactured by relatively small numbers of 
competitors on the market in the six original Member States. It was also a characteris-
tic of the market that a few major undertakings were price leaders in their respective 
branches and in their respective countries, and that a number of small firms of lesser 
importance followed the trade policy established by the leaders. 
The Commission refrained from imposing fines since the type of restrictions in this 
case had not previously been dealt with by a Commission decision and it was not 
obvious for the relevant undertakings that their conduct infringed the Treaty. 
Groupement des fabricants de papiers peints de Belgique 
65. The Commission found that the internal rules of procedure governing the 
Groupement Beige des fabricants de papiers peints and a number of decisions by this 
association of undertakings constituted infringements of Article 85 (1). 2 It accordingly 
ordered the relevant undertakings to terminate an agreement and the decisions based 
on it, where their effect was to restrict the free play of competition in the sale of 
wallpapers in Belgium. 
The Groupement had notified the relevant agreement in 1962, but the notification was 
incomplete. Following investigations carried out in response to complaints against 
1 Rule II (d): OJ C 75 of 29.7.1968. 
2 Commission Decision of 23.7.1974 in Case IV/426: OJ L 237 of 29.8.1974, p. 3. The undertakings 
concerned have appealed against the Decision to the Court of Justice. 
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the Groupement received in 1972, it was found thatthe Groupement was a compre-
hensive marketing organization set up to cover the whole industry concerned. It 
included collective sales price fixing and the imposition of retail prices on dealers, 
and also the standardization of general selling conditions, rebates, clearance sales, etc. 
Apart from preventing members of the association from fixing prices and terms 
individually, it prevented them also from seeking competitive advantages through 
their own advertising or from individually making better services available to their 
customers. Furthermore, a resale price maintenance rule was designed to eliminate, 
competition between wallpaper dealers. 
The agreement and the decisions covered not only wallpapers produced by members 
of the Groupement but also imported wallpapers sold in Belgium by the members. 
In line with the approach taken by the Court and the Commission in earlier cases the 
effect of such an agreement which covered the entire territory of one Member State l 
and also contained arrangements for aggregated rebates on total turnover, 2 , was to 
consolidate divisions between national markets and to hinder imports from ,other 
Member States. 
66. The main interest of the case arises from the ban under Article 85{l) of a decision 
between enterprises to impose a collective boycott. This amounted to a particularly 
serious violation of the rules on competition, since its aim was to eliminate a trouble-
some competitor. In this case the Commission, considering that the collective boycott 
went beyond the operations described in the notification, imposed heavy fines on the 
undertakings involved. The collective refusal to supply originated in the desire of the 
Groupement to enforce its rules, and particularly its imposed prices policy. Following 
an individual action by one of its members, the Groupement decided on a collective 
boycott, from October 1971, of a Belgian wallpaper wholesaler who refused to comply 
with the prices imposed by the Groupement and to ensure that they were applied by 
his customers. The wholesaler concerned was a supplier of wallpapers to self-service 
shops which were retailing below the fixed prices. 
'67. The Commission refused to grant exemption from the ban on restrictive practices. 
Its grounds were the preservation of an artificially high price level for wallpaper on 
the Belgian market aimed at by the collective pricing agreements, and the inhibiting 
effect on imports of the aggregated rebate system. Not only did users fail to derive 
any benefit, they actually suffered loss . 
• ' e.g., judgment of the Court of Justice given on 17.10.1972 in Case 8/72 (Vereniging van Cement-
handelaren): Recueil 1972, p. 977. 
l e.g., Commission Decisions of 29.12.1970 (Ceramic Tiles): OJ L 10 of 13.1.1971, p. IS; 3.7.1973 
(Water heaters): OJ L 217 of 6.8.1973, p. 34. 
COMPo REP, 1974 
48 POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES 
Advocaat Zwarte Kip 
68. Similarly to the Court of Justice which has recently reaffirmed that recourse to 
trademark rights to restrict the free movement of goods lawfully marketed within the 
common market is incompatible with Articles 30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty, l the 
Commission has made it clear that it will use its powers under Article 85 to oppose 
any attempts to partition off markets through the assignment or use of trademarks. 
69. The Commission condemned an agreement to assign a trademark insofar as the 
trademark was used to prevent imports of products bearing the same trademark. 2 
By an agreement concluded in 1938, the Dutch firm Van Olffen (currently a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Heineken NV) had assigned its rights over a trademark relating 
to Advocaat Zwarte Kip for egg liqueurs in Belgium and Luxembourg to a firm 
whose ,rights were ultimately vested in SA Cinoco in which the Stella Artois brewing 
group holds more than 25% of the shares. From the terms of the initial contract and 
from subsequent events the agreement was found to have the effect of segregating the 
Benelux markets and, although this occurred before the EEC Treaty came into force, 
the same effect continued thereafter. This was borne out by an exchange of letters 
between the parties by which the assignee was assured that he would have absolute 
territorial protection and by an action for infringement of the trademark right brought 
by SA Cinoco against a Belgian wine trader who had imported from the Netherlands 
a quantity of advocaat manufactured and marketed under the relevant trademark by 
Van Olffen. 
70. The Commission Decision will not prevent the Belgian assignee from using his 
trademark rights as a means of preventing the import and sale of products which 
infringe his trademark. However products manufactured by the original Dutch 
trademark holder and imported into Belgium and Luxembourg were not to be 
considered as infringing products and the existence of the trademark right was there-
fore not directly attacked. 
Moreover, the erection of barriers between Member States on the basis of trademark 
law was not justified by reason of quality differences between the relevant products. 
Consumers would not be misled as to quality or origin of products sold under the 
same trademark in a single market, unless a supplier failed to indicate the origin of 
the product or its composition. But information for consumers on those points can be 
1 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 3.7.1974 in Case 192/73 (Van Zuylen Freres v Hag AG): 
OJ C 114 of 27.9.1974, p. 26. See also point 60. 
2 Commission Decision of24.7.1974 in Case IV/28.374 (AdvocaatZwarte Kip): OJ L237 of29.8.1974, 
p. 12. An appeal against this Decision has been withdrawn. 
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provided by means which would not amount to barriers to the free movement of 
goods. 1 
This decision was made pursuant to a complaint from a parallel importer after a 
national court had stayed appeal proceedings in respect of infringements. The decision 
shows the use of the application of Article ~5 in relation to trademarks, even though 
the exercise of trademark rights in a way which is unlawful in relation to the Treaty 
objectives is in itself contrary to the rules on the free movement of goods. 
FRUBO 
71. Restrictive provisions of an agreement which set up a system of auction sales in 
Rotterdam for certain types of fruit (mainly citrus fruit) imported into the Nether-
lands were also the subject of a Commission decision.2 , The agreement was concluded 
between an association of the main Dutch fruit importers (Nederlandse Vereniging 
voor de Fruit en Groentenimporthandel) and an association of virtually all the Dutch 
fruit wholesalers (Nederlandse Bond van Grossiers in Zuidvruchten en ander geim-
porteerd fruit 'FRUBO'). In order to be allowed to take part in auctions, through 
which most (roughly 80%) of the citrus fruit sold in the Netherlands is handled, 
dealers had to comply with the conditions imposed by the agreement. The main 
restriction, apart from a set of technical provisions as to the organization of auction 
sales, consisted of the obligation for importers and wholesalers to market citrus fruit 
grown in non-member countries and intended for sale in the Netherlands only through 
the Rotterdam auction sales, 
72. As the agreement originally stood, the conditions imposed were even more 
restrictive, since only Dutch importers were allowed to sell at auction sales and even 
Community-produced citrus fruit was covered by the agreement. Following objections 
from the~ommission and complaint from twenty-two Dutch wholesalers who took 
part in the Rotterdam auction sales, the associations concerned made their agreement 
somewhat more flexible, without however deleting the major restrictions on the free-
dom for Dutch wholesalers to obtain supplies, They decided to keep these wholesalers 
subject to the ban on direct imports from non-member countries and to submit 
purchases of citrus fruits from elsewhere in the Community to a major restraint, 
1 In this case Van Olffen had been manufacturing since 1973 part of the advocaat then sold by 
Cinoco on the 'Belgian and Luxembourg markets; at the latter's request, the advocaat supplied was 
different in composition, alcoholic strength and presentation from that commonly sold in the 
Netherlands. ' 
2 Commission Decision of 25.7.1974 in Case IV(26.602 (FRUBO): OJ L 237 of 29.8.1974, p. 16. 
Proceedings against the Commission decision are pending before the Court of Justice. Under an 
, Order of the President of the Court given by summary procedure on 15.10.1974, the decision will 
not be implemented until the Court has ruled on the substance of the matter; however, clauses 
under which penalties may be imposed on the members of the agreement may not be applied 
during that period (OJ C 159 of 21.12.1974, p. 4). 
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namely customs clearance by another party, thereby compulsorily introducing an 
additional trading stage. Accordingly, the transactions concerned became virtually 
impossible. The Commission felt therefore obliged to adopt a decision requiring 
termination of these restrictions. 
73. The Commission's Decision was not aimed at the auction sales system as such. 
It is quite possible that advantages may be derived from the resulting concentration 
of supply and demand although in certain cases such advantages may be practically 
eliminated by the disadvantages created by the rigidity inherent in such a distribution 
system. However, in order to attain the advantages which could be gained from the 
Rotterdam auction sales, it was not essential to prevent wholesalers from having 
access to possibly cheaper or better supplies, either because prices were lower on 
other Community import markets or because, price for price, quicker supplies or 
fresher fruit could be obtained. It would seem that such opportunities do occur, since 
a number of wholesalers subject to the agreement at times preferred to obtain supplies 
elsewhere, despite the penalties which they risked incurring. Moreover, even in the' 
absence of the compulsory supply arrangements complained of, the nature and 
frequency of direct imports by wholesalers had not been such as to cause the dis-
appearance of this marketing system by reducing its advantages. 
Voluntary restraint agreements 
Franco-Japanese ball-bearings agreement 
74. Continuing the examination of Japanese measures for the voluntary restraint of 
exports to the Community, the Commission decided that, in 1972, the main French 
and Japanese ball-bearings producers had concluded an agreement which infringed 
Article 85(1).1 
The agreement consisted largely of an exchange of letters between trade associations 
following negotiations, and revealed a consensus on the part of the parties that the 
price of Japanese ball-bearings imported into France should be increased so as to 
align such prices with bearings of French production. Since price competition was 
therefore neutralized the agreement amounted to a serious restriction of competition 
in the common market. This was particularly the case since the relevant undertakings 
were the largest ball-bearing producers in their respective countries. The French side 
was represented by SKF Compagnie d'Applications Mechaniques (more than 80% 
of the shares being held by the Swedish Group SKF) and SNR Societe Nouvelle de 
Roulements (a wholly-owned Renault subsidiary), and the Japanese side by four 
firms: Nippon Seiko Kaisha, Koyo Seiko Ltd., Fujikoshi Ltd. and NTN Toyo 
Bearing Ltd. 
1 Commission Decision of 29.11.1974 in Case IV/27.085: OJ L 343 of 21.12.1974, p. 19. 
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, 
The agreement was also liable to affect trade between Member States. The scope of the 
, price increases permitted under the agreement depended on whether they could affect 
not only direct imports of ball-bearings from- Japan into France but also indirect 
imports via other Member States. This serious restriction of competition covered the 
whole of the territory of France, so that trade between France and the other Member 
States was likely to take place in conditions different from those which would have 
obtained in the absence of the agreement. 
Since the agreement had not been notified, the question of exemption under Article 
85 (3) could not be examined. In any event, the Commission did not feel that the 
agreement could have the beneficial effects referred to in Article 85 (3), in particular 
by allowing to consumers some share of benefit. 
·75. This Commission decision is noteworthy in that the Commission's Opinion 
on the import into the Community of Japanese products has been applied for the 
first time. In this Opinion, published in the Official Journal in October 1972,1 the 
Commission explicitly drew the attention of firms to the applicability of Article 85 
of the EEC Treaty.to measures designed to restrict Japanese imports into the Com-
munity or to regulate, for example, their prices or quality. The Commission recom-
mended that such agreements, decisions and practices should be notified in good time. 
As stated by the Commission in its Opinion, Article 85 is fully applicable to agreements 
of the kind in question. The agreement was not within the category of a trade agree-
ment between the Community and Japan; nor were the restrictions on the Japanese 
firms imposed by State authorities. The agreement consisted of bilateral measures of a 
private nature, and neither the French nor the Japanese Government had been in any 
way involved.2 
In ~ts decision the Commission found that the agreement constituted an infringement 
of the rules on competition. However, the Commission did not enjoin the parties to 
terminate the agreement, since the parties had made a formal statement that they 
were no longer bound by it. 
The Commission did not fine the firms involved in view of the special circumstances of. 
the case, and in particular since the agreement had been entered into before the 
Opinion had been published and the firms had not been in contact with each other 
~ince the publication date. 
1 OJ C III of 21.1 0.1972, p. 13. 
2, Third Report on Competition Policy, point 20. 
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National market protection agreements 
Dutch ~greement in the record industry 
76. Without a decision being necessary, Commission intervention1 brought to an 
end restraints of competition arising from an agreement between some twenty Dutch 
record manufacturers and importers, grouped in the 'Nederlandse Vereniging voor 
Grammofoonplaten Importeurs (NVGn '. The agreement had established close relations 
with the 1 600 or so record retailers in the Netherlands, who are members of the 
'Nederlandse Vereniging voor Grammofoonplaten Detailhandelaren (NVGD),. 
NVGI controls roughly 90% of the Dutch record market and takes in the main Dutch 
record manufacturers as well as the subsidiaries or importers of all the principal labels 
in the world, such as Ariola Eurodisc Benelux, Barclay Nederland, BASF Nederland, 
Bovema (EMI), CBS-Artone, Inelco Holland (RCA), Miller International, Phonogram 
(Philips), Polydor Nederland (polygramm) and Vogue Nederland. 
77. The restrictions and rules concerned constituted infringements of Article 85 
on grounds consistent with principles previously established by the Court and regularly 
upheld by the Commission.2 Particularly, the following provisions were affected: 
- ajoint reciprocal exclusive sales and supplies obligation binding upon the members 
both of the manufacturers' and importers' association and of the retailers' associa-
tion; 
- a collective price notification obligation (open price system), and a joint rebate 
system binding upon the members of the manufacturers' and importers' associa-
, tion; 
- a joint recommendation to the members of the retailers' association as to com-
pliance with minimum retail prices. 
The same applied to a number of general guidelines concerning sales outlets, for 
instance: 
- the provision prohibiting members of the manufacturers' and importers' associa-
tion from selling to individuals and record libraries, and from marketing records 
from each other's catalogues; 
- the rules prohibiting members of the retailers' association from selling records to 
other undertakings, including their own members. 
All these restrictions, which were aimed at imposing very tight limits on outlets and 
supplies on the Dutch record market and at consolidating market fragmentation were 
discontinued so that trade flows can now develop normally and prices can be fixed 
individually in line with supply and demand factors. 
1 Bull. EC 2-1974. point 2114. 
2 For instance. First Report on Competition Policy. points 1. 19 et seq .• and 24. and Second Report, 
point 23. 
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Belgian and Dutch agreements in the electrode sector 
78. Following precedents clearly established by the Court of Justice and the Com-
mission, agreements relating to the Belgian and Dutch markets for standard quality , 
electrodes for arc welding were abandoned by the parties without need for formal 
decision from the Commission. 1 The agreements affected the main national producers 
as well as distributors of German electrodes and covered respectively 50% and 90% of 
the Dutch and Belgian markets. 
The Belgian agreement had undergone some structural and operational changes. 
Originally more restrictive, in that its members had undertaken to respect, and to 
enforce upon their retailers, minimum priCes established by agreement and to operate 
a system of aggregate rebates on total turnover, it later provided only for fixing a 
common, non-binding price scale, Nevertheless, as previously held by the Court in 
other cases, this still constituted a restraint of competition contrary to Article 85(1). 
The Dutch agreement was even more restrictive in its scope since, apart from the 
preparation of common price lists, it provided for the sharing of customers and 
prohibited rebates of every kind. 
After these agreements had been abandoned, producers and importers once again had 
full freedom of action in their business relations with customers. 
Relations between undertakings in the glass industry 
79. The aggregated rebates agreement on fiat glass products in Germany, concluded 
between the local subsidiaries of the two largest companies in this industry, namely 
St. Gobain/Pont-a-Mousson and Boussois-Souchon-NeuveseI, was abandoned with 
effect from 31 December 1974.2 Because such a system naturally attracts orders, 3 
it was helping to strengthen these firms' control over the market for this very impor-
tant type of glass, The Commission ensured that all relevant customers were informed. 
Following intervention by the Commission, the two groups also separated a number 
of commercial operations which they were developing jointly, mainly on the French 
and German markets, concerning fiat glass products and insulation fibres. 
A plan for divestiture of their common interests in the manufacture and sale of safety 
glass for the motor industry, to be put into effect in 1975, is now being reviewed by the 
Commission. 
The Commission feels that these changes will boost competition on the glass m'arket; 
this is particularly necessary as the trend towards concentration is gathering momen-
tum in the industry which is exemplified by St. Gobain's acquisition of control over 
1 Bull. BC 11-1974, point 2111. 
2 Bull. BC 10-1974, point 2107. 
3- First Report on'Competition Policy, point 24. 
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St. Roch and BSN's acquisition of Glaverbel-Mecaniver. Since 1969/70 the Commis-
sion has continued to survey the situation in this industry, where it had already had to 
break up a number of agreements and concerted practices. Their incompatibility with 
the rules on competition was aggravated by the high degree of concentration in this 
market. 1 . 
§ 2 - Encouragement of permitted forms of cooperation 
Rank/Sopelem agreement 
80. Continuing the development of its policy on cooperation between firms, the 
Commission exempted from the general prohibition on agreements in Article 85(1) 
an agreement setting up cooperation in R&D, manufacturing and distribution 
between two potentially competing manufacturers of precision optical equipment 
(lenses and lens controls for the motion picture and television industries).2 . 
The agreement was entered into between Societe d 'Optique, Precision, Electronique 
et Mecanique (Sopelem), Paris, and Rank Precision Industries Ltd., London, two 
firms which have been leaders in research and manufacturing in this industry. Sopelem 
'had been the first to develop ultra-high speed cine-cameras (10 million frames/sec.) 
used by NASA. The mutually complementary technology of the parties and Rank's 
worldwide sales and aftersales service network were found to provide a sound basis 
for coordination of the two firms' R&D, manufacturing and sales activities at a time 
when a number of leading producers sl,lch as Zeiss-Ikon had to give up production of 
amateur cine-equipment following the influx of cheap photographic equipment from 
certain non-member countries, especially Japan. The market concerned in this case 
covers technically advanced and specialized products; and sales are dependent on 
technical considerations as much as on prices. There are very few major producers 
on this market, but there is active competition between them. The products are for 
sale primarily to a specialized clientele, namely camera manufacturers, who are well 
aware of the identity and technical characteristics concerned. Since there is no 
intermediate dealership stage, customers are in direct contact with the manufacturers 
themselves of the latters' networks. Purchasers are well placed relative to the manu-
facturers in regard to choice of products and bargaining power. Sales by Rank and 
Sopelem together account for some 20% of the Community market. 
81. The first version of the various contracts concluded between the parties contained 
provisions which the Commission was to declare incompatible with Article 85. This 
applied particularly to an absolute ban on lens exports by each party to the other's 
sales territory, to restrictions on the rights of the parties to manage their industrial 
1 Bull. EC No 8-1970, Part II, Chapter I, sees. 8 and 9. 
2 Commission Decision of20.12.1974 in Case IV/26.603 (Rank v Sopelem) OJ L 29 of3.2.1975, p. 20. 
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property rights (filing, maintenance and protection of patents) and to limitations on 
engaging in R&D programmes with third parties in the relevant field. The combined 
effect of a number of clauses, particularly the obligation for Sopelem to abandon its 
business name and trade marks upon expiry of the agreement, including those used 
prior to the agreement, entailed a not inconsiderable risk that the activities in question 
of Sopelem would no longer be able to continue following termination of the 
agreement. 
82. These restrictive arrangements were no longer contained in the agreement 
finally adopted by the two firms after extensive modification following representation 
by the Commission. The current agreement provides for close cooperation between the 
competing producers and satisfies the preconditions for exemption. Some restrictions 
of competition remain, such as the specialization arrangements on research and 
development and manufacture and the mutual exclusive dealing rights under the 
market-sharing provisions of the agreement, which extend to EEC territory. However, 
the economies of scale obtainable by each party, the fact that each was free to use the 
other's sales network (particularly in the case of Sopelem, which could make use of 
the world-wide Rank network, whereas without the agreement it would have had to 
envisage extensive investments spread over a number of years), and the improvement 
of productivity and profitability in research and manufacture, showed that technical 
and economic advantages could be obtained from which consumers could benefit. 
The fact that the parties to the agreement were effectively competing with each other, 
suggested that the benefits would be maintained and that the market would not be 
monopolized. 
83. The revised version of the agreement, which was the subject of the Commission 
decision, no longer contained restrictions which were not essential to the attainment of 
these objectives. The parties are to cooperate on research and development while 
retaining their individual activities; patents will be managed jointly or separately, 
depending upon whether the products concerned are joint products or products in 
which industrial property rights belong individually to either one of the parties, but 
always on the basis of equal rights and duties; there are no longer to be obstacles to 
collaboration by one or other of the parties with third parties on research and develop-
ment or subcontracting. Moreover, it is provided that trademarks under which joint 
products and Sopelem products are to be marketed but which belong to Rank, may be 
purchased by Sopelem atthe end ofthe agreementfor a reasonable price. Although each 
party is bound by the agreement not actively to seek customers in the other party's 
territory, either party may meet unsolicited orders from the other party's territory 
within the common market on the exporting party's usual terms and at his usual 
prices. In any such case the exporting party will pay to the other a commission 
confined to the value of the 'free' after-sales service (generally included in invoices at 
a flat rate of 2 % of selling prices) which the latter will actually have to bear in his 
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territory for products not originally sold by him. It is noteworthy in this connection 
that the Commission had also opposed the adoption of a general export commission 
scheme which was to replace the export ban, on the ground that the scheme itself and 
the amounts involved would effectively have acted as a disincentive to exports by each 
party to the other's territory within the common market. Each party is also bound to 
provide satisfactory after-sales service on identical conditions to all customers in his 
territories, even for products originally sold by the other party. 
Taking these matters into account, the Commission decided to grant exemption for 
a ten-year period, which was regarded as long enough for the agreement to achieve its 
objectives. The Commission coupled its Decision with reporting obligations upon the 
parties to enable it to monitor developments of the activities under the agreement. 
Agreements on the reprocessing of nuclear fuels l 
84. The Commission also gave public notice of its intention2 of taking favourable 
dec~sions on two agreements notified to it, which concern the marketing of reprocess-
ing services for irradiated oxide nuclear fuels.The first agreement is between two firms 
which are operating or are shortly to operate large-scale oxide nuclear fuels repro-
cessing plants: British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. (BNFL) and the French Commissariat it. 
l'Energie Atomique, together with a third firm Kernbrennstoff-Wiederaufarbeitungs-
gesellschaft mbH (KEW A), which has decided to build a reprocessing plant. The 
agreement provides for coordination of the parties' investments in this field and that 
KEWA will bring its own plant, with a capacity of something like I 500 t/year, on 
. stream as soon as the British plant (Windscale, 800 t/year) and the French plant 
(Cap de la Hague, 800 t/year) are operating at capacity, probably in 1980. The 
agreement also provided for the formation of a joint subsidiary which was established 
under the name 'United Reprocessors Gesellschaft mbH' (URG) for th~ joint 
marketing of the reprocessing services offered by the three parties and for the alloca-
tion of reprocessing work as between their plants. 
The agreement related to the foregoing was entered into between four German 
chemical firmS-Bayer, Hoechst, Gelsenberg and Nukem- for the formation of the 
joint subsidiary, KEWA, through which joint holdings in URG are to be acquired. 
85. Before it adopts its final decision, the Commission must carefully examine the 
situation of the oxide fuels reprocessing market and forecasts of demand for reprocess-
ing capacity, as well as the specific aspects of the reprocessing industry. At best, the 
Commission can envisage an authorization for an initial transitional period, so far as 
1 The object of reprocessing nuclear fuels is to recover the fissile material (uranium and plutonium) 
which these fuels still contain after irradiation in nuclear reactors; the recovered fissile material 
can be reused in manufacturing nuclear fuels. 
2 Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation No 17(lV/26.940); OJ C 83 of 16.7.1974, p. 2. 
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this may be necessary to enable the reprocessirig industry to operate under normal 
conditions of competition. The date of expiry of any authorization could be amended 
if any of the circumstances underlying the decision changed. In' announcing that it 
intended in principle to give a favourable decision, the Commission has shown that it 
attaches importance to the position of URG on the European reprocessing market. 
The Commission is likely to make its decision subject to conditions and obligations 
to enable it effectively to monitor the business policy of URG in the light of Articles 
85 and 86. 
§ 3 - Application of Article 85 to distribution 
Selective distribution 
BMW sales arrangements 
86. The Commission has decided to exempt from Article 85(1) the standard con-
tracts of Bayerische Motoren-Werke AG (BMW) for the distribution of its products in 
Germany. This decision was taken when, following Commission representations, 
BMW had abandoned export prohibitions which were to have applied within the 
common market and after BMW had adopted certain other provisions to comply 
with Article 85 (3).1 The decision applies only to BMW's German sales system, since 
in the other Member States BMW products are marketed on somewhat different lines 
and the necessary adaptations have yet to be made.2 Although the BMW decision is 
of a specific nature, the Commission feels it could be of general significance for the 
distribution of motor vehicles, in so far as manufacturers or general importers who 
wish to apply or establish similar distribution systems will be able to see what kind of 
restraints on competition may be admissible. 
87. In view of the special circumstances governing motor vehicle marketing, 
authorization has been given to a selective distribution system intended to favour 
intensive sales promotion in certain contract territories and the provision of after-
sales services of a given quality. BMW's German distribution network can be des-
cribed as a system of the selection of dealers on the basis of several objective criteria as 
to qualifications and which involve certain minimum requirements imposed on all 
dealers and sales outlets. 
1 Commission Decision of 13.12.1974 in Case IV/14.650 (Bayerische Motoren-Werke AG) OJ L 29 
'of 3.2.1975. p. 1. ' 
2 In France, Italy and Belgium, BMW distributes its vehicles through subsidiaries; in the other 
Community countries it works through independent importers. 
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Accordingly, BMW vehicles or parts were not to be sold by firms which, although they 
were willing to sell them, would not undertake to provide the additional services which 
BMW required them to provide at the dealer stage or to set up the prescribed service 
infrastructure (selection on qualitative criteria: namely, firm of sufficient business 
standing, employment of staff trained in cooperation with BMW, after-sales service 
according to BMW requirements, minimum maintenance of stocks, minimum· 
guarantees). 
In addition, there is quantitative selection of retailers by the manufacturer which 
amounts to a further restriction of competition in BMW products. Firms may 
occasionally be excluded although they are willing and able to meet the qualitative 
requirements, should BMW decide not to increase the number of approved dealers 
as a matter of marketing policy (quantitative selection). There are no predetermined 
uniform objective criteria as to this additional form of selection. 
88. Nevertheless, in this case the Commission recognized that the reasons given by 
BMW in support of the restrictions of competition resulting from its selective distri-
bution system were well founded. Selection of a limited number of dealers by BMW 
could be accepted since it enabled BMW to ensure that its products were rationally 
distributed in a manner advantageous to the consumer. It could be assumed that it 
would be cheaper and of greater benefit to the consumer to distribute BMW vehicles 
under arrangements linked with the provision of services complying with minimum 
requirements imposed by the manufacturer and the maintenance of a full range of 
spare parts. The contractual arrangements concerning selection qualified for exemp-
tion under Article 85(3) since they enabled BMW to work in continuing cooperation 
with its dealers in the interests of road safety, of providing a minimum uniform 
manufacturer's guarantee and of promoting new techniques which reduce environ-
mental pollution. These conditions necessarily entailed a limitation in the number of 
dealers. 
89. It is noteworthy from a legal point of view that, although dealers are primarily 
to concentrate their efforts on their own sales territories, they are not to be prevented 
from meeting orders from outside. Accordingly an ultimate customer, in whatever 
EEC country he may be, can now buy BMW vehicles and spares from dealers other 
than those locally appointed. BMW dealers have the same freedom as regards ob-
taining supplies of BMW products from approved BMW dealers other than their 
contractual partners. The Commission regarded the grant of these freedoms as 
fundamental for ensuring adequate competition in BMW vehicles and parts at all 
marketing stages and thus for the elimination of unwarranted price differences within 
the Community.! 
1 A similar principle underlies the Commission's approach to its decision on the selective distribution 
system applied by OMEGA (First Report on Competition Policy, point 56, and Third Report, 
point 12). 
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To ensure that they concentrate on sales promotion in their own areas1 BMW dealers 
are not to establish branches or supply depots nor work through intermediaries out-
side their own territory. But since a BMW dealer is to be able to advertise and canvass 
outside his own territory provided he has not defaulted on his obligation to provide 
intensive promotion in his own territory, consumers and other approved BMW 
dealers outside his territory can ~pproach him with a view to purchasing from him, 
not only on their own initiative but also in response to national advertising. 
90. A change was made also to the provisions under which BMW dealers were to 
distribute BMW products only. While BMW's consent is still required before vehicles 
of other makes may be sold, this consent may not be withheld provided there are 
reasonable grounds for the request. Non-BMW accessories may be sold freely to 
ultimate customers where such accessories are of no significant importance for the 
safety of a BMW vehicle. Where it is necessary for the repair of a BMW vehicle to use 
a spare part which is of significant importance for the safety of the vehicle, BMW 
concessionaires may use spare parts of other makes if these match BMW quality 
standards. As regards other spares, the dealers may use whatever parts they like. 
These provisions can be regarded as concentrating BMW dealers' sales efforts primar-
ily on BMW products, while not excluding them completely from the market as 
potential purchasers of spares of other makes or, in individual cases, as sales inter-
mediaries for vehicles of other makes. 
91. Furthermore, the fact that BMW has established its own after-sales service sys-, 
tern with the help of selected dealers does not mean that independent garages cannot 
work on BMW vehicles since they can obtain all the spares they need for carrying out 
repairs from any member of the BMW network. However the ban on supplies of 
BMW spare parts to independent dealers was accepted, on the ground that, in its 
absence, approved dealers, who were obliged to maintain a comprehensive range of 
parts in stock, could have been at a competitive disadvantage as compared with 
independent dealers who were free to stock only fast-moving items which are the most 
profitable. Thus BMW dealers could have been prevented from meeting all their 
obligations, and this would have been to the detriment of the consumer. 
, 
92. The period of validity of the exemption is to expire at the end of 1977 so that the 
extent to which BMW's distribution system restricts competition can then be reassess-
ed. The Commission has also lifted the ban as regards the preceding period as BMW 
had agreed to discontinue the export prohibitions as soon as it had become clear that 
such arrangements in the motor industry would not qualify for exemption. Conditions 
are attached to the authorization to enable the Commission to act in any case in which 
, 1 A similar approach provided the basis for Commission Regulation No 67/67 on the exemption 
of certain categories of exclusive dealing agreements (First Report on Competition Policy, point 46) .. 
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the system is abused. The Commission will thus be able to check at all times whether 
BMW is improperly restricting entry to the market in BMW products or the sale of 
competing products by BMW dealers. 
Dior and Lancome sales organizations 
93. In two test cases, the Commission completed its examination whether the selec-
tive distribution system applied in the perfumes industry is compatible with Article 
85. 1 These cases concern the French firms Parfums Christian Dior and Lancome, 
which organized the sale of their perfumes and beauty and toiletry goods in the EEC 
through a selective distribution network limited to a restricted number of approved 
retailers. 
The network is organized on the basis of exclusive franchise contracts concluded by 
each of the two firms with its general agents in the various EEC countries and on 
distribution contracts applied by the general agents in their respective territories. 
94. In response to a statement of objections from the Commission, the two firms 
deleted a number of clauses from their agreements which imposed serious restraints 
on competition. This particularly concerned provisions requiring approved Dior and 
Lancome retailers: 
- to make supplies only to ultimate customers; this amounted to an indirect export 
ban; 
- to obtain supplies only from the general agent for their country; this amounted to 
an indirect import ban; 
- to charge maintained prices, even for reimported or re-exported products. 
The effect of these arrangements was to make it quite impossible for Dior or Lancome 
approved retailers to engage in cross-frontier trade, so that EEC markets were parti-
tioned on national lines at the distribution stage and sometimes considerable price 
differences for identical products were maintained within the common market. 
95. Now that the offending clauses have been abandoned, Dior and Lancome 
approved retailers have acquired the freedom within their respective trade networks to 
sell to or purchase from any approved general agent or retailer in other EEC countries, 
and themselves to determine the selling prices of products sold by them whether they 
are reimported from or re-exported to other common market countries. Consumers 
will thus benefit from the new competitive situation with the Dior and Lancome sales 
networks. Retail prices for the products in the various EEC Member States should 
from now on gradually align themselves. 
1 Bull. EC 12-1974, point 2123. In a third test case, adaptations are in progress. 
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96. The market for perfumes and beauty and toiletry products is characterized by the 
existence of a fairly large number of competing firms, none of which holds a really 
pre-eminent position. Dior and Lancome account for relatively small market shares 
in each of the EEC countries. 
In view of the changes made by Dior and Lancome to their respective distribution 
systems by abandoning restrictive clauses and in view of the nature of the relevant 
market, the Commission decided that it had no grounds for action under Article 85(1) 
in respect of the selection of sales points as 'currently practised by these two firms. 
The Commission informec;l Dior and Lancome that it would check to make sure that 
the admission of qualified retailers to their respective distribution networks or their 
exclusion therefrom were not based on arbitrary decisions and were not a disguised 
means of cutting out competition in intra-Community trade between approved distri-
butors in a given network. 
97. These cases indicate the general lines which the Commission could apply to 
future similar cases in the perfumes industry. 
Exclusive dealing agreements 
Agreement between Goodyear Italiana and Euram Italia 
98. The Commission decided that Article 85(1) was applicable to the exclusive 
dealing agreement concluded by Goodyear Italiana with Euram Italia for the distri-
bution in Italy of plastic film for packing food products bearing the Vitafilm trade-
mark. 1 An exclusive dealing agreement involving only undertakings within a single 
Member State and concerning the sale of products within that State cannot qualify 
for block exemption under Regulation No 67(67;2 if Article 85(1) is found to apply, 
exemption can only be by individual decision. In this case the Commission decided to 
grant exemption under Article 85 (3) since the current version pf the agreement does 
not contain provisions appreciably restricting competition other than such provisions 
as would have been authorized by the Regulation. 
99. The restrictions of competition resulting from the grant of this exclusive dealing 
concession, under which the dealer has to confine his active sales policy to the 
.Italian market and to refrain from selling any competing products, were regarded as 
appreciable and as liable to affect intra-Community trade in view of the important 
position held by Euram, currently the only Italian firm offering the full range of 
1 Commission Decision of 19.12.1974 in Case IV/23.013: OJ L 38 of 12.2.1975, p. 10. 
2 Commission Regulation No 67/67/EEC of 22.3.1967 on the application of Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty to certain categories of exclusive dealing agreements: OJ 57 of 25.3.1967, p. 849; amended 
by. Regulation (EEC) No 2591/72 of 8.12.1972: OJ L 276 of 9.12.1972, p. 15 (First Report on 
Competition Policy, point 50). 
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products necessary for film-packaging of food. There'is growing demand for the 
product concerned and the exclusive dealer meets this demand through direct supplies 
to users (food supermarkets and self-service stores); the decision recognized that the 
exclusive dealing agreement has made it easier for users to obtain supplies of this form 
of packaging. 
100. As regards the movement of these items within the common market, the original 
version of the agreement prohibited the dealer from exporting these products from 
his own territory. Following the Commission's intervention, he may now sell anywhere 
in the common market although he may not undertake active sales promotion in 
other common market countries (branches, supply depots, advertising). The Commis-
sion decision also took account of the fact that Vitafilm products manufactured else-
where may be imported freely into Italy, both from other Community countries and 
from outside the Community. 
101. The fact that the dealer was prohibited from exporting the relevant products 
outside the EEC was not regarded as an appreciable restraint of competition since, 
in view of other supply possibilities available to Community purchasers, it was 
unlikely that Vitafilm products previously sold by Goodyear Italiana to Euram and 
then exported from the EEC by Euram would be resold in the common market. 
At the moment there are no such price discrepancies between the EEC and non-
member countries as would absorb the additional costs involved in such an operation 
nor are such discrepancies likely to develop in the forseeable future. Thus the Com-
mission followed the line of authority it has already established in this field, l concen-
trating its appraisal of the clause on the question whether or not the restriction of 
competition was appreciable rather than whether intra-Community trade was liable 
to be affected. 
Agreement between Europair and Duro-Dyne 
102. The second decision in this field gave the Commission an opportunity to state 
its views on an agreement belonging to the other category of exclusive dealing agree-
ments not qualifying for block exemption under Regulation No 67/67. This category 
concerns contracts which cover the whole EEC area, whereas the Regulation deals 
only with those which cover a defined area of the common market. In the case in 
question, the Commission granted an exemption for an agreement under which the 
American company, Duro-Dyne Corporation (New York) appointed the Belgian 
company Europair SA (Brussels) as its main exclusive dealer for the importation 
into the whole EEC area of a range of parts and fittings intended mainly for use in 
heating and air-conditioning installations.2 
1 Cf especially the Commission's Decision of 30.6.1970 (KODAK); OJ L 147 of 7.7.1970, p. 24. 
2 Commission's Decision of 19.12.1974 in Case IV/560 OJ L 29 of 3.2.1975, p. 11. 
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103. The grant of an exclusive dealership for the whole EEC area was regarded as a 
restriction of competition liable to affect trade between Member States, since it meant 
that no dealers in the EEC other than the ~uthorized, dealer could obtain supplies of 
the relevant products directly from the principal for resale in the other Member 
States. Consequently intra-Community trade will develop through channels differing 
from those which would have existed in the absence of the agreement. 
Nevertheless, for reasons similar to those underlying Regulation No 67/67, which 
was designed to facilitate trade in goods between Member States, the Commission 
took the view that concentration by Europair of imports into the EEC of a whole 
range of products from a non-member country would facilitate active sales promotion, 
continuity of supplies and rationalization of distribution. Thus the principal no longer 
has to maintain a multiplicity of trading relationships in order to distribute his 
products. The advantage is all the greater in the present case as the relevant products 
can be integrated by the authorized dealer into the complex ranges of parts necessary 
for the various heating and air-conditioning systems available in the Community 
market. 
104. The Commission's Decision also noted that the principal exclusive distributor 
did not enjoy absolute territorial protection, since his principal had not undertaken 
to refrain from indirect supplies to the common market. A further point was that the 
main distributor applied an identical price scale for all his own dealers and that the 
sub-dealing system set up by hiin permitted parallel imports as between the various 
territories of the common market. 
Export bans and measures having equivalent effect 
105. Continuing its action against export bans imposed on dealers and against terms 
of sale restricting dealer-to-dealer sales where, as a result of such bans or restrictions, 
trade between Member States may be affected, l the Commission caused a number of 
marketing policy measures to be brought into line with Article 85 without having to . 
take a formal decision. 
AEG-Telefunken 
106. In response to a statement of objections from the Commission, AEG-Telefunken 
(Frankfurt) lifted a ban on exports to the Netherlands which had been imposed on its 
dealers in the Federal Republic of Germany with regard to the sale of domestic 
electric appliances. 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, point 57; Third Report, points 3 and 64-66. 
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The company regarded the ban as essential for the protection of Dutch consumers, 
since the AEG-Telefunken appliances intended for the German market did not con-
form to the safety regulations in force in the Netherlands. 1 
German dealers are now expressly authorized to export AEG-Telefunken appliances 
to the Netherlands, so that there will be a greater selection of appliances a~ailable on 
the Dutch market through German dealers. Protection of Dutch consumers will be 
guaranteed by virtue of the fact that all appliances offered for sale in the Netherlands, 
whether directly by German dealers or through Dutch dealers, will have to conform 
with the safety regulations or other legal standards applicable in the Netherlands, even 
where they have not been manufactured expressly for the Dutch market. 
This case is in line with the Commission's view that foreign safety regulations cannot 
be used to justify bans on exports. Arrangements made to assure compliance with 
safety requirements must not be such as to restrict exports by being more rigorous 
than is actually necessary. 
Sperry Rand GmbH 
107. Following intervention by the Commission, a series of provisions infringing 
Article 85(1) were removed by Sperry Rand GmbH (Frankfurt), a Sperry Corporation 
subsidiary, manufacturing data processing and transmission equipment, office 
machines and equipment, electric razors and other electrical appliances. 1 The provi-
sions were contained in resale price maintenance contracts and in the supply and 
selling conditions applied by Sperry-Rand GmbH as regards Remington electric 
razors, electric clocks and other electric appliances. The following obligations were 
involved: 
- There was a general prohibition on exports or imports of the relevant products by 
German dealers; 
- German wholesalers were not allowed to supply other wholesalers, unless Sperry-
Rand GmbH had given prior written consent; nor could they supply ultimate 
customers; 
~ German retailers were allowed to sell the relevant products only to ultimate 
customers. 
Commission practice has clearly established that arrangements restricting supplies 
from dealer to dealer, like direct export and import bans, can contribute to market 
fragmentation and infringe Article 85. 
1 Bull. EC 11-1974, point 2110. 
1 Bull. EC 1-1974, point 2113. 
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After-sales service 
108. In the course of its work on monitoring the adaptation of distribution systems' ' 
to the EEC competition rules, the Commission has extended its enquiries to the provi-
sion of after-sales service. 
In order to protect consumers by ensuring that parallel imports in intra-Community 
trade· can take place side by side with producer firms' own distribution channels, 
satisfactory after-sales service must also be available for parallel imports. 
Constructa 
109. A case in point concerned Constructa GmbH (Munich),l a subsidiary of the 
German firm Siemens-Electrogerate GmbH, which, following the Commission's 
intervention, agreed with Siemens SA (Brussels) that the latter would provide after-
sales service when any owners of household electrical appliances manufactured by 
Constructa could not obtain such service elsewhere in Belgium or Luxembourg; 
Henceforth, Belgian and Luxembourg consumers will be able to buy Constructa 
appliances in the country of their choice and from the retailer of their choice, and 
need fear no difficulties should repair work subsequently become necessary. 
§ 4 - Abuse of a dominant position (Article 86 of the EEC Treaty) 
General Motors Continental 
110. Applying the prohibition in Article 86 of abuses of dominant market positions 
to a new type of case, the Commission imposed a fine on General Motors Continental 
NY (GMC), Antwerp.2 
The reason was that it had found that, during the period from 15 March to 31 July 
1973, GMC had intentionally infringed Article 86. From 15 March 1973 onwards, by 
virtue of Belgian law and of the authorization conferred upon it by Opel, GMC had 
sole power to issue certificates of conformity and typeshields establishing that new 
Opel vehicles and Opel vehicles registered abroad for less than six months conformed 
to the general approved type. In this respect GMC had a dominant position in Belgium 
and hence, in a substantial part of the common market. It had abused this dominant 
position on a numper of occasions by charging an excessive price for inspecting new 
Opel vehicles which had not been marketed through its own distribution network in 
Belgium but had been brought in as parallel imports from other countries. The 
excessive price had ~ctually been charged in five cases before the Commission took 
1 Bull EC 7/8-1974, point 2129. 
~ Commission Decision of 19.12.1974 in Case IV/28.851 (GMC): OJ L 29 of 3.2.1975, p. 14. GMC 
has appealed against the decision to the Court of Justice. ' . 
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action. A number of factors went to make up the abuse, including especially the fact 
that GMC had indiscriminately applied the highest inspection fee applicable to 
American General Motors vehicles when inspecting less costly Opel vehicles. 
Intra-Community trade was actually affected in the five cases where parallel importers 
had to bear the excessive charge. But in general, the fact of charging an excessive 
inspection fee was in any case likely to prevent or at least complicate the import of 
Opel vehicles into Belgium by users and dealers through channels other than General 
Motors' own distribution network. 
111. The fact that the Commission had frequently stated1 that it regarded parallel 
imports as particularly deserving of protection in the interests of .competition and of 
consumers within the common market, was one of the decisive factors when the 
amount of the fine was decided upon. Measures which constitute barriers to parallel 
imports-such as the establishment of excessive charges for inspecting motor vehicles 
by a firm whose services individuals and dealers are compelled to use in the case of 
such imports-are just as reprehensible from the point of view of competition policy 
as contractual export bans in distribution agreements. 
However the Commission took one point in GMC's favour, which was that the 
infringement had been only of a short duration and that GMC had already put an 
end to it. 
SACEM and SABAM 
112. The Commission also took action under Article 86 to re-establish normal condi-
tions of competition as regards the management of authors' rights in musical works. 2 
Following the case of 'Gesellschaft fUr musikalische Auffuhrungs~ und mechanische 
Vervielfaltigungsrechte' (GEM A) in Germany, both the Societe des auteurs, com-
positeurs et editeurs de musique (SACEM) in Paris, and the Societe beIge des auteurs, 
compositeurs et editeurs (SABAM) in Brussels also amended their statutes and regula-
tions in such a way as to terminate existing abuses of their dominant positions. The 
Commission was thus able to discontinue the proceedings it had opened against them. 
In 1971,3 the Commission had noted that GEMA practices which constituted an 
abuse of dominant position, prohibited by Article 86 of the EEC Treaty, had the effect 
of limiting the commercial freedom of composers, authors and music publishers in 
Germany. The principle underlying the Commission's finding has since been con-
firmed by a ruling of the Court of Justice.4 
1 e.g., First Report on Competition Policy, point 48; Second Report, points 40-43; Third Report, 
point 65. 
2 Bull. EC 3-1974, point 2111. 
3 Commission Decision of 2.6.1971; OJ L 134 of 20.6.1971, p. 15. 
4 Judgment of 27.3.1974 in Case 127/13 (BRT v SABAM). 
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As GEMA had done before, SACEM and SABAM implemented a policy of: 
discrimination against the nationals of other Member States; 
worldwide monopolization of their members' copyrights; 
an excessively long obligation to the company for members (50 years in the case of 
SACEM); 
a system preventing the setting up of a unified common market in music publishers' 
services. 
113. Firstly, following the Commission's Decisions of 2 June 1971 and 6 July 1972, 
GEM A discontinued practices found contrary to Article 86, without appeaL 
Secondly, SACEM and SABAM abolished all discrimination against nationals of 
other Member States and agreed to allow their members greater freedom, both as to 
the mode of exploitation of their copyrights and as to the choice of society to which 
such rights could be assigned. 
The restoration' of better competitive conditions with regard to the management of 
copyright, which the Commission has in this way obtained, will allow authors, com-
posers, and music publishers a freer hand in deciding how their rights are to be man-
aged, and this should, in turn entail financial advantages for them. 
§ 5 - Formation of joint subsidiaries 
SHV -Chevron 
114. In its first decision on such a matter in the EEC sphere,1 the Commission gave 
negative clearance for the formation of joint subsidiaries responsible for distributing 
certain petroleum products under a general cooperation agreement between Steen-
kolen-Handelsvereniging NV (SHY) and Chevron Oil Europe Ihc. (Chevron).:Z 
The decision stated that on the basis of the facts in its possession, the Commission 
had no grounds for action under Article 85 (l) in respect of the general cooperation 
agreement or of the specific national agreements which derive from it. 3 This decision 
is important as a matter of principle, in that it deals, under Articles 85 and 86, with 
the problem of joint subsidiaries formed under a general cooperation agreement 
containing clauses under which the parent companies agree not to compete in the 
products covered by the agreement. 
1 See also Second Report on Competition Policy, point 63. 
2 Commission Decision of20.12.I974 in Case IV/26.872 (SHV-Chevron): OJ L 38 ofl2.2.1975, p. 14. 
3 Article 2 of Council Regulation No 17 of 6.2.1962: OJ 13 of 21.2.1962, p. 204. 
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115. SHY is a Dutch group with diversified interests in the coal industry, chain stores 
and transport; although it is associated with other companies in oil exploration, it 
has no refineries and does not constitute a petroleum group. Under the agreements it 
has given up all its own activities in the distribution of certain petroleum products. 
Chevron Oil Europe Inc. is a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of California 
(Socal), an integrated American multinational oil group whose activities include crude 
oil production, oil refining and distribution, petrochemicals and manufacture of 
fertilizers. 
Under their general agreement, Chevron and SHY have set up through a joint holding 
company subsidiaries, all known as Calpam, in which each party has an equal holding. 
The subsidiaries will sell certain petroleum products in Belgium, the Netherlands, 
, Luxembourg, Germany and Denmark, where Chevron and SHY hitherto had indepen-
dent distribution networks. The general cooperation agreement and the individual 
agreements forming a Calpam subsidiary for each country involve the following 
products (except in Germany): 1 paraffin, heating oil, industrial oil, asphalt and marine 
fuels and lubrication oils. 
Chevron and SHY have vested in the Calpam subsidiaries for at least fifty years their 
distribution networks and all assets relating thereto (plant, equipment, etc.). 
116. In its decision the Commission stated that most aspects of this transaction suggest 
that the formation of the joint subsidiaries will result in an extensive concentration of 
operations relating to distribution of Chevron and SHY products in the new Calpam 
trading structure. The agreements show that there will be a permanent modification 
of market structures, especially in SHY, which will no longer be in business as an 
independent wholesale buyer of petroleum products; SHY and Chevron, having' 
divested themselves of their individual distribution systems, will no longer retail the 
relevant products separately; the fact that the joint subsidiaries have been set up for a 
fifty-year period is strong evidence that the assets in question are to be transferred 
permanently to the Cal pam companies. 
117. As regards distribution of the products covered by the arrangement, Chevron 
and SHY have each agreed not to compete with the other without that other's prior 
consent. But in this case it was decided that the non-competition clause involved no 
appreciable restriction of competition, in view of the nature of the two founder 
companies. 
This clause provided SHY with an assurance that the transfer of its assets to the joint 
subsidiaries would not cause depreciation of these assets as a result of Chevron's 
competition with the joint subsidiaries. Indeed, none of Chevron's industrial or 
trade interests are such that Chevron would be likely to compete with undertakings in 
1 In Germany. the agreements for the time being cover only marine fuels and lubricating oils. 
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which it has a 50% interest. SHY disappears as an independent wholesaler on the 
petroleum product market, with no likelihoo~ of ever being able to return. 
118. The original version of the cooperation agreement contained a non-competition' 
clause as regards petroleum products not distributed by the Cal pam companies, . 
i.e., lubricants, diesel oil and petrol in the Benelux and Denmark. The Commission 
decided that this clause was caught by Article 85(1), and the parent companies deleted 
it so as not to impede the grant of negative clearance. 
The Commission also took the view that the fact that Chevron was to fix the price of 
asphalt sold by the Calpam companies did not constitute a restraint of competition, 
since asphalt was not one of the products formerly sold by SHY. 
119. Accordingly, the Commission concluded that the operation did not constitute 
an infringement of Article 85(1). 
, Finally, since Chevron's and SHY's share of the relevant market in the products in 
question (a substantial part of the common market) did not confer a dominant position 
on either of the undertakings, the Commission felt that the agreement did not require 
investigation under Article 86. ' 
§ 6 - Merger control (Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty) 
Main mergers authorized 
120. The main decisions aciopted by the Commission in 1974 under Article 66 of the 
ECSC Treatyl are those authorizing: 
- August Thyssen-Hiitte to acquire not more than 25% of the share capital in 
Solmer; 
- British Steel Corporation to acquire control of Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd; 
- 'the Federal Republic of Germany to acquire a majority shareholding in Gelsen-
berg AG and to integrate Gelsenberg into VEBA. 
Tbyssen/Solmer 
121. By Decision of 20 November 19742 the Commission authorized August Thys-. 
sen-Hiitte AG (Thyssen) to acquire shares in the French steel firm Societe Lorraine 
et Meridionale de Laminage Continu SA (Solmer), Fos-sur-Mer (Bouches du 
l The other decisions on the coal and steel industries taken under Article 66 are listed in the Annex. 
See pp. 130 to 132 . 
. 2 Commission Decision of 20.11.1974, OJ L 49 of 25.2.1975, p. 13. 
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RhOne), which will now be controlled by the Sacilor group (Acieries et Laminoirs de 
Lorraine SA), Usinor (Union Siderurgique du Nord et de l'Est de la France SA) and 
Thyssen. 
Thyssen is the largest steelmaker in Germany and the second largest in the Community. 
Sacilor and U sinor are the top two steel producers in France, and fifth and eighth in the 
Community. 
The agreement between Thyssen, Sollac (Societe Lorraine de Laminage Continu 
SA - controlled by Sacilor-Usinor) and Solmer provides for Thyssen to acquire by 
stages 25% of the capital of Solmer, through simultaneous reductions in the 50% 
holdings of Sollac and Usinor. 
Solmer is a producer of flat products whose production capacity by 1978 will be as 
follows: 3.5 million tonnes of crude steel, 3 million tonnes of coils, 1.1 million tonnes 
of plate and 0.5 million tonnes of sheet. 
A second stage of development, after 1978, will probably double these figures. Solmer 
does not make steel sections. 
122. In appraising the effects of Thyssen's acquisitions on competition in the common 
market, the Commission considered the likelihood of the three parties aligning their 
conduct in the flat products market. 
Here the Commission bore in mind that Solmer is a production cooperative which 
supplies its products at cost price to its members in proportion to their shareholdings. 
These members--the three groups-will process the bulk of the unfinished products 
(coils) acquired from Solmer in their own plants, and will market the finished products 
through their own distribution systems, so that Solmer will not be on the market as a 
supplier. 
Moreover the three groups will continue to manufacture in their own plants the bulk 
of their requirements for flat products of the types manufactured by Solmer. Thus 
they will be dependent on Solmer only to a limited extent. 
Even at the second stage (7 million tonnes of crude steel), Solmer will account for no 
more than 16% of Thyssen's coil production, 11 % of its plate and 4% of its sheet. 
Thyssen currently processes some 90% of its coils into other products, particularly 
sheet. 
Admittedly, competition between the three groups in relation to investments and 
flat products will be restricted, but each group remains free to practise an independent 
pricing policy. The groups will be market competitors throughout their production 
ranges. The number of suppliers will not be changed and there will be enough producers 
of comparable size in the common market to ensure effective competition. 
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The Commission therefore concluded that a Thyssen shareholding in Solmer would 
not give the undertakings concerned the power to hinder effective competition on the 
market in flat products or to evade the rules of competition instituted under the Treaty. 
123. However, to ensure that the three groups remain effectively independent of each 
other, the Commission has made the authorization subject to four conditions: 
(i) the groups must remain fully independent of each other in their marketing 
operations; 
(ii) except for joint decisions on investment and production by Solmer, they must 
refrain from concluding any further agreements, from aligning their market 
behaviour and from establishing interlocking directorates or other management 
links without the Commission's approval; 
'(iii) any increase in Solmer's production capacity must be approved by the Com-
mission; this is to ensure that each group's share in Solmer's productiQn remains 
below its own production; 
(iv) the authorization extends only to production of flat products by Solmer. 
124. Although Article 66 does not require the advantages of concentrations to be 
taken into consideration (e.g., rationalization), this case is nevertheless of considerable 
interest in relation to the Community's industrial policy. 
In its Memorandum on the general objectives of the Community iron and steel 
industry, 1975-80,1 the Commission forecast that the trend towards larger steel works 
and jirms would continue, while financial problems could be expected to arise from 
the lengthy period required to get steel mills into production. So that the Community 
steel industry should not be founded on a narrow national basis, which leads to a 
costly dispersion of undersized production facilities, particularly where flat products 
are concerned, the Commission expressed the hope that transnational mergers would 
take place. . 
Solmer represents just such a case; it will enable investment to be made on the scale 
called for by technological developments in flat products and the firms will be able 
more rapidly to attain an optimum scale of operations through joint financing. 
Solmer is the forth major case after Sidmar, Hoesch/Hoogovens (ESTEL) and 
Rochling/Burbach of transnational cooperation between Community steel producers 
to be authorized by the Commission under Article 66. 
1 OJ C 96 of 29.9.1971, p. 72. 
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British Steel Corporation/Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd. 
125. By decision of 5 December 1974,1 the Commission authorized British Steel 
Corporation (BSC) to acquire a majority shareholding in Johnson and Firth Brown 
Ltd., Sheffield. With an annual turnover of £1 775 million and an output of 23 
million tonnes of crude steel, BSC is the largest steel producer in the Community_ 
Johnson and Firth Brown Ltd. (JFB), with a turnover of £150 million is the holding 
company of a group of undertakings engaged in the production and processing of 
steel and other products, including copper. JFB's main ECSC Treaty steel products 
are forging ingots and blooms, stainless and other alloy bars and wire rods. 
126. Examination of BSC's application in the light of Article 66(2) of the ECSC 
Treaty showed that acquisition of a majority shareholding would not have significant 
effects on competition, provided that BSC did not retain ownership and control over 
two companies in the JFB group, namely William Beardmore & Co Ltd., Glasgow, 
and Johnson & Nephew (Mill Street) Ltd., Manchester. 
Beardmore is responsible for virtually all the forging ingots and blooms made by the 
JFB group for sale to independent forgemaste(s, i.e., companies who have their own 
forging presses but no steel melting facilities. There are about fifteen of these indepen-
dent forgemasters in the United Kingdom and they are responsible for an important 
part of the forgings trade. If BSC were to control Beardmore, it would have, after 
taking account of its own production facilities, about 84% and 100% respectively 
of the forging ingots and blooms marketed in the UK and would have the power to 
prevent effective competition. 
Johnson & Nephew (Mill Street) Ltd. makes wire rods and if it were controlled by 
BSC there would remain only one substantial competitor of BSC on the UK wire 
rod market, while BSC would account for 77% of wire rod production. BSC would 
therefore be in a position to prevent effective competition in supplies of rod to UK 
wire makers. 
127. Accordingly the Commission, after having received the comments of the 
UK Government, gave authorization under Article 66(2) of the ECSC Treaty, 
subject to the condition that within one year BSC should divest itself of all rights in 
Beardmore and in Johnson and Nephew (Mill Street) Ltd. and meanwhile should 
refrairi from interfering in the management of the two companies and from in any way 
jeopardizing their commercial independence . 
1 Commission Decision of 5.12.1974; JFB's proceedings against the Decision are pending before the 
Court of Justice. 
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VEBA/Gelsenberg AG 
128. On 16 December 1974,1 the Commission authorized the Federal Republic of 
Germany to acquire a majority shareholding in Gelsenberg AG, Essen. The Federal 
Government had stated its intention of merging Gelsenberg with the Vereinigte 
Electrizitats- und Bergwerks-Aktiengesellschaft (VEBA), Bonn and Berlin, over 
which its 40% shareholding already gives it virtual control, the rest of the shares 
being dispersed over a large number of small shareholders. 
The merger of Ge1senberg and Veba would bring into existence a large and powerful 
group operating mainly in the areas of petroleum products and production of 
electricity. The merger would also affect their coal production and distribution activi-
ties so that there is a concentration within 'the meaning of Article 66(1). 
Through its subsidiary Raab Karcher GmbH, Essen, and the various companies 
controlled by the latter, Gelsenberg has interests in the solid fuels wholesale trade. 
It is therefore an undertaking covered by Article 80 of the ECSC Treaty. 
VEBA is also an undertaking covered by Article 80, since it controls a number of 
solid fuel distributing firms, including Hugo Stinnes AG, one of the largest in the 
Federal Republic. 
129. In addition to VEBA, the Federal Republic controls other undertakings engaged 
in coal production or distribution within the meaning of Article 80 of the ECSC 
Treaty. However, as the High Authority and the Commission have noted on several. 
occasions when considering Federal shareholdings, these undertakings are not subject 
to a single planning and decision-making body. In fact, they are operated as economi-
cally independent enterprises. In considering the effects of this concentration on 
competition, the Commission therefore confined itself to appraisal of the integration 
of Gelsenberg into VEBA. 
On the solid fuels distribution market, the two companies together account for 
about 33% of wholesale trade in coal in the Federal Republic. The scheme was 
nevertheless authorized under Article 66(2) of the ECSC Treaty, since in particular 
it was found that the undertakings concerned, in view of all the economic circum-
stances, would not have the power to determine prices for solid fuels in a substantial 
part of the market, or to control or restrict distribution. 
Despite this merger, which resulted in a 33% market share, the existence of seven 
other wholesalers with market shares of between 5 % and 10% and of some 150 other 
firms of less importance, together with the high degree of dispersion of firms working 
in this field in Fe,deral territory, ensured that consumers would still have considerable 
scope for choice when obtaining supplies of solid fuels. 
1 Commission Decision of 16.12.1974: 01 L 65 of 12.3.1975, p. 16. 
COMPo REP. 1974 
74. POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES 
As regards prices, effective competition on the relevant market will be ensured to an 
adequate extent by the fact that fuel oil is a substitute for solid fuels and that the oil 
companies sell these products directly, so that a solid fuels wholesaler has little oppor-
tunity to exploit a position of strength on the market. 
130. Consideration of this concentration extended also to the activities of the relevant 
companies in relation to products and services which are subject to analysis under the 
EEC Treaty. In this case the principal items were light and heavy fuel oil, phtalic 
anhydride (chemical primary product for manufacturing flexible plastics, lacquer 
resins and polyester resins), electricity generating and inland waterway shipping. 
The relatively large market shares as regards electricity and phtalic anhydride gave rise 
to the following comments: 
(i) The market shares held by VEBA and the other five electricity producers 
controlled by the Federal Government are of very limited interest since in 
practice, technical requirements give producers territorial monopolies and there 
is no direct competition between them. Electricity users have in effect no choice of 
supplies. Hence the fact that Gelsenberg's low market share will be added to that 
held by VEBA is only of secondary importance. 
(ii) The intensity of competition on the market for phtalic anhydride and its deriv-
atives (flexible plastics, lacquer resins and polyester resins) means that competi-
tion will be unaffected by the merger of VEBA's and Gelsenberg's market 
shares. 
The Commission therefore decided that there was no case for objecting to the con-
centration on the basis of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty. 
131. The acquisition by the Federal German Government of a majority holding in 
the share capital of Gelsenberg was initially prohibited by the Bundeskartellamt under 
section 24(1) of the German Law against restrictions of competition (Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen) (GWB). But the German Federal Minister for Econo-
mic affairs later authorized the scheme under the waiver clause (section 24(3» in the 
general interest of the economy. 
The initial refusal by the Bundeskartellamt to authorize the proposed operation was 
based on criteria in the German law which are different from those of Article 86 of the 
EEC Treaty. Under the GWB, the Kartellamt can forbid mergers which create, or 
constitute a strengthening of, a dominant position on the market; a dominant market 
position is presumed to exist if the undertakings involved by themselves or 
together with third parties have shares of the market which exceed the limits specified 
in the GWB. 
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Rationalization and extension of distribution networks 
132. Regarding the distribution of steel products, the Commission also authorized, 
under Article 66(2) of the ECSC Treaty, a number of mergers designed to rationalize 
or strengthen existing distribution networks or to enable producers and dealers to 
penetrate new markets within the Community more easily. 
The most important decisions taken here were those authorizing: 
the restructuring of the Sacilor trading network; 
the Guest Keen and Nettlefolds Ltd. takeover of Miles Druce and Co Ltd.; 
the acquisition of a majority shareholding in Lye Trading Co Ltd. by British Steel 
Corporation; 
the acquisition of the Cassart Group by Guest Keen and Nettlefolds Ltd.; 
the acquisition of Howard E. Perry Ltd. by Klockner and Co. 
Restructuring the Sacilor trading network 
133. By Decision of 18 July 1974,1 the Commission gave the authorization under 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty applied for by SacilOl-Acieries et Laminoirs de 
Lorraine (formerly Wendel-Sidelor SA) to restructure its trading network. 
Sacilor, a steel producer in eastern France, came into existence as a result of the major 
regrouping of firms in that area which began in 1968. The networks for distribution 
of its production had remained under the financial control of the founder holding 
companies, Compagnie Lorraine Industrielle et Financiere, Compagnie de Saint 
Gobain Pont-a-Mousson and Marine-Firminy. 
134. Once the group's industrial restructuring was complete, it became possible to 
reorganize its trading network in three new companies, Valor SA, Daval SA and Ie 
Fer Blanc SA under SacHor's financial control. Now that SaciIor has full direct 
control over its sales networks, it will be better placed to elaborate a long-term 
business strategy, while by cutting down duplication as between the marketing 
companies it will be able to reduce distribution costs. 
Examination of the transaction revealed that it entailed concentrating assets or firms 
from the'three groups having Sacilor shareh~ldings, so that only the internal structures 
of the SaciIor group were involved and its competitive potential on the market for 
ECSCproducts was not affected. 1 
1 Commission Decision of 18.7.1974, Bull. EC 7/8-1974, point 2125. 
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Guest Keen and Nettlefolds Ltd./Miles Druce and Co. Ltd. 
135. In response to a request made in June 1973 by Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds Ltd., 
Smethwick Warley, Worcestershire, for authorization to acquire the entire capital 
of Miles Druce and Co. Ltd., High Wycombe, the Commission, by decision of 
14 March 1974,1 gave approval to the transaction under Article 66 of the ECSC 
Treaty. 
GKN is a holding company controlling a group of more than 200 firms with a wide 
variety of activities. The major activities of the GKN group cover mechanical engi-
neering, especially for the motor industry, industrial equipment, industrial fasteners 
and the production and distribution of finished steel products. By turnover, the group 
was then the fourteenth largest undertaking in the United Kingdom. 
Miles Druce & Co. Ltd. is a holding company controlling a group consisting largely 
of steel stockholders. It has an Engineering Division and a Safety and Security 
Systems Division. In terms of sales the group in 1973 ranked 301st among United 
Kingdom companies. 
136. Since MD is mainly concerned with steel distribution, the effects of the merger 
would be felt on the steel stockholder market and were covered therefore by Article 66. 
The Commission nevertheless considered the possible influence of the increased ton-
nage of steel to be purchased by the new group on prices charged by the British Steel 
Corporation (BSC). In the light of the rules governing steel prices (Article 60), to 
.which BSC is subject, this influence was not such as to give GKN/MD a substantial 
competitive advantage either on the steel market or on the market for steel products 
covered by the EEC Treaty. 
/ 
The Commission also took the view, as regards the marketing of industrial fasteners, 
where GKN has a dominant position, that the acquisition of MD, which is a small 
distributor of these products, did not constitute an abuse of a dominant position 
within the meaning of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty. 
137. In general terms the proposed acquisition made only a marginal change in 
GKN's position both as a producer and as a seller of steel and steel products. There 
was no effect on the nature and degree of vertical integration within the GKN group. 
The new GKN/MD group is the largest steel distributor on the United Kingdom 
market. In addition to the new group, the GKN/MD merger left within the stock-
hoider market: BSC, the largest steel producer and supplier of most of the steel 
consumers in the United Kingdom, and itself a steel stockholder; some ten dealers 
who, while individually not holding a large share of the national market, enjoy 
1 Commission Decision of 14.3.1974, OJ L 132 of 15.5.1974, p. 28. 
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considerable local power and account for some 40% of the UK stockholder market; 
some 300 medium, or, more often, small undertakings, many of whom are well 
established locally; and the merchants representing continental producers. 1 
British Steel Corporation/Lye Trading Co. Ltd. 
138. By Decision of 14. October 1974,2 the Commission authorized British Steel 
Corporation, London, under Article 66, to acquire a majority shareholding in Lye 
Trading Co. Ltd., Worcestershire, a small steel stockholder on the UK market. As a 
steel producer BSC holds a dominant position on the UK steel market. However 
BSC's importance as a steel stockholder is negligible, since it possesses only one small 
stockholder. H.F. Spencer and Co. Ltd. After acquiring Lye Trading, BSC accounts for 
roughly 7% of the stockholder market in the UK; it is thus of comparable size with 
a number of other major stockholders and producer/stockholders, but lags far behind 
the 20% market share held by GKN after its acquisition of Miles Druce. The Com-
'mission therefore decided that the transaction would not impede effective competition 
on the relevant market. ' 
Guest Keen and Nettlefolds Ltd./Cassart group 
139. Guest Keen & Nettlefolds Ltd. (GKN) was authorized to acquire the shares of 
the Belgian firms Produits metallurgiques Cassart SA, Brussels, Aciers Cassart SA, 
Marcinelle, Cassart Metaux SA, Tilleur, Auxiliaire Cassart SA, Brussels, and Cassart 
Plastique SA, Brussels. 3 This purchase would give GKN control over these firms; 
the'effect of the transaction was thus a concentration within the meaning of Article 66 \ 
of the ECSC Treaty between GKN and the firms belonging to its group and the Belgian 
firms belonging to the Cassart group. 
GKN is engaged in steel production and distribution in the, United Kingdom; in 197,2 
its sales reached some 1.5 million tonnes of steel products. Its exports of ECSC 
products to Belgium wer~negligible, and its exports to other Community countries 
also ran at a low level. The Cassart group is mainly a steel stockholder operating, on 
the Belgian market, with a 1972 throughput of approximately 100 000 tonnes of steel 
products. GKN and Cassart have a combined share ofless than 2% of the entire steel 
1 This was the first time the Commission had to consider a contested takeover bid. Through its board 
of directors, MD made it clear that it was opposed to the takeover and that it proposed to bring 
proceedings to have any decision authorizing the transaction declared void. In the interests of 
fair treatment, the Commission wished to make sure that the company whicli was to be taken over 
could actually exercise the legal rights which the Treaty makes available to all concerned. It decided 
that the decision should take effect three weeks after notification, so that MD had an opportunity 
to appeal and, if it so desired, to take interlocutory proceedings before the Court of Justice (see 
point 59). 
1 Commission Decision of 14.10.1974, Bull. EC 10 -1974, point 2111. 
3 .commiSSion decision of 8.7.1974, Bull. EC 7/8-1974, point 2126. 
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products market in the Community. In Belgium they will account for some 2.5% of 
the stockholder market. 
The Commission decided that, as a purchaser of steel products, the Cassart group 
would provide GKN with a possible new outlet for its rolled products, thus giving 
GKN a bridgehead on the continent. In view of the intensive competition facing 
producers of finished rolled products, GKN's acquisition ofCassart would not impede 
effective competition. 
Howard E. Perry & Co. Ltd./Kliickner & Co. 
140. On 2 October 1974,1 the Commission authorized, under Article 66, the acquisi-
tion of Howard E. Perry & Co. Ltd., Willenhall, Staffordshire by Klockner & Co., 
Duisburg, a major steel stockholder. Perry holds only a small share of the United 
Kingdom steel stockholder market. However, the transaction will give KlOckner 
and Co. a chance to penetrate the UK market, thus intensifying competition in an 
area of the common market which is not yet properly integrated. 
Interim measures of protection 
141. During 1974 the Commission found it necessary to take interim measures of 
protection under the third subparagraph of Article 66(5) of the ECSC Treaty in two 
cases involving concentrations between undertakings. The first concerned Marine-
Firminy SA, Schneider SA, Denain and the de Wendel group; and the second 
concerned the British company Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd., the British Steel 
Corporation and Dunford Hadfields Ltd. 
In both of these cases the Commission took account of the Order of the President 
of the Court of Justice given on 11 October 1973 in Joined Cases 160/73R and 
161j73R (Miles DrucejGKN), which stated that 'if... the status quo should appear 
to be threatened for any reason whatsoever, it will be for the Commission, with due 
notice, to make an immediate decision on the matter under Article 66 of the Treaty, 
or, at the very least, on the interim measures provided for by Article 66(5), third 
subparagraph, ... '.2 
Marine-Firminy SA/Schneider SA/Denain/de Wendel 
142. On 5 April 1974, at the request of Marine-Firminy SA (Marine), the Commission 
took interim measures of protection to preserve the status quo while it was examining 
the situation arising from the acquisition by Schneider of 34% of the share capital in 
Marine. 3 By its Decision of 27 October 1970 the Commission had authorized the 
1 Bull. EC 10-1974, point 2110. 
2 Point 59. 
:J Bull. EC 4-1974, point 2110. 
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establishment of common and equal control by Schneider and Marine over Creusot-
Loire SA; at that time Schneider and Marine had reciprocally undertaken not to 
change the state of equilibrium within Creusot-Loire by buying each other's shares in 
that company. The purchase in November 1973 by Schneider of the 34% holding in 
Marine effectively changed that equilibrium, although Schneider agreed temporarily 
to deposit the shares with a bank and not to exercise the voting rights attaching to 
them. The interim measures of protection granted by the Commission on 5 April 
safeguarded the independence of Marine pending a decision by the Commission under 
Article 66. Inter alia, the measures prevented Schneider from purchasing Marine 
. shares or from using the voting rights attaching to the shares which it already held in 
Marine. 
The status quo was again threatened early in December 1974, when Denain Nord-Est 
Longwy SA (Denain) made a takeover bid for the shares of Marine. Following this 
move, the Wendel Group (through Compagnie Lorraine Industrielle et Financiere, 
'CLIF') began to make purchases of Marine shares on the open market. Also 
Schneider. asked· to be relieved from the interim prohibition on its purchase of 
Marine shares. On 21 December 1974, the Commission took interim measures of 
protection to maintain the balance between the interested parties and ordered Denain 
and de Wendel to suspend their moves to secure control of Marine pending definitive 
decisions by the Commission under Article 66 on the applications made by CLIF and 
Denain and the Schneider holding company. 
Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd./British Steel Corporation/Dunford Hadfields Ltd. 
143. On 1 November 1974, the British Steel Corporation (BSC) informed the Com-
mission of its intention to make a bid for a controlling interest in the share capital of 
the British steel company Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd. (JFB). BSC undertook to take 
the necessary steps to prevent itself from exercising, in advance of authorization by the 
Commission, the control overJFB deriving from the acquisition of these shares. 
However, on 18 November 1974, the board of directors of JFB requested the Com~ 
mission to take interim measures of protection under Article 66(5) to prevent BSC 
from acquiring a controlling interest unless the Commission gave prior authority. 
Having regard to the request and to the dominant position of ESC in the United 
Kingdom steel market, the Commission granted interim measures of protection 
against BSC on 20 November 1974. 
On 27 November 1974, at the request of BSC, the Commission granted interim 
measures of protection against a further British steel company, Dunford Hadfields 
Ltd., who had also intimated their intention of acquiring a controlling interest in 
JFB, for which they too would require prior authority from the Commission. This 
action by the Commission ensured that both BSC and Dunford Hadfields were pla·ced 
on the same footing pending the Commission's ruling on the merits of BSC's 
application. . 
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On 5 December 1974 the Commission authorized BSC to acquire a controlling interest 
in JFB, subject to certain conditions designed to preserve the competitive situation. 1 
At the same time, the Commission revoked the interim measures against Dunford 
Hadfields to enable the latter to proceed if it wished with its own bid for a controlling 
interest in JFB subject to the Commission's authorization for any actual acquisition. 
The principle of avoiding any discrimination as between BSC and Dunford Hadfields 
was thus preserved. 
§ 7 - Market surveillance following Commission decisions 
144. On an earlier occasion,2 the Commission stated that it had initiated monitoring 
procedures to check whether its earlier decisions were being complied with, and 
that it planned to do this more extensively. Recent enquiries to this end have concen-
trated on fertilizer sales agencies, and changes in dyestuffs prices have also occupied 
the Commission's attention. 
Fertilizer sales agencies 
145. In 1968 and 1969 the Commission gave negative clearance to three joint selling 
agencies for fertilizers manufactured respectively in Belgium, France and Italy. 
The first two clearance decisions, dated 6 November 1968,3 concerned the Belgian 
agency (Cobelaz-Usines de Synthese et Cobelaz-Cokeries) and the French agency 
(Comptoir Fran~ais de I' Azote - CFA). Negative clearance in the third case was given 
on 3 June 19694 to the Italian agency SEIFA (Societa per 10 Sviluppo dei Consumi 
dei Fertilizzanti). 
The agreements notified conferred powers on the agencies covering national territory, 
other Community countries and non-member countries. 
Before granting negative clearance, the Commission had asked the agencies to 
abandon all responsibilities in respect of intra-Community trade; this was then done. 
However, when clearing the agencies, the Commission also decided that the fertilizer 
industry should be monitored closely and that it should check particularly whether the 
surviving parts of the agreements did not in fact involve market fragmentation by 
country.s 
The enquiry carried out under Council Regulation No 17 yielded a certain amount 
of information on the ~elling agencies and on the general situation in this industry. 
The main points are as follows: 
1 Point 125. 
2 Sixth General Report on the Activities of the Communities (1972), point 86. 
3 OJ L 276 of 14.11.1968, p. 29. • 
4 OJ L 173 of 15.7.1969, p. 8. 
S First Report on Competition Policy, point 13; Third Report, point 50. 
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The Belgian agency -;- Cobelaz 
The Cobelaz-Usines de synthese agreement was extensively amended on 1 July 1969; 
since then Cobelaz has had no responsibilities for marketing synthetic nitrogenous 
fertilizers in Belgium. It deals exclusively with sales outside the Communities. As 
regards ammonium sulphate from coke ovens, Cobelaz now markets the production 
of only one company, and it has become, so to speak, that company's sales depart-
ment. 
The French agency - Comptoir franrais de l'azote (CFA) 
On 1 June 1969, the members of this agency withdrew all its responsibilities for 
\ marketing in France. The CF A has now no activities within the nine countries, being 
responsible only for exports outside the Community. 
The Italian Agency - Societa per 10 sviluppo dei consumi (SE/FA) 
SEIFA gave up all sales business on 30 June 1972 and was absorbed by Montecatini-
Edison SpA on 3 July of that year, when it ceased to exist as a separate legal entity. 
, 
However, although these agencies no longer operate in the Community, there does not 
seem to have been any substantial corresponding increase in the volume of intra-
Community trade. 
French producers export only 4 to 6% of their total production to other Community 
countries, and Italian producers less than 1 %. Only Belgium exports half of its 
production,' France and Germany taking equal shares. But here marketing policy is 
selective: Belgian producers steer clear of the Dutch market (which takes only 2% of 
their sales) for fear of a retaliatory inflow of Dutch products into Belgium. 
Dyestuffs prices 
146. Although a Commission Decision of 24 July 19691 was issued against a number 
of dyestuffs producers who had acted in concert to raise their prices, suspicion arose 
in 1972 that a concerted policy on price increases was still being pursued. 
Investigations revealed that the 1972 price increases did not take place simultaneously 
but were spread over several months. On the other hand, the increases applied by the 
various producers were always identical within a given Member State: 
Italy 11 % 
Germany 7% 
France 10% 
United Kingdom 11% 
Belgium 11% 
Netherlands 11 % 
1 OJ L 195 of 7.8.1969, p. 11. 
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There are a few exceptions, but not enough to remove the impression that there is 
a concerted policy. 
While these investigations were proceeding, the system for increasing prices 'was 
changed. Subsequent increases (late 1973 and early 1974) were not expressed as across-
the-board percentages but as individual amounts for each product. Percentage 
conversion alters the figures considerably. 
147. The Commission is examining the results of the enquiries in both cases with a 
view to possible action. 
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Chapter I 
State aids 
§1 - General 
148. In 1974, while pursuing the measures undertaken during the preceding financial 
years, the Commission extended its activities to include new areas, in particular 
environmental aid, an area where, for obvious reasons, assistance from the Member 
States is tending to increase. 
The Commission considers it of the greatest importance in the present situation that 
the rules on State aids laid down in the Treaty should be strictly observed. The devel-
opment of the general economic situation presents two kinds of problems at the same , 
time for the Community: those engendered by the serious economic slowdown, and 
those resulting from the new energy situation, which calls for important structural 
changes, some industries having to speed up their development while others must 
undertake certain modifications to their plans. 
Only if Community rules on aids are respected will it be possible for Government 
assistance measures to overcome the relevant problems effectively, rapidly and with 
the minimum cost, avoiding mutual overbidding with all that that would entail: the 
neutralizing of the effects of those national policies which are most justified, the 
exporting of unemployment from one Member State to another and, finally, the 
aggravation of the Community situation as a whole. The Commission will use the 
powers, conferred on it by the Treaty in this area to prevent this occurring. 
§ 2 - Regional aid systems 
149. On regional aids, the Commission continued its efforts to formulate a new 
coordination arrangement which would take account of the diversity of the regional 
situations in the enlarged Community and whose principles would apply to all the 
Community regions, taking into consideration the relative seriousness of the problems 
in each of the regions not designated as 'central' in the Commission COmIDunications 
to the Council of 23 June 1971 1 and 28 June 1973.2 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, point 145 et seq. 
2 Third Report on Competition Policy, point 82. 
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In this last Communication and in a new Communication dated 28 Novemberl973, 
setting out the guidelines from which it was working, l the Commission undertook to 
define the principles of this new coordination solution by 31 December 1974 at the 
latest. However, the work begun with the competent national authorities was 
initially hampered by certain technically complex problems and certain political 
obstacles. These difficulties are now being overcome and the Commission hopes to be 
able to finalize in the near future a new coordination arrangement with the following 
main features: 
- the terms 'central' and 'peripheral' used to determine the categories of regions 
, in the 1971 coordination arrangement would be dropped; 
- the coordination principles in force for the regions previously designated as 
'central' (excepting certain regions in Italy) would be maintained; 
- the principles governing aid, in particular, aid intensity would be differentiated 
more widely in the light of the nature and the seriousness of the problems besetting 
other regions. 
§ 3 - Aid system for specific industries or sectors 
Shipbuilding 
150. The Council continued examination of the Commission's proposals on ship-
building, presented at the end of 1973, which are directed towards the definition of a 
reorganization and investment policy coordinated at Community level. One of the 
bases of this policy will be the third Directive on shipbuilding, discussed in the Third 
Report on Competition Policy.2 
Because of the complexity of the material and the doubts of some Member States 
regarding the system of prior examination which it lays down for large-scale invest-
ment aid projects in this sector, the Council has not yet been able to adopt the third 
Directive. Consequently, on proposals from the Commission, the second Directive,3 
due to lapse on 31 December 1973, was twice extended for six months. Since progress 
was not sufficient to allow the speedy adoption of the third Directive, the Commission 
proposed to the Council in December 1974 that the second Directive be extended once 
again until 31 June 1975, so as to avoid a legal gap in the specific Community rules on 
aid to shipbuilding and to allow the Council to reach agreement. The Council adopted 
this proposal on 19 December 1974.4 
1 Third Report on Competition Policy, point 83. 
2 Third Report on Competition Policy, points 90 to 99. 
3 Second Report on Competition Policy, point 95. 
4 OJ L 349 of 28.12.1974, p. 62. 
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Modification of the OECD arrangement on credits granted for the export of ships 
i51. The conditions applying to credits granted in most shipbuilding countries for 
the export of ships are governed by the resolution of the OECD Council of 30 May 
1969. These conditions are also adopted on a Community level in the proposal for a 
third council Directive on aids to shipbuilding. 
It had been agreed in 1971 that the maximum duration of these credits must not 
exceed eight years and that the annual interest rate must not be below 7.5%, while 
payment on account before delivery must be at least 20% of the contract price. 
In view of trends on the shipbuilding market and the desire of the governments 
participating in the arrangement to phase out gradually all the obstacles in the way 
of establishing normal competitive conditions in the shipbuilding industry, the 
OECD Council decided, on 18 July 1974, to tighten up these rules: the maximum 
duration was reduced from eight to seven years, the minimum rate was increased to 
8% and the minimum advance payment was raised to 30% of the contract price. . 
These amendments thus constitute an important step in the reduction of distortions of 
competition in shipb1,1ilding. 
France 
152. During 1973, the Commission initiated against the French Government the 
procedure provided for in Article 169 on grounds of infringement of Article 5 of the 
second Council Directive on aids to shipbuilding,! which requires Member States to 
refrain from any discriminatory practice favouring, within their national territories, 
the building .or conversion of ships or the manufacture of items intended to form part 
of such ships. ' 
The infringement resulted from the fact that, under the insurance system applied in 
France against exceptional cost increases, calculation of the allowance granted to the 
French shipyards to compensate for cost increases did not take account of the prices 
of materials imported from other Member States and used in ships built in France. 
This led the national shipbuilders to give preference to French materials so as not to 
lose the benefit of the guarantee granted to them by the insurance system. 
Following an undertaking given by the French authorities to include imported 
materials with effect from 1 March 1974, the Commission decided to terminate the, 
infringement procedure which it had initiated. 
1 Third Report on Competition Policy, point 99. 
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Textile industry 
British aid to the wool industry 
153. The United Kingdom notified the Commission of an aid scheme designed to 
promote the rationalization and reorganization of the British wool industry, in 
particular through the elimination of unprofitable production plant. 
This aid scheme, which constitutes a sectoral aid programme within the terms of the 
1972 Industry Act, makes available a total credit of £ 15 million and envisages four 
types of operation to be carried out during a four-year period ending on 31 December 
1977: 
- projects for the replacement of equipment may qualify for a 15% subsidy; 
- projects combining rebuilding and re-equipment may qualify for a 20% subsidy; 
--.:... projects designated as 'wider-ranging and major projects' which, apart from the 
replacement of existing plant (which may qualify for the aids mentioned above), are 
intended to rationalize the production process within one or more firms, may also 
qualify either for loans (duration 7 years, interest rates slightly below that of the 
market and, possibly, interest-free for 2 years) or for interest subsidies (3% for 
4 years) on loans contracted on the market; 
- projects for the closure of firms or production units qualify for a subsidy of 4% of 
the turnover of the last year of operation or of 2.50% of turnover plus £ 150 per 
loom scrapped and £ 1.50 per ring-spindle equivalent scrapped. 
Of the total appropriation of £ 15 million, £4 million will go to each of the first three 
categories of projects, and the remainder to the fourth. 
Very tight control will be excercised to ensure that firms receiving aid do not use this 
to increase their production capacity; thus, in the case of combing machines, re-equip-
ment aid is subject to the scrapping of an existing capacity equal to the new capacity; 
in the case of cards, spindles, looms and dying facilities, capacity equal to 90% of 
the new capacity must be scrapped. 
154. The reasons given by the United Kingdom authorities for this assistance are of 
two kinds: 
Over the last ten years, the competitive position of the British wool industry on the 
world market has steadily declined. From 1962 to 1972 British production decreased 
by 26% while that of the Community of Six increased by 15%. This was because 
industrial facilities are too widely dispersed and almost on the level of cottage indus-
tries-in 1971, out of a total of 430 firms, only 4 had assets exceeding £ 10 million-and 
this keeps profits low and therefore curtails investment. 
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The industry is highly concentrated geographically; of the 100000 persons employed, 
70% work in Yorkshire and 10% in Scotland. In many areas of Yorkshire,'it is the 
only economic activity. In this region, as. in Scotland, the unemployment rate is 
considerably higher than the national average. The healthy economic situation in 1973 
therefore masked structural problems which threatened to bring severe social prob-
lems in their wake in these regions in the future. . 
155. The Commission raised no objection to the implementation of this aid system. 
Given its limited period of application, the fact that it will allow the structures of the 
industry concerned to be improved by modernization and regrouping of firms without 
an overall increase in production capacity, and the fact equally that reorganization will 
prevent the emergence of social difficulties in certain less well-off regions, the Com-
mission felt that the aid system was within the limits set out in the Communication on 
the 'Community framework for aids to the textile industry' which it had addressed 
to the Member States in July 1971.1 
However, sin~e the 'wider-ranging and major projects' were not clearly enough defined 
in the aid system notified, the Commission asked the United Kindom Government to 
specify the criteria which those qualifying would have to meet, or to notify it in advance 
of all the specific cases coming under this heading. The Commission also requested 
that the reorganization objectives of the scheme be respected in the granting of 
regional aids which can be combined with the assistance provided for under the wool 
programme. Finally, the Commission asked that material to be scrapped and replaced 
by new equipment under the aid scheme be defined in such a way that there is certainty 
that it was in fact being used during a significant period of the year preceding its 
scrapping. 
Italy: Temporary charging to general taxation of certain 
social security contributions 
156. The Italian authorities introduced, without prior notification to the Commission, 
a'temporary (three years) and partial (rate reduced from 15 to 10%) arrangement for 
cha~ging to g~neral taxation family allowance contributions paid by Italian textiles 
and clothing firms. On completion of the proceedings which it initiated in respect of 
this aid under Article 93 (2) of the EEC Treaty, the Commission adopted a decision on 
25 July 1973,2 calling upon Italy to terminate the aid. The Commission based its 
decision on the following considerations: 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, point 172. 
2 Third Report on Competition Policy, point 101. 
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- because of its amount (0.8% of the turnover of the firms concerned) and its 
direct effect on costs, the aid may impair trade and competition within the Com-
munity in an industry which, throughout the Community, is facing difficulties as 
regards adaptation to new conditions; 
- this aid is an operating aid of a 'conservatory' nature which is not intended to 
encourage the firms in need of it to carry out structural changes; it is aid of a 
general nature which makes no distinction between firms in structural difficulties 
and firms which have no such problems; 
- the argument that the social security contributions chargeable to firms in respect of 
family allowances are higher in Italy than in other Member States does not justify 
the aid: while it is true that the general background to industrial operations (for 
example, taxation, social security contributions, cost of credit) varies from one 
Member State to another, there is no case for isolating one particular factor 
(in this case, social security contributions), and compensating, by means of aids, 
the addition costs which this factor imposes on firms in one Member State in 
comparison with their competitors in the other Member States, while failing to 
take into account other factors which may have an opposite effect. 
157. On 9 October 1973, the Italian Government instituted proceedings before the 
Court of Justice for annulment of this Commission decision, on the basis of the 
following arguments: 
- the Commission decision did not set any time-limit for the abolition of the tax I 
relief; the EEC Treaty, however, lays down that such a time-limit must be set for 
the alteration or abolition of an existing aid; 
- the decision encroaches on an area reserved by the Treaty to the sovereignty of 
the Member States, that of imposing internal taxes: in addition, the tax relief on 
the social security charges under dispute is a measure of a social nature which, 
by that fact, does not come under Articles 92 and 93; 
- the tax relief is intended to rectify an imbalance existing to the detriment of an 
industry which, employing a majority of female workers who are not entitled to 
family allowances, has nevertheless to pay contributions for each employee, 
contributions which are higher than in the other Member States. 
The Court of Justice did not accept the Italian Government's argument. In its judg-
ment of 2 July 1974, Case 173/73, the Court dismissed the appeal, pointing out that: 
- 'the spirit and general scheme of Article 93 imply that the Commission, when it 
establishes that an aid has been granted or altered in disregard of paragraph (3), 
must be able, in particular when it considers that this aid is not compatible with 
the common market having regard to Article 92, to.decide that the State concerned 
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must abolish or alter it, without being bound to fix a period of time for this 
purpose and with the possibility of referring the matter to the Court if the State in 
question does not comply with the required speed'; 
- 'the aim of Article 92 is to prevent trade between Member States from being 
affected by benefits granted by the public authorities which, in various forms. 
distort. or threaten to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods. Accordingly, Article 92 does not distinguish between 
the measures of State intervention concerned by reference to their causes or aims, 
but defines them in relation to their effects. Consequently, the alleged fiscal nature 
or social aim of the measure in issue cannot suffice to shield it from the application 
of Article 92'; 
- 'as to the argument that the social charges devolving upon employers in the 
textile sector are higher in Italy than in the ,other Member States, it should be 
obserVed that, in the application of Article 92 (1), the point of departure must 
necessarily be the competitive position existing within the common market before 
the adoption of the measure in issue. This position is the result of numerous 
factors having varying effects on production costs in the different Member States. 
Moreover, Articles 92 to 102 of the Treaty provide for detailed rules for the. 
abolition of generic distortions resulting from differences between the tax and 
social security systems of the different Member States .... On the other hand, the 
unilateral modification of a particular factor of the cost production in a given 
sector of the economy of a Member State may have the effect of disturbing the 
existing equilibrium. Consequently, there is no point in comparing the relative 
proportions of total production costs which a particular category of costs repre-
sents, since the decisive factor is the reduction itself and not the category of costs 
to which it relates'. 
Aid systems financed by para-fiscal charges 
158. The reasons for which the Commission considers it incompatible with the 
common market that the Member States should finance national aids by means of 
para-fiscal charges imposed not only on domestic products but also on those imported 
from the other Member States, were set out in previous Reports. 1 The Commission 
continued its efforts to win acceptance for this general position, which was confirmed 
by the Court df Justice in its Judgment of 25 June 1970 in Case 47/69, concerning 
schemes of this type still existing in the industrial sphere. 
1 First Report on Competition Policy. points 181 to 183; Second Report, points 108 to 111; Third 
Report, points 102 to 104. 
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Italy: Industrial research and experimental institutes 
159. Under a Decree dating from 1923, there exist in Italy 'experimental centres for 
industry' whose task it is to promote, by means of studies, analysis, and applied 
research, technological and technical progress in each of the branches of industry for 
which it is responsible. These centres are financed partly from the public budget, but 
also through a contribution from Italian industry and a tax imposed on imported 
products. The Commission took the view that this tax constituted a tax equivalent in 
effect to a customs duty and initiated the procedure provided for under Article 169 
against Italy in order to obtain its abolition. 
The Italian Government believed it had solved this problem by tabling in Parliament 
a draft law reorganizing the centres and renaming them 'institutes of research and 
experimentation for industry'. 
The institutes will have the status of corporate bodies established in public law. They 
will specialize in one branch of industry and will concentrate on applied research 
work to meet the needs of small and medium-sized firms which do not have the neces-
sary financial resources to carry out such work themselves. In addition to the 'centres' 
already existing for certain industries (skins and tanning materials, cellulose and 
paper, food preserves, fuels and glass), which will simply change their name, there will 
also be new institutes for the wood, ceramics and plastics industries. The general aim 
of the institutes is to promote technical progress in the various branches of the national 
economy so as to make them more competitive 'both within the common market 
and in relation to non-member countries with high levels of productivity'. 
Like the 'experimental centres' they replace, the institutes will be financed half from 
their own resources and a financial contribution from the State, and half from contri-
butions from national firms and importers operating in the industry concerned; 
however, this contribution will now be imposed on imported products at the same 
rate and in the same way as on domestic products. 
160. The Commission took the view that as their main aim and effect was to promote 
technical progress in these industries, the research institutes constituted a system of 
aid to Italian industry within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the EEC Treaty. The 
fact that foreign firms are free to avail themselves of the services provided by the 
institutes and that the results of their research and development work are published, 
theoretically establishes equality of treatment, but the fact remains that in practice 
the institutes will base their research work on the specific work, needs and techno-
logical requirements of Italian industry, and, because they are near at hand, it will 
be easier for Italian firms to avail themselves of their services. Furthermore, firms in 
the other Member States will not derive such benefit from these services since they 
often undertake similar research work, either directly or by making financial contribu-
tions of their own to similar technical centres. 
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In view of the fact that the Commission is usually favourably disposed towards aids 
which facilitate industrial development (particularly of small and medium-sized firms) 
by improving technical progress, the aid system could qualify for exceptional treat-
ment under Article 92(3, c) as 'aid to facilitate the development of certain economic 
activities', as long as it 'does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent 
contrary to the common interest'. However, it is precisely the fact that the contribution 
to be used in financing this aid system is levied not only on domestic products but 
also on imported products which precludes the view that this condition has been met, 
the Court of Justice having held, in Case 47/69, that an aid financed by this method' 
has the effect, whatever its amount, of adversely affecting trade to an extent contrary 
to the common interest. 
Consequently, in order to have this tax lifted from products imported from the other 
Member States, the Commission initiated the procedure provided for under 
Article 93(2) in respect of the draft law in question, with the understanding that it 
would have no other objection to its implementation. The Italian Government has 
now informed the Commission that it will endeavour to raise from other sources the 
budgetary resources which will permit this exemption. 
Italy: Aids to the press, the paper industry and for reafforestation 
161. In Italy, the Ente Nazionale per la Cellulosa e la Carta (ENCC), which is a 
semi-official body, grants various aids to the press, to pulp and paper research and 
for reafforestation. These aids are financed by two para-fiscal charges, one of which 
is levied on paper and cardboard and the other on chemical pulp used in Italy, whether 
these products are imported or of domestic origin. 
The Commission initiated the procedure provided for under Article 93 (2), EEC in 
respect of this scheme, requesting, that the aid granted to newspapers and periodicals 
printed in Italy in the form of a premium calculated on the basis of the quantities of 
newsprint used be granted also on newsprint imported by printing firms directly from 
'the other Member States without passing through the intermediary of the ENCC and 
that the aid be abolis~ed for newspapers and periodicals published in a foreign 
language for export to other Member States. 
In addition, it proposed that the aid granted to pulp and paper research should no 
longer be financed by the taxes levied on products imported from the other Member 
States. 
The Commission conceded, on the other hand, that the aids for reafforestation were 
compatible with the common market, since the levying of the para-fiscal charge was 
not such as to aggravate their effect on competition and trade, by reason of the very 
indirect link between the products subject to charge and the product aided. 
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The Italian Government altered the system along the lines requested by the Com-
mission, and the Commission decided to discontinue the procedure which it had 
initiated under Article 93 (2) EEC. 
France: Industrial research establishments in the clock and watch, 
leather and hide, and resinous products industries 
162. In Decision No 74/8/EEC of 17 December 1973,1 the Commission decided that 
the French Government must modify the method of financi'ng the industrial research 
establishments in the clock and watch and leather and hide industries. In this case too 
the Commission took the view that the aid granted through the intermediary of those 
establishments to promote technical progress in the firms in these industries could not 
be considered as compatible with the common market unless the para-fiscal charge 
used to finance their activities was no longer levied on products imported from the 
other Member States. 
The French Government complied with this decision and exempted products imported 
from the Member States from the charge. It undertook the same measure in respect of 
the para-fiscal charge used to finance the research establishment for resinous products. 
Aid systems for the development of electricity generation based 
on Community coal 
163. In laws adopted in 1965 and 1966 and in directives adopted in 1972, the German 
Government had already undertaken measures to encourage the use of coal in elec-
tricity generation. These measures had two objectives: 
- to facilitate the orderly contraction of the coal industry while ensuring minimum 
outlets in electricity generation; 
- to ensure that the energy supplies of the Federal Republic depended to a lesser 
degree on imports of other energy products from non-member countries. 
The subsidies provided for under the 1972 directives to achieve these objectives 
included: 
(a) a fixed subsidy intended to compensate for the additional investment costs 
required by coal-based power station in comparison with a power station operating 
on fuel oil; 
(b) an annual subsidy paid over ten years and intended to compensate for the dif-
ference in production costs of a calorie by coal in comparison with one by fuel oil; 
1 OJ L 14 of 17.1.1974. 
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(c) an annual subsidy of DM 10 per tonne of coal equivalent over ten years intended 
to compensate for the additional operating costs of a coal-based power station in 
comparison with a fuel oil based power station. ' 
Similar measures were implemented in France on 1 January 1972. The French Govern-
ment applied an aid system to encourage the use of Community coal in electricity 
generation. Subject to certain guarantees by the suppliers regarding the regularity of 
their deliveries, the French Government grants a fixed allowance of FF 10 per tonne 
of solid mineral fuels intended for use in electricity generating stations, 
In both case, the Commission took the view that in terms of the EEC Treaty these 
aids would not alter the competitive position of electricity producers using coal since 
they would not lower the price of electricity produced from Community coal below 
the price at which the electricity could be obtained from other fuels, but would only 
prevent or slow down the changeover to supplies of imported coal or fuel oil; that, 
consequently, these aids would not affect trade and competition within the Community 
in the industry concerned. the Commission had also noted that the objectives pursued 
(stabilization of ~arkets for Community coal and contribute to ensuring reliable 
supplies) were in accordance with the interests of the Community. 
164. In 1974, the German Government notified the Commission, in accordance with 
Article 93(3), of a draft law ('Drittes Verstromungsgesetz') pursuing these same 
objectives and intended to safeguard energy supplies by encouraging the use of 
Community coal, discouraging the use of fuel oil and to aid the Community coal 
industry by guaranteeing it a stable market of the order of 27 to 30 million tonnes per 
per year for electricity generation purposes up to 1980. 
The new measures, which will supersede those adopted by the German Government 
in 1972, are as follows: 
Users of coal-of whatever origin in the Community-for electricity generation will 
receive a subsidy to compensate for the difference in production costs between a 
calorie by coal and by fuel oil. This subsidy will be paid by a Federal Office specially 
set up for this purpose and financed by means of an equalization charge levied on all 
German producers of electricity. This charge will be calculated as a percentage of the 
value of the electricity produced. It will have the effect of increasing electricity produc-
tion costs by 3% to 4%, entailing only very slight rise in consumer prices. 
This new subsidy system will supersede the subsidies previously paid to compensate 
for the difference in production costs of a calorie by coal in comparison with fuel oil 
in coal-based power stations, and for the higher running costs of such power stations. 
The Federal Government will also grant a subsidy to compensate for the additional 
investment costs required by. the construction of a coal-based power station in 
comparison with a power station working on fuel oil. The aim is to build coal-based 
powel'stations with a total capacity of 6 000 MW by 1980. 
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In addition, the Federal Government has prohibited the building of new power 
stations or the enlargement of existing power stations of more than 10 MW capacity 
using only fuel oil or fuel oil and natural gas. The Federal Government's authorization 
is required for the building of new power stations or the enlargement of existing 
power stations using natural gas if their output is higher than 10 MW. 
165. The Commission has not expressed any objection to the implementation by the 
German Government of this new system of aids. 
The compensatory payments will not place German producers of electricity who use 
coal in a more advantageous position than they would be in if they used other fuels. 
Consequently, these compensatory payments will not affect competition and intra-
Community trade in electric power, which is at the present time conducted on a very 
small scale. 
The same conclusion must be drawn with regard to the subsidy intended to cover the 
additional investment costs required by a coal-based power station in comparison 
with a power station operating on fuel oil. 
Furthermore, the German Government's measures are in line with the guidelines 
recommended by the Commission in its Communication to the Council of 26 June 
1974 on a new energy strategy for the Community.1 One of the Commission's 
suggestions is that measures be taken to facilitate the use of coal in electricity genera-
tion so as to diversify the Community's energy supply sources. 
§ 4 - Systems for providing general aid 
166. In its Second Report on Competition POlicy2 the Commission gave its reasons 
for embarking on general action with regard to general aid systems which, being 
subject to the discretionary powers conferred on the competent national authorities 
and not being of a sectoral or regional nature, may be granted to undertakings what-
ever their location or the industry to which they belong. 
As part of this action, the Commission, while not seeking the abolition of the systems, 
would like the Member States to stop applying them save within the framework of 
programmes concerning particular industries or regions in line with the requirements 
as regards aid 'specificity' provided for in the Treaty, the programme to be notified 
to the Commission in advance. Should certain Member States feel that they could not 
break down their general aid systems into 'sectoral' and regional aid systems, another 
solution could be employed whereby all significant cases of implementation qf the 
aids are submitted to the Commission in advance, such cases being defined with 
1 Bull. EC 12-1974, points 1201 to 1203. 
2 Second Report on Competition Policy, points 116 to 119. 
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reference both to the size of the assisted investment and to the effect of the aids 
,granted on the assisted investment 
167. The Commission had already achieved acceptance of this principle in respect of 
the Belgian general aid schemes set out in Article 5 of the Law of 30 December 1970,1 
the Economic and Social Development Fund (FDES) in France,2 and the Luxem-
bourg Law for the promotion of economic expansion.3 , " 
Acting under the procedures pursuant to Article 93 (2) which it had previously initiated, 
the Commission eliCited compliance in'1974 with these procedures by the Netherlands 
Government, in respect of the system of State' guarantees for the transactions of the 
Nationale lrivesteringsbank (NIB),4 and by the Italian Government, in respect, 
firstly, of draft law No 231/72, which subsequently became Italian Law No 4645 and, 
secondly, draft law No 946, which subsequently became Law No 274.6 
168. Article 9 ofItalian Law No 464 provides for aid to firms which, having run into 
difficulties, may have to dismiss workers or put them on short time. 
This aid basically consists of interest subsidies which can bring down to 4% the rate 
of interes~ on the loans contracted by the'firms to carry out their plans to avoid the 
total or part-unemployment of their workers. Thede subsidies are for a maximum 
period of 15 years, and there is a c,eiling for each case which can be as high ,as 70% of 
the expenditure involved. : 
The Commission decided to initiate the procedure of Article 93 (2), EEC against this 
aid scheme because, while sharing the Italian Government's concern to protect 
employment, it took the view, firstly, that the proposed aid measures were concerned 
purely with keeping ailing firms active and would make no effective contribution to 
their rationalization and, secondly, that to be able to assess the effect of these aid 
Ipeasures, it should be given prior notification of 'sectoral' or regional programmes 
which the Italian authorities would be establishing for the application of such aid or, 
failing this, of the more important specific cases where aid was granted. 
As a result of the opening of this procedure by the Commission, the Italian Govern-
ment agreed: 
- that the grant of the aids under consideration should be, made subject to the sub-
mission by the recipient undertakings of reorganization, restructuring or conver-
sion schemes and that aid should be granted in resPect of the investment operations 
carried out under these programmes; it, would thus be impossible' for the aId to 
be used simply to ~eep ailing firms active; , 
1 Second Report on Competition Policy, point 90. 
2, Third Report on Competition Policy, point 113. 
3, Idem, point 120 
4 Idem, point 118. 
5 Second Report on Competition Policy; point 119. 
6 Third Report on Competition Policy, point 115. 
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- that priority should be given to the granting of this aid in the Mezzogiorno and in 
certain less-favoured areas in the centre and north of the country; in this latter 
case, the aid measures would comply with the principles of coordination adopted 
by the Commission in respect of regional aids in the central regions of the Com-
munity; 
- lastly, that outside these development areas, prior notice should be given to the 
Commission of significant specific cases where aid was granted. 
169. The same result was achieved in respect of draft law No 946 (now Law No 274), 
which posed similar problems. In this law, the Italian Government proposed to 
refinance, to an amount of Lit 40 000 million, aid granted under Law No 1470,1 
under which low-interest loans are granted to ensure the survival of firms which have 
run into difficulties or to facilitate the reopening of firms which, because of such 
difficulties, have already been obliged to discontinue operations. 
In initiating the procedure provided for in Article 93(2) against this law, the Com-
. mission had requested the Italian Government to ensure: 
- firstly, that the loans in question should in future be granted only in respect of 
investment programmes undertaken by firms within the framework of restructuring 
plans, so as to avoid this aid being used simply to keep non-competitive firms alive; 
- secondly, that the loans should be used only within the context of sectoral or 
regional programmes of which the Commission was to be given prior notification, 
or, failing this, that significant specific cases where aid is granted should be notified 
in advance. 
The Italian Government was able to satisfy the Commission on these points. It 
further undertook to discontinue the aid system under consideration once the funds 
currently appropriated under Law No 274 had been exhausted . 
. 170. The Commission also initiated the procedure of Article 93 (2) against the Belgian 
Law of 17 July 1959 introducing and coordinating measures to promote growth and 
the creation of new industrial activities. 
This law provides for a number of benefits in connection with investment operations 
which contribute to the creation, extension, conversion or modernization of industrial 
u~dertakings and which are likely to be of 'advantage to the economy as a whole': 
- interest subsidies of 2% generally granted for between three and five years; these 
subsidies can be increased to 4% in respect of operations integrated into the 
sectoral objectives of the general economic plan or to enable existing firms, by 
means of a large-scale investment programme, to face the new conditions of 
international competition; as a general rule, the loans subsidized in this way may 
cover 50% of the investment expenditure; 
1 Third Report on Competition Policy, points 115 to 117. 
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- State guarantees for bank loans having qualified for interest subsidy; 
- exemption from withholding tax for a period of five years. 
The criteria governing the choice of industry qualifying under the aid scheme are not 
spelled out in, detail, so that the scheme could be used, under the discretionary powers 
exercised by the national authorities, to support investment in any industry and in any 
location. 
As in the case of the aid schemes mentioned above, the Commission requested the 
Belgian Government to give prior notification, that is as laid down in Article 93(3): 
- of the programmes for certain industries or branches of industry which it may 
establish, from time to time, for the application of the Law of 17 July 1959, 
or, failing this, 
----;- of the specific cases where this law. is applied in respect of given undertakings 
where the assistance given is significant from the point of view of intra-Community 
trade and competition: this will be necessary, firstly, where the investment aided 
is not less than 2 million u.a., whatever the value of the aid itself, and, secondly, 
where the aid itself amounts to or exceeds 15% in net subsidy-equivalent of the. ~ 
amount of the investment, whatever the size of the investment. 
§ 5 - Aid to encourage new technological developments 
1.71. The German Government notified the Commissiop of the agreement it proposed 
to conclude with Wagnisfinanzierungs-AG (WFG) to participate in the risks under-
taken by this firm in its financing operations. The role of the WFG, a limited-liability 
company to be founded by the large German banks, will be to provide financial and 
management assistance to small and medium-sized firms which wish to launch new 
products or technologies on an industrial and commercial basis. This financial 
assistance will take the form of participation in shareholdings and other forms of 
capital. The holdings will be retained only as long as is necessary to ensure a chance 
of commercial success for the new developments in qu~stion. 
182. The support given by the Federal Government to WFG will take the form of a 
guarantee whereby it undertakes to re-pay 75% of any losses of the WFG up to a sum 
ofDM 50 million; these moneys will bear interest and are intended to be repaid olit of 
subsequent profits. 
-The German Government decided on this step having found that certain weaknesses 
in German financial structures prevented the best use being made of research and 
development work carried out at the instigation of the public authorities or by 
research workers or the firms themselves. The industrial and commercial exploitation 
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of this work is often hindered by the difficulties which small and medium-sized firms 
encounter in raising the funds they need in the form of venture capital. 
In view of the fact that there was no chance of a financial undertaking corresponding 
to this need being set up in Germany to fill this gap and in order to encourage other 
bodies to take an interest in this type of financial activity, except by means of an 
initial financial support, the Federal Government decided, under a risk sharing con-
tract, to assume for a limited period a proportion of this risks assumed by such a 
company, that is the WFG. 
173. The conclusion reached by the German Government is similar to that expressed 
by the Commission in its 1970 memorandum on industrial policy. The Commission 
stressed that in the majority of the Member States existing financial structures were 
not well suited to the launching of new developments by small and medium-sized 
firms though this category of firm had an important role to play in this field. 
Although the State itself plays a fairly important role in the innovation stage by giving 
financial support to research and development, its assistance generally ceases when the 
phase of industrial and commercial exploitation of the results begins. This phase 
requires a relatively large amount of capital, and the banking system does not always 
meet this need sufficiently since it is wary of the hazardous nature of industrial initia-
tives based on new developments. Consequently, it tends to demand exce[)sive 
guarantees or a direct involvement in the management of the firm, or even actual 
control before providing support. As a result, self-financing often remains the only· 
source of finance-and it is seldom adequate-for small and medium-sized firms 
which wish to launch a new product or process without loss of independence. 
There is therefore a clear need, if the transition from innovation to industrial exploita-
tion is to be facilitated in the Community, for a specific 'financing system which can 
supply undertakings with venture capital and management advice. This would be 
similar to the venture capital systems known in the USA, in Japan and in Sweden, 
where the banks, investment companies or industrial groups make such capital 
available to firms which have a new idea to exploit, participate in the rewards and 
risks involved in its industrial and commercial launching without assuming control 
of the operation, a~d resell their holding, generally a minority one, as soon as the 
operation appears to be profitable. 
174. In view of the fact that this German measure promises to fill this gap in the 
traditional financing structures and to promote the spread of technological progress 
in the Community via the small and medium-sized firm, the Commission decided to 
raise no objection to the aid granted in the form of a guarantee by the German Govern-
ment to the WFG. 
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Certain Member States have in fact already adopted measures of a similar type. In 
197.2, th~ Societes Financieres d'Innovation (SFI) were set up in France with a role 
identical to that of the WFG. To facilitate the development of these new financial 
institutions, the French Government laid down that the subscriptions to the capital of 
a SFI may qualify for a special depreciation allowance of 50%. This systematic 
depreciation ofthe amounts subscribed is equivalent, given corporation tax liability, to 
a subsidy of 25% of the SUbscription. This incentive is designed to facilitate the' 
collection by the SFI of loan capital to be reinvested as venture capital. 
§ 6 - Aid for environmental purposes 
175. Faced with the large number of measures adopted in this field by the Member 
States, the Commission-which had already commented on a number of these 1_ 
made known its general position towards specific aid measures aimed at protecting the I 
environment. This position is consistent with the guidelines laid down by the Council 
and the Member States both in the Council Declaration2 of 22 November 1973 on ~he 
programme of action of the European Communities on the environment, and in the 
Recommendation to the Member States3 which the Council adopted on 7 November 
1974,' on a proposal from the Commission, regarding cost allocations and action by 
public authorities on environmental matters ('polluter pays' principle). 
General considerations 
176. The Commission considers environmental protection should be a priority 
Community objective, but feels that" in the long-term the 'polluter pays' principle 
will have to be applied throughout the Community if the environment is to be 
protected efficiently without distorting trade flows or competition. 
Applying this principle and the other general principles in the EEC Treaty relating to 
State aids, the cost of measures required to reduce nuisances and pollution to an 
acceptable level should be borne by the firms whose activities are responsible for them. 
Environmental policies both at national and at Community level should be based, 
not on the general grant of aids by states, which simply means that the public pays 
in the end, but by the imposition of obligations (standards and levies) en'abling the 
authorities to make polluters bear the cost of protecting the environment. 
The State aids should be granted only when the objectives considered essential for the 
envirqnment are seriously in conflict with other social or economic objectives also of 
priority importance. Basically, they should be granted only when it is apparent that 
1 Third Report on Competi.tion Policy, points 107 and 123. 
2 OJ C 112 of 20.12.1973, p. 6: Part I, Title II, para. S. 
3 OJ C 68 of 12.6.1974, p. 1. . 
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existing undertakings are not in a position to support the new costs facing them and 
where social or economic difficulties might arise in certain industries or geographical 
areas which only financial intervention by the State could avoid. 
177. However, the Commission realizes that in the present circumstances the polluter 
pays principle is far from being generally or uniformly applied throughout the 
Community. 
Because the environment problem has only very recently come to the fore, environ-
mental 'costs' are either inadequately taken into account or not taken into account at 
all in the economic systems of the Member States. Thus products or production 
processes which cause pollution are in general use, firms have been located 
regardless of ecological principles, and the environment has been allowed steadily 
to deteriorate. It would be wrong to hold existing firms wholly responsible for this 
state of affairs. 
Furthermore, Member States adopt differing approaches to similar environmental 
cost situations and impose differing requirements on polluters, so that competition 
and trade within the Community are seriously distorted. Finally, environmental 
problems in any given state will frequently have repercussions on the environment of 
other Member States; pollution is, of course, no respecter of national frontiers. 
178. There will have to be drastic changes if the accumulated damage is to be put right: 
The public authorities in all the Member States must therefore be urged to adopt 
quickly and apply firmly the regulations requiring polluters to defray the costs of 
eliminating the pollution they have caused. Alongside this, there must be a major 
effort on the part of businesses to adapt exsting plant. 
This will not be easy, particularly in view of deeply ingrained habits and of the financial 
burdens which firms will have to face and which, in some cases, will threaten their 
survival. The necessary changes cannot be made overnight since all the Member 
States will have to overcome a considerable degree of inertia and at the same time try 
to ensure that improving the quality of the environment does not conflict with other 
priority objectives, particularly in the industrial, regional and social fields. 
It can be assumed that the Member States will be in a position to introduce rapidly and 
enforce effectively national or Community regulations .embodying the polluteI pays 
principle only if they overcome these obstacles. Yet this is a matter of real urgency 
because the environment is steadily deteriorating, the Member States grow increasingly 
interdependent, and the distortions resulting from the varying degrees of strictness in 
their treatment of firms grow greater. 
179. The Commission therefore believes that, during a transitional period, the 
Member States must be able to promote and facilitate the adaptation of their 
industries to the new requirements. This will be done by the grant of State aids and 
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these aids will not be restricted simply to the cases where it is considered that, in the 
absence of the aid, the obligations imposed on the firms would create serious diffi-
culties in given regions or indust~es. 
Assuming a certain degree of discipline, carefully applied State aids should enable the 
polluter pays principle to be introduced more uniformly and rapidly throughout the 
Community, while effectively protecting the environment and eliminating existing 
, distortions of competition. 
Guidelines for the application of Article 92 et seq. of 
the EEe Treaty in respect of specific aids to the environment 
180. On the basis of these considerations, and distinguishing between: 
- firstly, its attitude during the transitional period to State aids aimed at speeding 
up the application of regulations embodying the polluter pays principle and at 
adapting existing businesses to these regulations, always assuming that these aids 
meet certain requirements,. 
- and secondly, the general principles which it will apply after the transitional 
period, or even during the transitional period, to environmental aids not meeting 
the requirements, 
that the Commission sent to the Member States on 7 November 1974 a memorandum 
setting out the 'Community approach to State aids in environmental matters', in 
which it informed the Member States of the general criteria which it will apply in its 
assessment of the aids in question. 
Transitional period 
181. In this memorandum, the Commission states that, for a transitional period of 
six years from 1 January 1975 to 31 December 1980, the State aids designed to assist 
existing firms in adapting to laws or regulations imposing major new burdens relating 
to environmental protection will qualify for exemption under Article 92(3, b) of the 
EEC Treaty as aids to promote the execution of an important project of coronion 
European interest. 
The Commission feels' that this period is long enough to enable all the Member 
States to implement arrangements ensuring that the polluter pays principle is applied 
throughout the Community on broadly similar principles. 
In order to qualify for exemption foreseen, national aids will have to satisfy the 
following tests: . 
-- they will have to be made necessary by new major obligations imposed by the 
State or by the Community on the recipient firms in relation to environmental 
protection; 
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- they will have to be granted to finance additional investment required by these 
firms to meet obligations relating to adaptation of plant in operation at 1 January 
1975 to the level required to meet the obligations mentioned above. 
Such additional investment might consist either in acquiring new equipment to 
reduce or eliminate pollution or nuisances or in the adoption of new production 
processes having the same effect. In the latter case, aid should not be granted in 
respect of that part of the new investment whose effect is to increase productive 
capacity. The cost of replacing and operating the investments should be fully 
borne by the relevant firms. 
- when expressed as a net after-tax subsidy-equivalent calculated by reference to the 
common method set out in the Commission memorandum to the Council on 
regional aid schemes,l they must not exceed: 
• 45% for investments made by firms in 1975 and 1976, 
• 30% for investments made by firms in 1977 and 1978, 
• 15% for investments made by firms in 1979 and 1980. 
This degressive scale is necessary to make the Member States clearly aware of the 
need to make arrangements as rapidly as possible to ensure that pollution and 
nuisance costs are charged to those responsible. The maximum aid is high because 
it must be properly related to the costs that will be incurred by managements whose 
production processes were adopted at a time when environmental costs were 
largely disregarded; it has, however, been fixed at less than 50% in order to 
emphasize that while for the time being the polluter pays principle cannot be fully 
applied, it still remains the ultimate objective. 
Within these limits, the Member States will be able to implement aid schemes in 
favour of given industries or regions and general schemes applying to all firms in the 
country in question. Unless it reflects the principles of general application set out 
below, any scheme which does not meet the above conditions will have to be modified 
if it is to qualify for endorsement by the Commission. 
Principles of general application 
182. In dealing during the transitional period with aids exceeding the above-
mentioned limits and, after the transitional period, with all specifically environmental 
aids, the Commission states in its memorandum that it will apply the following 
principles: 
To enable. the Commission to decide whether they supply real needs and how they 
affect competition and trade, any aid schemes introduced by the Member States on 
environmental grounds will have to specify in detail the industries or geographical 
areas for which aid is to be granted. . 
1 OJ C 111 of4.11.1971, p. 10. 
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This means that "tlie Member States" will not· be able to apply aid schemes which, 
under the discretionary power of national authorities unsupervised by the Co'mmis-
sion, would be able to assist any firm regardless of its geographical location or indus-
trial context. 
Furthermore, the Commission will assess whether the new obligations on firms are 
indeed of sl;lch a natur,e that, in a given industry or region; di~culties would be pro-
voked which might disturb the equilibrium of that industry or region and which,. in 
that. case, :would justify the proposed aid schemes. 
The aids which are to be granted will have to be aimed at facilitating the adaptation 
of firms to the new obligations concerning the elimination of their pollution imposed 
by the public authorities. This objective should be reflected in the rules governing 
these aids and in the definition of those who are eligible to benefit. 
The aim of the aids should be to help firms: 
..:..... ,either to carry" out research and development programmes so that .they can 
evolve new products or production techniques which cause less p"ollution or can 
'promote the industrial exploitation of the results of such programmes (construc-
tion of pilot plants); . 
- or to" carry out new investments involving the construction of supplementary 
plant so as to eliminate pollution or by the conversion of existing plant to cleaner' 
production processes. . 
Aids to these investment should be justified by a sudden major change in the obiiga-
tions and constraints imposed on firms in respect of environmental pollution." 
Accordingly they should be granted only to going concerns and only in respect of 
alterations to plant in service at the time of the change. New firms and new plant 
commissioned by existing firms will have to be designed and set up in such a way that, 
without state financial support, they can meet the environmental standards in force at 
the time they begin production. . 
Exceptions from this restriction, may, however, be allowed in favour of new firms 
and new plant where international competition is such that certain of their activities 
would ,be seriously handicapped by being subjected to differing obligations from 
those imposed in given non-member countries or where non-member countries are 
themselves granting environmental protection aids. 
Application of these guidelines to certain aid schemes 
183. The Commission is currently examining on the basis of these guidelines two 
proposed aid schemes for environmental protection purposes which have been 
notified to it, one by the Belgian Government, the other by the German Government. 
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The proposed German scheme provides that investment operations carried out by 
firms for environmental protection purposes will qualify for accelerated depreciation 
arrangements for tax purposes amounting to a net subsidy-equivalent of approximately 
10% of the investment. This facility will be available only in respect of plant in opera-
tion as of 1 January 1975 but will have no set time limit. 
The Belgian proposal takes into account additional investment which firms must 
/ carry out in respect of the purification of their waste water to conform to the new 
,obligations imposed by a law of 26 March 1971 and by the regulations arising there-
from. As in the German scheme, aid will be granted only to existing undertakings and 
will not cover any extension of capacity. This aid will take the form of subsidies 
granted on a degressive scale ranging from 60% for investments carried out in 1974 to 
30% for those carried out in 1979. 
Initially, the Commission opened the procedure of Article 93 (2) against these two 
schemes, because, since their scope was general, there was no way of checking that the 
aids corresponded to cases of real necessity each time they were granted. However, 
since they fall to a large extent within the guidelines laid down in the above-mentioned 
memorandum concerning aid which can be granted to existing firms to enable them 
to adopt over a transitional period to the new environmental protection conditions 
imposed on them, the Commission has since informed the Governments concerned 
that it would withdraw its objections to the implementation of these two systems 
provided certain details were amended (duration of application in the case of the 
German scheme, aid rates in the case of the Belgian scheme). 
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The adjustment of state monopolies 
of a commercial character 
184. The Commission continued the work it has been engaged in since the end of the 
transitional period with respect to state monopolies of a commercial character. 1 
As the Commission stated in its Recommendations of 25 November and 22 December 
1969, it believes that the best way to achieve its objective is to abolish the exclusive 
rights of monopolies. The Commission has already achieved the abolition of the 
French gunpowder and explosives monopolies, the match monopoly (in respect of 
products from the original Member States), and the manufactured tobacco monopoly 
is due to be abolished no later than 1 January 1976 in accordance with an undertaking 
given by the French Government. In addition, Italy has ended its cigarette-lighter, 
cigarette papers, flints and industrial salt monopolies. The importation into Italy of 
matches from the other Member States has already been liberalized, and the adjust-
ment of this monopoly to comply fully with Article 37 of the EEC Treaty is to follow 
before 1 January 1976. An assessment of the practical effects of the adjustments made 
by the Italian Government has been rendered difficult by the lack of interest in the 
Italian market shown by the other Community manufacturers. 
185. As regards the French potash monopoly, the French Government has complied 
with the Commission's reasoned opinion concerning compound fertilizers containing 
potash. By a decree of 22 August 1974,2 the requirement that these products be 
deciared prior to importation when they originate in the other Member States has been 
abolished. This monopoly can be considered as fully adjusted in accordance with 
Article 37(1). As regards straight fertilizers containing potash or potassium salts, the 
French Government has withdrawn the French joint sales agency's exclusive import 
and sales right. The requirement that the goods be declared prior to importation has 
nevertheless been retained until 1 May 1975 in the most recent measures adopted by 
the French Government,3 and the Commission has notified the French Government 
that this requirement must be dropped without delay. 
1 First Report on Competition Policy. point 195 et seq. Second Report on Competition Policy, 
point 150 et seq. Third Report on Competition Policy. point 125 et seq. 
2 Journal Officiel de la Republique Fran~se. 29.8.1974. p. 9014. 
3 Decree of 28.11.1974. 
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186. The reasoned opinion delivered by the Commission, on the question of the 
French alcohol monopoly resulted in Decree No 74-91 of 6 February 1974 in which the 
French Government amended the economic arrangements within this monopoly. 
Under these amended arrangements, the import surcharge, which is a standard rate 
and higher than the levy on home-produced products, is retained only in respect of 
spirits and spirituous beverages from countries other than the original Member 
States. The products from these countries are therefore subject to a countervailing 
charge; when home-produced products are exempt from this duty, the products from 
the original Member States are also exempt from the countervailing charge. 
On 31 March 1974, the French Government issued the implementing decrees laying 
down the amounts of the various charges. In view of the fact that these charges could 
be considered as non-discriminatory, the Commission was able to decide not to 
continue with the infringement procedure initiated earlier in accordance with 
Article 169 of the EEC Treaty, but reserved the right to review this position if circum-
stances so required, since in the Commission's view the definitive adjustment was of 
secondary importance compared with the replacement of the French monopoly market 
organization by a common organization of the market in ethyl alcohol of agricultural 
origin. However, the Commission feels obliged to re-examine its position in the light 
of the Court Judgment handed down in Case 48/74 on 10 December 1974. In this case, 
the Court ruled that national market organizations must comply with' the provisions 
concerning the free movement of goods after the end of the transitional period. 
The new position to be adopted by the Commission on this question will also require 
a change in its attitude towards the German alcohol monopoly. 
187. In the case of the basic slag monopoly, the Commission had established that the 
law of 31 December 19731 adjusting this monopoly wou.Id be effective only when 
measures had been introduced for the 'mise en place economique' of basic slag, these 
measures to iriclude a form of prior import licence and a mechanism for equalizing 
freight costs. 
The Commission therefore called upon the French authorities to confirm that the 
freedom to import basic slag into France for marketing was effective immediately and 
that there was no need to wait for the end of the period necessary for the drafting of 
the implementing texts provided for in Article 3 of the above-mentioned law. 
The Commission was assured that this was the case and a notice to importers was 
published in the Journal Officiel de la Republique Fran~aise of 25 July 1974. 
188. The Italian Government made certain adjustments to its manl.{factured tobacco 
monopoly in the light of the procedure under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty which the 
Commission had initiated after establishing the existence of discriminatory measures 
and practices against imported items. 
1 Third Report on Competition Policy, point 128. 
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These adjustments were in response to a number of criticisms made.by the Commission 
concerning inter alia the lower limit applied to supply prices in the tariff; the limiton 
the number of new foreign brands and the frequency with which these couJd·.be intro-
duced; the machinery for changing prices and the supply of regional depots. In addi-
tion, the flat-rate distribution costs have been reduced from Lit. 700 to 500 per 
kilogram, this amount being· deemed to cover the expenses incurred after the receipt 
of the goods at the two points allowed by the monopoly for entry into its network, 
Bologna and Genoa. 
An examination of the effect of these adjustments has not allayed the fears of the 
Commission concerning the existence of import barriers. Furthermore, following 
complaints from certain foreign manufacturers concerning overlong delays on the 
part of the monopoly in paying for imports, the Commission initiate1 a new infringe-
ment jProcedure2 since it took the view that these delays had an effect equivalent to 
that of quantitative restrictions. 
189. In Law No 835 of 28 November 1973,3 the Italian Government published 
measures concerning the establishment of a consortium for the compulsory storage of 
bergamot oil. Within the Community, be'rgamot oil is manufactured only in Italy and 
the consortium is therefore in a position to exert a considerable influence on the sales 
and exports of this product. 
The Commission takes the view that this consortium constitutes a monopoly within 
the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 37 (1) of the EEC Treaty and has 
initiated the infringement procedure proyided for in Article 169 of the EEC Treaty. 
190. Since the three new Member States declared that they had no state monopolies 
within the meaning of Article 37 EEC, the Commission's sole task in this area was to 
make recommendations concerning the adjustme,nt of the monopolies in the six 
original Member States vis-ii-vis the three new states (Article 44 of the Act concerning 
the Conditions of Accession). Recommendations have been made in respect of the 
French manufactured tobacc04 and match monopoliess and the Italian manufactured 
tobacco monopoly,6 the Commission urging the opening of import quotas in favour 
of the new Member States. In accordance with Article 44, these quotas should be 
increased each year to reflect the progressive nature of the measures adopted pending 
the complete adjustment envisaged in the Act for no later than the end of 1977. As 
regards the French alcohol monopoly, the Commission recommended,? in accordance 
1 Third Report on Competition Policy, point 126. 
2 Commission decision of 20.12.1974. 
3 Gazzetta Ufficiale No 333; 28.12.1973. 
4 OJ L 237 of 29.8.1974, p. 35. 
5 OJ L 237 ot 29.8.1974, p. 2. 
6 OJ L 326 of 6.12.1974, p. 29. 
7 OJ L 278 of 15. 10.1974, p. 16. 
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with Article 44(2) of the Act, that France should ensure that, by 31 December 1975 
at the latest, spirits and spirituous beverages from the new Member States should no 
longer be subject to heavier taxation than that imposed on home-produced products 
of a similar nature. It was not considered necessary to make recommendations in 
respect of the French basic slag and potash monopolies or in respect of the Italian 
match and bergamot oil monopolies, since the legislation covering their activities 
makes no distinction between the new Member States and the original Member States. 
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Introduction 
191. The Commission is now presenting for the first time information on the current 
degree and trend of concentration in the enlarged Community. It is true that this 
information will not provide a detailed picture, mainly because there is still a lack of 
statistical material needed for the year-to-year comparisons on which the analysis of 
trends and structural changes depends. Nevertheless, the following evaluations of 
information published in the specialized press together with the latest results of the 
Commission's research programme which analyses concentrations give a broad 
picture of the present degree of economic concentration within the Community. 
192. First, the structure in 1973 of national and international mergers, participations 
in and formations of joint subsidiaries is examined. There follows a description of the 
degree and development in 1972 and 1973 of general industrial concentration. The 
third section deals with the trend of concentration in a few selected industries and 
countries of the Community between 1969 and 1972. In the last section the results are 
summarized. 
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§ 1 - National and international mergers, participations in 
and formations of joint subsidiaries in the Community in 1973 
, 
Comparison between national and international operations 
193. The figures for the number and structure of corporate interpenetration opera-
tions in the Community in 1973 cannot be directly compared with the results last 
published in the Second Report on Competition Policy, points 153 to 165, for the 
period from 1966 to 1971. Both are based on an evaluation of the operations reported 
in the specialized press. However, the number of countries considered and the range 
of the contents have been altered. The figures now cover not only international trans-
actions but also purely national ones. In addition, they no longer include the setting up 
of non-joint ('one-parent') subsidiaries, since these are of no relevance to the analysis 
of concentration in the Community. 
The following figures cover only the number of operations. Since no figures are 
available on the economic importance of the individual cases, no direct relationship 
can be established between the frequency of operations and the development of the 
degree of concentration. 
194. Table 1 shows the number of takeovers and mergers, participations in and 
formations of joint subsidiaries for 1973 and also the number of operations, broken 
down into bilateral and multilateral operations, according to the number of partici- . 
pants. The number of firms involved in each type of operation is also shown. The 
figures indicate how many firms were involved in the transactions, l but the firms are 
not necessarily different ones for each transaction. The same firm may have been 
involved several times in one year in mergers, participations or the formation of joint 
subsidiaries. Finally, Table I shows the percentage of all operations carried out in the 
Community in 1973 which took place on a purely national level. 
195. The acquisition of participations, accounting for 58% of all operations, was the 
most frequent single type of operation. The setting up of joint subsidiaries accounted 
for just over a third (34%). Bilateral operations (79%) were much more common than 
operations involving three or more participants. On average 2.7 firms participated in 
the setting up of joint subsidiaries, 2.3 in takeovers or mergers and 2.1 in the acquisi-
tion of participations. 
196. The number of international operations was much greater than the number of 
purely national transactions, accounting for 39% of operations and 43% of 'firms 
involved'. Takeovers and mergers were an exception to this pattern since these all 
1 In what follows the expressions 'number of firms involved' or 'firms involved' are used in this 
special sense. 
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TABLE 1 
National and international operations in the Community in 1973 
Operations according to type of operation Operations according 
Total operations to number of firms involved 
Takeovers and mergers I Participations I Joint subsidiaries 
I I I I I I I 
Bilateral Multilateral 
No of No of firms No of No of firms No or No of firms No of No of firms operations operations 
operations involved operations involved operations involved operations involved 
138 318 952 1989 548 1476 1638 3783 1298 340 
----
of which purely national operations (%) 
100 ~--~--l 42 1 .. 22 1 32 1--39 I-~T 42 I 29 
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took place between firms of one and the same Member State. This is because the 
several company laws of the Member States are not geared to international takeovers 
and mergers. 
Geographical breakdown of international participations 
and establishment of joint subsidiaries 
197. Between 1966 and 1971, in all forms of international operations in the six-
member Community, corporate transnational activities increased only between firms 
from Member States. 1 Their share in the number of operations rose from 35% in 
1966, to 38% in 1970 and to 41 % in 1971. This trend continued in the enlarged 
Community. In 1973 firms from Member States were involved in more than half (57%) 
of all international operations (cf. Table 2).2 
TABLE 2 
Geographical breakdown of international operations and types of operation in the European Community 
and non-member countries in 1973 
Participations 
EC NMC 
60 40 
No of operations 
Joint 
subsidiaries 
EC NMC 
54 46 
Total 
EC NMC 
57 43 
No of firms involved in operations 
Participations 
EC NMC 
78 22 
Joint 
subsidiaries 
EC NMC 
66 34 
Total 
EC NMC 
74 27 
NB - % for each type of operation; EC = operations involving only firms from the Member States, NMC = operations 
in which firms from non .. member countries participated. 
198. In the period 1966 to 1971 there was a sharp increase in international operations 
in France.3 Compared with the other Member States, France accounted for the third 
largest number of international operations in 1966, the second largest in 1970 and in 
1971 the largest number. In 1973, in the enlarged Community, France also led all the 
other Member States in the number of international operations (cf. Table 3). 
Belgium retained the second place which it had acquired in 1971. Germany once 
again occupied the third position, though sharing it with Luxembourg, which in 1971 
lay in sixth position. The increase in the number of international operations in 
Luxembourg is a continuation of the trend already established between 1966 and 1971. 
The rate of growth of the number of international operations in Luxembourg was 
second only to that in' France. 
1 Second Report on Competition Policy, point 157. 
2 The figures for the six-member Community, in contrast with those for the enlarged Community, 
included the setting up of 'one-parent' subsidiaries. A check has shown that the change made has 
not affected the results. 
3 Second Report on Competition Policy, points 160 and 161. 
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TABLE 3 
Geographical structure of international operations in the Community in 1973 
("/0) 
G I F N B L UK IRL D EC 
14 I 22 6 11 19 14 12 100 I 
199. The figures available on the nationality of firms involved in international 
operations in the enlarged Community make it possible to assess the involvement of 
firms from non-member countries (Table 4). As in the six-member Community, 
American firms are in the lead before Swiss firms and firms from other non-member 
countries.! Compared to 1971, however, American influence was considerably 
reduced. Only Japanese firms and firms from 'other non-member countries' 
maintained their percentage share in the figure for the number of firms involved in 
international operations in the Community. 
TABLE 4 
Shares of non-member countries in the total number of firms involved in international operations in the 
Community in 1973 
EC USA 
73 12 
I SC = Scandinavian countries. 
2 OC = Other countries. 
SWITZ 1 sct 
6 2 2 
Breakdown by industry of national and international mergers, 
participatio'!s and jOintly established subsidiaries . 
oCZ Total 
5 100 
200. Between 1966 and 1971, the highest growth rates in international operations in 
the six-member Community were in the food industry, followed by services. 2 Analysis 
of national and international operations in the nine-member Community reveals tha.t 
the service sector was in first position in 1973 with a considerable lead over the metal 
industries, the other processing industries and the chemical industries (Table 5). It is 
possible that these results reflect the tendency in highly developed economies towards 
increasing concentration on the services sector. Before more precise conclusions can 
be drawn, however, an analysis will have to be made of the further development of the 
structure industry by industry of national and international mergers, participations 
and the setting up of joint subsidiaries in the Community. 
1 Second Report on Competition Policy, point 162. 
2 Second Report on Competition Policy, point 163. 
COMPo REP. 1974 
118 THB DBVELOPMENT OF CONCBNTRATION 
TABLE 5 
Structure industry by industry of national and international operations in the Community in 1973 
(%J' 
Metal-using Fuel and Other manu .. Food 
industries power Chemicals Textiles facturing industry Services Total 
industries 
27 2 8 4 II 9 39 100 
§ 2 - Concentration in industry within the Community in 1972 and 1973 
Aims and statistical bases 
201. In this first attempt to describe overall concentration in industry, the geo-
graphical distribution of large-scale industries in the Community, that is to say, the 
geographical concentration of industry, is first of all examined. There follows an 
analysis of concentration with regard to big industrial companies, and finally the role 
played by the big companies in industry as a whole in the Community is examined. 
202. This is only a tentative approach, and the methods used do not permit of a more 
definitive analysis. Generalized findings on concentration in industry within the 
Community necessarily conceal the structural differences which exist in the degree of 
industrialization and in the composition and importance of the individual branches of 
industry in the various Member States. Further problems which international com-
parisons over a number of years present are those arising from changes in exchange 
rates and from inflation and also the difficulties arising from the nature of the statis-
tical data. 
203. The statistical source material used is the data on the sales and employment of 
'Europe's 500 biggest' published by the magazine VISION1 and also the figures 
supplied by the Statistical Office of the European Communities. 
The Community's big industrial companies 
204. On 20 July 1973, the Commission presented to the Council the 'Proposal for a 
Regulation on the Control of Mergers,.2 Following the absolute quantitative criteria 
set out in it, European big companies in 1972 and 1973 are defined as firms with 
annual sales of more than 200 million u.a., with those having sales of 1 000 million u.a. 
shown separately. Table 6 shows the number and geographical distribution of these 
firms. 
1 VISION, the European Business Magazine, monthly published by SEPEG, Geneva, October 1973 
and October 1974. 
2 Third Report on Competition Policy. point 22 et seq., and this Report, points 17 et seq. 
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205. The number of industrial firms'with annual sales above 200 million u.a. rose 
by 4% from 1972 and 1973. British firms were the most numerous in both years, 
ahead of German and French firms. On the other hand, the number of industrial firms 
in the Community with sales exceeding 1 000 million u.a. fell by 4%. In 1972, the 
United Kingdom had most firms with sales exceeding 1 000 million u.a., followed by 
Germany, France and Italy, while in 1973 Germany led the table ahead of the United 
Kingdom~ with the order of the other Member States unchanged. 
206. :Concentration processes are not the only factors affecting the development 
shown over a period of time in the number of big companies in Europe. -VISION 
gives the sales in dollars. The rise in the vaiue of the unit of account against the dollar· 
which took place in the 1972/73 period led necessarily to a reduction in the number of 
. big companies measured by their sales in units of account. Without the change iri the 
conversion rate, there would have been a total of 367 firms with annual sales above 
200 million u.a. in 1973, that is to say a rise of 15% as against 1972, and 86 firms with 
sales of 1 000 million u.a., namely, a rise of 4% compared with 1972. How far the 
change in the conversion rate offsets the effect of inflation, which boosts the number 
of big industrial companies measured according to their sales, it is impossible to say, 
particularly in view of the varying rates of inflation in the individual Member States. 
Comparisons over a period of time between the absolute values have therefore very 
little meaning. Structural comparisons can, however, be carried out. 
207. The figures indicate that the distribution of European large-scale industry 
among the Member States became more even from 1972 to 1973. The variation ratio 
as index of this distribution fell for undertakings with annual sales of more than' 
200 million u.a. by 8 points and for firms with sales of more than 1 000 million u.a. by 
6 points. 
208. Over both years, firms with sales of more than 1 000 million u.a. were more 
evenly spread throughout the Member States than big firms taken as a whole. 
Compared to the geographical distribution of all big industrial firms, firms with sales 
of more than 1 000 million u.a. were disproportionately numerous in both 1972 and 
1973 in Germany, Italy and Luxembourg, and in 1973 also in the Netherlands. 
209. Concentration within the big industrial firms increased. Whereas, in 1972 
forty-five firms accounted for 50% of the sales of all big firms in the Community, in 
1973 this figure was only forty-two. In 1972, thirty-eight firms employed half of all the 
workers employed in large-scale firms, while in 1973 the number was thirty-seven 
firms. The fifty largest firms increased their share in the total sales of large-scale 
industry from 53% in 1972 to 55% in 1973. Their total sales rose by 13%, that of all 
big firms by 11 %. 
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TABLE 6 
Geographical distribution of the largest Industrial firms in the Community in 1972 and 1973 
Number of firms with sales of more than 
200 million 
Country units of account 1 
1972 I 
United Kingdom 129 
Germany 81 
France 58 
Italy 16 
Netherlands 12 
Belgium 14 
Denmark 1 
Luxembourg 1 
United Kingdom/Italy 1 
United Kingdom/Netherlands 2 
Germany/Netherlands 2 
Belgium/Germany 1 
EC 318 
1 Dollars were converted into units of account (u.a.) at the following rates: 
1972 - I u.a. = 1.0857\ dollars. 
1973 - I u.a. = 1.20635 dollars. 
Sources: 
1972 - VISION assessment, October 1973. 
1973 - VISION assessment, October 1974. 
1973 
116 
92 
69 
17 
15 
13 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
332 
I 000 million 
units of account 1 
I 1972 I 1973 
27 22 
27 26 
14 15 
6 6 
2 3 
2 2 
- -
1 1 
1 1 
2 2 
1 1 
- -
83 79 
210. The trend towards concentration within large-scale industry in Europe is also 
reflected in calculations of the total degree of concentration (Table 7). The indices 
used are those employed in the Commission research programme on concentration. 1 
Rising ratios indicate an increase in concentration. 
1 cr. Third Report on Competition Policy, point 130 et seq. and also point 214 et seq. 
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TABLE 7 
Concentration of, firms with annual sales of more than 200 million units of account in 1972 and 1973 
Share of the 4 I HerfindahI-Hirschman \ Disparity between largest firms (%) Index the largest firms Year 
Employment I Sales I Employment I Sales I Employment I Sales 
1972 11.5 11.3 9.8 8.9 0.11 0.13 
1973 12.0 11.4 10.1 9.2 0.12 0.13 
The place occupied by big companies in Community industry 
211. The lack of adequate statistics on industry as a whole within the Community 
makes it more difficult to draw conclusions as to the role played by big firms. Even 
with this proviso it is clear, however, that large-scale industry increased its already 
very strong position in comparison with industry as a whole between 1972 and 1973. 
While concentration in industry as a whole increased, concentration in large-scale 
dndustry increased more rapidly. 
212. Although firms with annual-sales of more than 200 million u.a. accounted for 
29% of total industrial employment in 1973, compared with 30% in 1972, the fifty 
largest European industrial concerns increased their share of employment from 
16.8% to 17.1%. The total sales of European industry as a whole, converted into 
u.a. and therefore considerably reduced in purely arithmetical terms by the change in 
the conversion rate, rose by 8% between the two reference years; those of big firms 
rose by 11 % and those of the fifty largest European industrial firms by 13 %. 
213. The statistical material available does not permit exact calculation of the share of 
big firms in total industrial sales in the two reference years. Supplementary calculations 
and estimates have shown, however, that the big European companies with annual 
sales of more than 200 million u.a. accounted for some 50% of total industrial sales in 
the Community, and the fifty largest European firms for some 25%. 
§ 3 - Concentration trends in further selected industries 
and countries in the Community between 1969 and 1972 
Methods used 
, 
214. The following description is confined to an examination of the development of. 
concentration in the industries for which results were available for at least one new 
Member State in the Commission research programme on concentration. This was the 
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TABLE 8 
Studies available analysing concentration (Situation on 31 December 1974) 
Country 
Industry 
(NICE nomenclature) 
I I I I 
IUKIIRLI G F I N B D 
23 Manufacture of textiles 
232 wool x x x x 
233 cotton x x x x 
237 knitted and crocheted goods x x x x 
------------
27 Manufacture of paper products 
271 manufacture of pulp, paper and 
paperboard x x x x 0 
272 processing of paper and paperboard x x x x 0 
----------
--
31 Chemical industry 
313.1 pharmaceutical industry x x x+ X X 
313.2 manufacture of photographic products x x x x x 
313.5 manufacture of cleaning and 
maintenance products (waxes, x x x 
polishes, metal polishes,etc.) 
------------
38 Manufacture of transport equipment 
385.1 manufacture of motor cycles, 
cycles and mopeds Xl x x+ X 
------------
36 Manufacture of machinery 
361 manufacture of agricultural machinery 
and tractors x x 0 
362 manufacture of office machinery x x 0 
364.1 manufacture of textile machinery x x 0 
366.3 {manufact~re of machinery for. 
364.4 constructIo": and for I?reparatlon 
of constructIOn materIals x x 
366.5 manufacture of mechanical handling 
equipment x x 0 
----------
37 Electrical engineering 
375 manufacture of radios, televisions 
and sound reproduction equipment x x 0 x 
376 manufacture of electrical appliances 
for domestic use x x 0 x 
--
----------
20-B Food industry x 0 0 x 0 0 0 
1 In Germany the industry was sub-divided into cycles on the one hand and motor cycles and mopeds on the other. 
x Given in the Second Report on Competition Policy. 
o New studies. 
+ Updating of available studies. 
--
--
0 
--
--
--
0 
0 
--
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case in the food industry, the pharmaceutical industry, electrical engineering and the 
manufacture of paper and paper product~. Only thirteen out of the total of seventy-one 
reports prepared for the old Member States in respect of these industries could be taken 
up to the year 1972. To that extent the following figures give only a preliminary 
indication of the development of concentration in the enlarged Community. 
, 
-
. ,215. To facilitate comparison with the figures previously published by the Com-
./ 
mission, l the quantitative analysis is once again based on the number of firms, 
employment and sales. The statistical indices used are: 
- the Herfindahl-Hirschman indices for the description of the changes in the 
degree of concentration of an industry over time; 
- the Linda indices weighted by the number of the largest firms in industry for 
determining size disparities between these firms; 
- concentration ratios for comparisons of degrees of concentration from country 
to country and industry to industry. 
Also with a view to facilitating comparisons, the figures already published earlier for 
the old Member States are repeated in the tables. 
216. Table 8 summarizes all the studies completed up to the present. The new studies 
which became available during 1974 were prepared by the following national research 
institutes and experts: 
France: Institut Agronomique .Mediterraneen and INRA Montpellier -
J. L. Rastoin, G. Ghersi, M. Castagnos, D. Boulet, J. P. Laporte 
(food industry); 
Italy: FIS-ATOR Consulenza Aziendale, Milan - A. Amaduzzi, I, 
. R. Camagni, G. Martelli (electrical engineering and updating of 
the pharmaceutical industry and manufacture of transport equip-
ment); 
SaRIS S. p.A. Studi e richerche di Economia e Marketing, Turin -
P. Balliano, G. Bertone, F. Guaschino, R. Lanzetti (manufacture 
of transport equipment and food industry); 
Belgium: STUDIA Vzwd, Brussels - J. Hallet (food industry); 
United Kingdom: Development Analysts Ltd., Croydon - R.W. Evely, P.E. Hart, 
S.J. Prais (food industry); 
Cranfield School of Management, Cranfield - Bedford -
F. Fishwick, W. Hull, R. B. Cornu (manufacture of paper prod-
ucts); 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, points 204 to 216; Second Report on Competition Policy, 
points 166 to 187; Third Report on Competition Policy, points 130 to 160. 
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TABLE 9 
Number of firms and changes In numbers in certain industries and certain Community countries, 1969 and 1972 
20-B Food industry 
G F N B UK IRL 
Industry Year I AbSO-1 1969 1 AbSO-1 1969 1 AbSO-1 1969 1 Abso-I1969 I Abso-I 1969 1 Abso-I1969 1 Abso-I1969 (NICE nomenclature) lute = 100 lute = 100 lute = 100 lute = 100 lute = 100 lute = 100 lute = 100 
20-B 1969 127181100 141251100 119591100 114071100 110591100 1 110 1100 1 575 1 100 
Food industry 1972 - - 3959 96 1982* 101* 1231* 87* 984 93 72 65 525 91 
31 Chemical industry 
Industry Year G F I N I B I D 
690 1 _496 1 100 
1 
2~II00 
1 
751100 1 313.1 I 1969 100 539 1100 251100 
Pharmaceutical industry 1972 459 85 27 108 
37 Electrical engineering 
Industry Year I G F B D 
375 1969 19 100 39 100 81 100 Il2 100 19 100 
Radio, television, sound 
reproduction equipment 1972 - - 33* 85* - - - - 19 100 
376 1969 96 100 167 100 133 100 9 100 
Manufacture of 
electrical appliances 
for domestic use 1972 - - - - - - 9 100 
-
27 Manufacture of paper and paper products 
Industry Year I G 
271 
Manufacture of pulp, 
paper and paperboard 
272 
Processing of paper 
and paperboard 
- No data available . 
• Data rerer to 1971. 
1969 191 
1972 -
1969 1120 
1972 -
F 
100 203 100 
- - -
100 1350 100 
- - -
-
N UK 
532 100 19 100 65 100 
- - - - 66 102 
700 100 194 100 174 100 
- - - -
145 83 
-
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,20-B Food industrr 
Industry 
(NICE nomenclature) 
20·B 
Food industry 
31 Chemical Industry 
Industry 
313.1 I 
Pharmaceutical industry 
37 Electrical engineering 
TABLE 10 
Concentration in selected industries and countries of the Community, 1969 and 1972 
(Herfindahl- Hirschman indices) 
Year 
1969 
1972 
Yosr I 
1969 
1972 
G F N B UK IRL 
EmPlOy-I Sales I EmPlOy-I Sales 1 EmPlOy-I Sales ·1-;~PlOY·1 ~:l: I ;mPloy-1 Sales I EmPlOy-I Sales I EmPloy-I Sales 
ment ment. ment ment ment ment ment 
3 1 41 4 I 4 I 7 I 61 II 10 I 14 18 1 64 I 69 1 14 1- 27 3 4 9· 6* 16· 16* 20 21 60 67 21 -34 
G 
29 I 33 I 18 
F 
I = I 27 29 
N 
I ~~ I 173 1142 
B 
1 83 1 
83
1 
D 
135 1129 
157 138 
Industry Year G F B D 
375 1969 -
Radio, television, sound 
reproduction equipment 1972 -
376 1969 -
Household electrical 1972 -
goods 
27 Manufacture of paper and paper products 
Industry Year G 
271 
Manufacture of pulp, 
paper and paperboard 
272 
Processing of paper 
and paperboard 
- No data available. 
• Data refer to 1971. 
1969 32 
1972 -
1969 17 
1972 -
- 134 123 
- 156* 152* 
-
-
F 
68 16 -
-
- -
29 4 -
- - -
46 45 206 200 270 351 
- - - -
332 306 
122 91 506 437 
- - 337 306 
-
N UK 
20 25 199 187 - 82 
- - - - -
80 
3 5 23 29 - 96 
- - - - - 91 
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TABLE 11 
Disparities between the largest firms in selected industries and countries of the Commu nity, 1969 and 1972 
(Weighted Linda indices) 
20-B Food indust~y 
Industry (NICE nomenclature) 
20-B 
Food industry 
31 Chemical industry 
Industry 
313.1 
Pharmaceutical industry 
37 Electrical engineering 
Industry 
375 
Radio, television, sound 
reproduction equipment 
376 
Household electrical 
goods 
G F N B UK IRL 
Year 
EmPlOy-I Sales 1 EmPlOy-I Sales I EmPlOy-I Sales 1 EmPlOy-I Sales 1 EmPlOy-I Sales I EmPlOy-I Sales 1 EmPlOy-I Sales 
ment ment ment ment ment ment ment 
1
19691 0.08 I 0.071 0.12 10.13 1 0.17* 10.13*1 0.23* 10.21 *1 0·;-1· 0.29·1 0.23 I 0~281 0.43 10.38 
1972 - 0.11 0.13 0.18 0.12 0.28 0.20 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.32 0.34 
Year 
1969 
1972 
I Year I 
1969 
1972 
1969 
1972 
G F 
0.1710.2010.19 
G F 
0.47 0.47 0.53 
- - 0.55* 
0.49 0.72 
- -
1 
0.21 -I 0.20 I
0.21 0.19 
0.42 0.25 0.32 
0.59* - -
0.47 0.40 
- -
N 
0.631 0.451 
B 
0.54 0.54 
- -
B 
0.36 10:61 
D 
0.97 1.33 
1.28 1.17 
2.14 1.53 
0.98 0.88 
D 
0.53 10.41 
0.58 0.54 
27 Manufacture of paper and paper products 
Industry I Year G F N UK 
271 1969 0.31 0.34 0.42 0.36 0.24 0.21 0.76 0.59 - 0.29 
anufacture of pulp, 
paper and paperboard 1972 - - - - - - - - - 0.28 
272 1969 0.39 0.38 0.10 - 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.17 - 0.37 
Processing of paper 
and paperboard· 1972 - - - - - - - - - 0.34 
~ - No data available. 
• Data refer to 1971. 
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, Ireland: 
Denmark: 
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Faculty of Commerce, .university College, Dublin - L. P. F. Smith 
(food industry); ,. 
Handelsh0jskolen in Arhus - Th. H. Nielsen, N. J0rgensen, 
J. Vestergaard (pharmaceutical industry and electrical engineering). 
Changes in the degree of concentration , 
217. Reductions in the number of firms can be taken as an index of concentration 
processes. Table 9 shows the number of firms for the industries chosen and, the 
changes over the reference period (1969 = 100). Between 1969 and 1972 there was a 
further general reduction in the number of firms, a trend already noted for the 
period 1962 to1969. Of the thirteen comparable cases, eight show a decline in the 
number of firms (food industries in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, United King-
dom and Ireland; pharmaceutical industry in Italy; radio, television and sound 
reproduction equipment in France; paper-processing industry in the United Kingdom), 
two show no change (radio, television and sound reproduction equipment and 
electrical appliances for domestic use in Denmark), and three show an increase 
(food industry in Italy; pharmaceutical industry in Denmark; paper and paper prod-
ucts production in the United Kingdom), Against these last three industries, one 
showed an increase of only two new firms (pharmaceutical industry in Denmark), and 
another an increase of only one new firm (paper and paper products production in the 
United Kingdom). 
218. A more differentiated view of the continuing concentration process in the 
Community can be obtained from the general reduction in the number of firms if the 
analysis includes the Herfindahl-Hirschman indices (cf. Table 10). Apart from the 
changes in numbers~ they also take account of the changes in the size structure between 
the firms. It is true that concentration in terms of employment indicated increases in 
the degree of concentration in eight out of a total of eleven comparable cases. However, 
concentration in terms of sales showed an increase in the degree of concentration in 
only five of the thirteen comparable cases, a decrease in six cases and no change in 
two cases. 
219. The Linda indices (Table 11) give some indication of the cause of the relatively 
small increase in concen'tration in terms of sales. As indices of the disparities simply 
between the big firms of one industry, they show only two cases of increasing concen-
tration between 1969 and 1972 amongst the thirteen comparable cases of concentration 
in terms of sales. The differences in size between the large firms are narrowing. 
Consequently, with this continuing decline in the number of firms, it was mainly the 
firms at the lower end of the scale which were active in terms of concentration. 
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TABLE 12 
Percentages of employment and of sales by the four or eight largest firms in selected industries and countries of the Community (concentration 
ratios) in 1969 and 1972 
20-B Food industry 
Industry 
(NICE nomenclature) 
20-B 
Food industry 
31 Chemical industry 
Industry 
313.1 
Pharmaceutical industry 
G F N B UK IRL 
Year I EmPlOY-I Sales 1 EmplOY-I Sales 1 EmplOY-I Sales 1 EmplOY-I Sales 1 EmplOY-I Sales 1 EmploY-I sales-I EmPlOY-I Sales 
ment ment ment ment ment menl ment 
------------------------------4\ 8\4\8\ 4\8- \ 4 -\8\4\--8 -\4\8\ 418\4/8 -/-41-8 .14\ 81 4\ 8\418/ 4\ 8\4/8 
1969 4 7 5 8 7 13 8 13 13 21 10 17 15 21 14 22 20 27 21 27 43 61 41 58 20 30 26 40 
19721- - - - 7 12 8 13 14* 22* 10* 17* 17* 23* 19* 28* 24 31 22 32 40 61 39 59 22 35 29 43 
I Year I G F N B D 
1
1969125143129143123132-1 1-128-1 37 132 14Y-1 74 1-1 721--143164-143164164185166187 1972 - - - - - - - - 28 36 31 42 - - - - - - - - 68 88 65 86 
37 Electrical engineering 
Industry I Year I G 
375 1969 62 71 
Radio. television sound 
reproduction equipment 1972 - - -
376 1969 - 69 85 
Household electrical goods 1972 
- -
27 Manufacture of paper and paper products 
Industry I Year I G 
271 
Manufacture of pulp, 
paper and paperboard 
272 
Processing of paper 
and paperboard 
- No data available. 
• Data refer to 1971. 
1969 
1972 
1969 
1972 
26 37 40 
- - -
20 25 28 
- - -
54 
-
34 
-
F 
r 82 66 85 35 54 72· 87· 68· 86· -61 76 
-
F 
20 31 22 32 
- - - - - -
8 14 - - 5 8 
- - - - - -
B D 
31 50 F 90 77 88 65 85 66 87 - - 68 88 65 86 54 76 95 100 94 100 93 99 93 100 
N UK 
23 37 76 88 72 86 51 67 
- - - - - - - - 49 64 
8 15 21 32 25 39 - - 55 67 
- - - - - - - -
53 65 
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Industry-to.oindustry and country-to-country differences in the 
degree of'concentration ' 
220. The percentage employment and sales ,shares accounted for by the four or eight 
largest firms in the industries chosen (Table 12) show that in the enlarged Community 
as well, concentration varies appreciably from industry and from Member State to 
Member State. 
221. The highest degree of concentration amongst· the selected industries was in 
household electrical goods, followed by radio, television and sound reproduction 
equipment and the pharmaceutical industry. These were followed by pulp, paper and 
paperboard production and processing and the food industry. 
222. Amongst the 'large' Member States, the United Kingdom had the highest 
concentration ratio, followed by the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and France. 
Among the 'small' Membet States the order was: Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Ireland. 
223. No further detailed analysis can be undertaken of the industry-to-industry and 
country-to-country differences in degrees of concentration until further results are 
available. 
An example of the development of concentration in selected product· markets 
224. General conclusions on the development of concentration- in the Community 
can be drawn on the basis of the 71 studies which have so far been carried out as part 
of the Commission research programme on concentration. However, a description of 
frends in individual sub-markets in the various Member States cannot be included in 
the present report because of the wealth of detailed information in these studies. This 
information can be found in the reports of the institutes and experts published by the 
Commission. An example is given below of the development of concentration in 
selected product markets of the food industry in Italy and France. 
225. Figures are available for 1972 which show the market shares of the four largest 
firms in ten submarkets of the Italian food industry. In three submarkets over 90% of 
demand was covered by only four suppliers (98% in baby foods and dietary foods, 
93% in processed meats and 91 % in deep-frozen foods). In three other cases, the four 
largest producers had more than 50% of the market (75% in chocolate and other 
cocoa-containing foods, 53% in preserved fish and 53% again in preserved fruit and 
vegetables). The market shares of the four largest producers in the other markets were 
40% in jams and marmalades, 28% in spaghetti, macaroni, etc., 25% in cheeses and 
16% in confectionery. 
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226. A similar picture of highly concentrated supply structures in the submarkets of 
the food industry emerges from the figures available for twelve product ·markets in 
France (Table 13). In half of all cases in 1972 the four largest firms together 'accounted 
for 'over .50% of the market (84% in meat broths and soups, 78% in spaghetti, 
macaroni, etc., 71 % in spices, 65% in deep frozen foods, 56% in sugar and 54% in 
oils and fats). Between 1969 and 1972 in the French food industry there was a fall in 
the number of firms and no change in the degree of concentration in terms of sales, 
while concentration in terms of employment decreased (see Table 10). The information 
available on the changes in the degree of concentration in the submarkets on the other 
hand shows that the market shares of the four largest firms increased in eight cases, 
remained unchanged in one case and declined in only three cases. 
TABLE 13 
Market shares of the four largest firms in selected product markets of the food industry in France 
1969 and 1972 
Number of firms I Market shares of the four largest firms Produ~t market 
1969 I 1972 I 1969 I 1972 
Sugar 59 60 55% 56% 
Preserved fruit and vegetables 189 181 24% 26% 
Preserved fish 117 112 24% 23% 
Spaghetti, macaroni, etc. 35 30 72% 78% 
Chocolate and sweets 279 257 33% 33% 
Oils and fats 131 135 66% 54% 
Mill products 464 386 27% 38% 
Biscuits 322 325 27% 29% 
Deep-frozen foods 48 45 47% 65% 
Feeding stuffs 541 527 15% 14% 
Meat broth, soups 13 12 73% 84% 
Spices 70 73 70% 71% 
227. In both Italy and France the same groups are frequently encountered on the 
various submarkets of the food industry. In Italy, Motta, which is one of the four 
largest producers of chocolate and other cocoa-containing foods, is also engaged in 
the production of biscuits through Motta Ala. The Star group, which is one of the 
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four largest suppliers on the market for processed meats, also produces cheese 
(through its interest in Prealpi), edible oil (through its interest in ITALSO) and also 
baby foods and dietary foods (through its interest in Mellin). In 1972 tht- large-st 
French group BSN-Gervais-Danone, set up by merger on 1 January 1973, with 53% 
of its sales in the food sector, had a market share of 70% in baby foods, 43% in 
spaghetti, macaroni, etc., and< 36% in cream cheese. The four largest groups on the 
French market (BSN-Gervais-Danone, Nestle, Beghin-Say, Sodima) accounted for 
90% of the sales in baby foods, 80% in dessert preparations, 52% in cream-typf' ("heese 
and 33% in yoghoUlt. 
228. Financial interpenetrations at both national and the international levels between 
the big companies mean that the degree of concentration actually arrived at :;hould 
be estimated at a fotill higher level than that indicated in the figures on market shares. 
Thus in Italy the firms Alemagna, Cirio, Motta and Star belong to the State-owned 
group IRI-SME. In France, BSN-Gervais-Danone and Nestle are linked through 
their joint subsidiary France-Glace-Findus. 
229. Figures are available fOI 1971 which show the place occupied by multinational 
companies in the food industry in Italy and France. In Italy, these firms accounted for 
30% of total sales in the industry and for 25% of the capital invested in it, while in 
France they accounted for 16% of total sales and 15% of capital. The material avail-
able indicates the growing influence of foreign firms, and in particular British firms, 
in France. 
§4 - Summary 
230. In summary the following conclusions can be drawn for the enlarged Com-
munity; 
- International mergers, participations and the establishment of joint subsidiaries 
predominated in 1973 over purely national transactions, with 61 % of all operations. 
- More than half of all the international operations were between firms from 
Member States. 
- In Europe,. the concentration of big companies (firms with annual sales of more 
than 200 million units of account) in certain Membe~ States decreased from 1972 
to 1973. . 
- General industrial concentration increased within the Community. The sales of 
the fifty largest firms rose by 13% from 1972 to 1973, the sales of industry as a 
whole by 8%. 
- Concentration within the big companies also increased. In 1972 45 firms accounted 
for 50% of the sales of all big firms in the Community, whereas in 1973 the figure 
was 42 firms. 
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- The latest results of the Commission research programme on concentration also 
indicate a general decline in the number of firms for the period 1969 to 1972. The 
results of the remaining studies must be awaited before further conclusions can be 
~~ . 
- Analysis of the development of concentration in selected markets of the Italian 
and French food industries shows that while the degree of concentration has 
declined in the industry as a whole, concentration has increased, substantially in 
, some cases, in individual submarkets. Because of extensive financial interpenetra-
tion, the actual degree of concentration arrived at should be estimated at a still 
higher level than that shown by the figures on market shares. 
COMPo REP. 1974 
Annex , , 
                                                                 133-4
q 
.'"'-') 
( 
LIST 
of individual decisions of the Commission and rulings of the Court of Justice made in 1974 concerning 
the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty and of Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty. 
DECISIONS ON INDIVIDUAL CASES 
1. Concerning Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty 
Decision of 15 May 1974 on a proceeding under Article 85 
of the EEC Treaty 'Agreements between manufacturers 
of glass containers' 
Decision of23 July 1974 on a proceeding under Article 85 
of the EEC Treaty 'Papiers peints de Belgique" 
Decision of 24 July 1974 on a proceeding under Article 85 
of the EEC Treaty 'Advocaat Zwarte Kip' 
Decision of25 July 1974 on a proceeding under Article 85 
of the EEC Treaty 'FRUBO' 
Decision of 29 November 1974 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 'Franco-Japanese bal/-
bearings agreement' 
Decision of 13 December 1974 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 'Bayerische Motorenwerke' 
Decision of 19 December 1974 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 'Goodyear Italiana - Euram' 
Decision of 19 December 1974 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 'Duro-Dyne - Europair' 
Decision of 19 December 1974 on a proceeding under 
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty 'General Motors_ Conti-
nental' 
Decision of 20 December 1974 on a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 'Rank/Sopelem' 
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IP (74) 85 of 29.5.1974 
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OJ L 237 of 29.8.1974, p. 3 
IP (74) 135 of 25.7.1974 
Bull. EC 7/8-1974, point 2128 
OJ L 237 of 29.8.1974, p. 12 
IP (74) 142 of 25.7.1974 
Bull. EC 7/8-1974, point 2130 
OJ L 237 of 29.8.1974, p. 16 
IP-(74) 133 of 25.7.1974 
Bull. EC 7/8-1974, point 2127 
OJ L 343 of 21.12.1974, p. 19 
IP (74) 214 of 4.12.1974 
Bull. EC 12-1974, point 2121 
OJ L 29 of 3.2.1975, p. 1 
IP (74) 229 of 17.12.1974 
Bull. EC 12-1974, point 2126 
OJ L 38 of 12.2.1975, p. 10 
IP (75) 4 of 7.1.1975 
Bull. EC 12-1974, point 2124 
OJ L 29 of 3.2.1975, p. 11 
IP (75) 4 of 7.1.1975 
Bull. EC 12-1974, point 2124 
OJ L 23 of 3.2.1975, p. 14 
IP (75) 2 of 6.1.1975 
Bull. EC 12-1974, point 2122 
OJ L 29 of 3.2.1975, p. 20 
IP (75) 3 of 6.1.1975 
Bull. EC 12-1974 point 2125 
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Decision of 20 December 1974 on an application for 
negative clearance under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
'SHV-Chevron Oil Europe' 
2. Concerning Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty 
Decision of9 January 1974 on a proceeding under Article 
66 of the ECSC Treaty on the acquisition by Guest Keen 
& Nettlefolds Ltd. of the Bryrnbo Steelworks belonging 
to the British Steel Corporation. 
Decision of 9 January 1974 on a proceeding under 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty on the acquisition by the 
British Steel Corporation of GKN Dowlais Ltd. 
Decision 74/77/ECSC of22 January 1974 on a proceeding 
under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing an 
agreement between British steelmaking undertakings for 
the establishment of a joint buying agency for ferrous 
scrap and other steelmaking materials. 
Decision of 15 February 1974 on a proceeding under 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty on the joint formation by 
certain coal wholesaling undertakings of Montan 
Brennstoffhandel und Schiffahrt GmbH & Co KG. 
Decision of 28 February 1974 on a proceeding under 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the acquisition 
by Creusot-Loire SA of a majority shareholding in 
Cartry-Worrns SA. 
Decision of 12 March 1974 on a proceeding under Article 
66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing Fiat SpA and Allis 
Chalmers Co. to form a joint subsidiary to produce 
earthmoving machines. 
Decision of 14 March 1974 on a proceeding under Article 
66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the acquisition by 
Guest, Keen & Nettlefolds Ltd. of Miles Druce & Co. Ltd. 
Decision of22 March 1974 on a proceeding under Article 
66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing undertakings in the 
coal wholesale trade to found a joint undertaking to be 
known as Hansen Neuerburg Export-Import GmbH & 
Co. OHG, Essen. 
Decision 74/211/ECSC of 4 April 1974 on a proceeding 
under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty extending the author-
ization of the joint selling of fuels from Houilleres du 
Bassin de Lorraine and Saarbergwerke AG by Saarlor. 
Decision of 5 April 1974 on a proceeding under Article 66 
of the ECSC Treaty on interim measures of protection in 
respect of the companies Schneider S.A. and Marine 
Firminy S.A. 
OJ L 38 of 12.2.1975, p. 14 
Bull. EC 1-1975, point 2109 
Bull. EC 1-1974, point 2116 
Bull. EC 1-1974, point 2116 
OJ L 52 of 23.2.1974, p. 22. 
Bull. EC 1-1974, point 2114 
Bull. EC 3-1974, point 2114 
Bull. EC 3-1974, point 2113 
OJ L 132 of 15.5.1974, p. 28. 
Bull. EC 3-1974, point 2112 
Bull. EC 3-1974, point 2115 
OJ L 113 of 26.4.1974, p. 46. 
Bull. EC 4-1974, point 2109 
Bull. EC 4-1974, point 2110 
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Decision of 25 April 1974 on a proceeding under Article 
65 of the' ECSC Treaty authorizing an exception to 
Article 2(1) of Commission Decision No 71/315/ECSC 
of 27 July 1971 authorizing agreements for specialization 
between iron and steel undertakings in south-west Ger-
many in the production of rolled steel and' in the joint 
purchasing of iron ore. 
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Decision of 5 July 1974 on a proceeding under Article 66 Bull; EC 7/8-1974, point 2124 
of the ECSC Treaty relating to the formation by the 
companies Forgeal, Creusot-Loire, Aubert et Duval and 
SNECMA of a company to be jointly owned and known 
as Interforge. 
Decision of 8 July 1974 on a proceeding under Article 66 Bull. EC 7/8-1974, point 2126 
of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the acquisition by 
Guest, Keen & Nettlefolds Ltd. of the Cassart group. 
Decision of 9 July 1974 on a proceeding under Article 66 
of the ECSC Treaty on the acquisition of the goodwill of 
the wholesale coal undertakings Midland Supply (Bel per) 
Limited, Belper, Derby, and Hall & Boon, Coventry, by 
the British Fuel Company, London. 
Decision of9 July 1974 on a proceeding under Article 66 
of the ECSC Treaty on the acquisition of the wholesale 
coal undertaking A. J. Doig & Son, Greenock, Scotland, 
by the British Fuel Company, London. 
Decision of 18 July 1974 on a proceeding under Article 66 
of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the reorganization of the 
marketing network of Sacilor. '. 
Decision of 13 September 1974 on a proceeding under 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the formation 
by Sacilor and Metallurgique et Miniere de Rodange-
Athus of a company to be jointly owned and known as I 
Societe des Laminoirs de Villerupt. 
Decision of 2 October 1974 on a proceeding under Article 
66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the formation by 
Societe Nouvelle des Acieries de Pompey, Compagnie 
U niverselle d' Acetylene, Societe Fran~aise d 'Electro-
Metallurgie and Societe Eurominas Electrometalurgia of 
a Groupement Europeen du Manganese. 
Decision of2 October 1974 on a proceeding under Article 
66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the acquisition by 
Klllckner & Co. of the entire share capital of Howard 
E. Perry & Co. Ltd. 
Decision of 14 October 1974 on a proceeding under 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the acquisition 
by the British Steel CorporatIon of the share capital of 
Lye Trading Company Ltd. 
Decision of 20 November 1974 on a proceeding under 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty approving the acquisition 
by August Thyssen-Hiitte ofa shareholding of up to 25% 
in SOLMER. 
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Bull. EC 10-1974, point 2109 
Bull. EC 10-1974, point 2110 
OJ L 13 of 18.1.1975, p. 45. 
Bull. EC 10.1974, point 2111 
OJ L 49 of 25.2.1975. p. 13 
Bull. EC 11-1974. points 2112 and 2113 
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Decision of 20 November 1974 on a proceeding under 
Article 66 (5) of the ECSC Treaty on interim measures of 
protection against British Steel Corporation (BSC) in 
respect of Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd. 
Decision of 27 November 1974 on a proceeding under 
Article 66 (5) of the ECSC Treaty on interim measures of 
protection against Dunford Hadfields Ltd. (DH) in 
respect of Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd. 
Decision of 29 November 1974 on a proceeding under Bull. EC 11-1974, point 2114 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing Creusot-Loire 
SA to acquire a majority shareholding in Marrel Frbres. 
Decision of 5 December 1974 on a proceeding under Bull. EC 12-1974, point 2128 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the acquisition 
by the British Steel Corporation of a controlling share-
holding in Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd. 
Decision of 5 December 1974 on a proceeding under 
Article 66 (5) of the ECSC Treaty revoking the interim 
measures of protection taken on 20 and 27 November 
1971 in respect of British Steel Corporation and Dunford 
Hadfields Ltd. 
Decision of 16 December 1974 on a proceeding under 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty on the acquisition by the 
Federal Republic of Germany of a majority shareholding 
in Gelsenberg AG, Essen. 
Decision of 19 December 1974 on a proceeding under 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorising amendment of 
the terms of business of Ruhrkohle AG, Essen. 
Decision of 21 December 1974 on a proceeding under 
Article 66 (5) of the ECSC Treaty on interim measures of 
protection in respect of Compagnie Lorraine Industrielle 
et Financiere, Paris. 
Decision of 21 December 1974 on a proceeding under 
Article 66 (5) of the ECSC Treaty on interim measures of 
protection in respect of Denain Nord-Est Longw}. 
RULINGS OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
Ruling (30 January 1974) 
Ruling (27 March 1974) 
in case 127/73: 
'BRT v Fonior et SABAM v Fonior' 
Ruling (6 March 1974) 
in cases 6/73 and 7/73: 
'ICI-CSC v Commission of the European Communities' 
OJ L 16 of 12.3.1975, p. 16 
Bull. EC 12-1974, point 2127 
OJ L 21 of 28.1.1975, p. 19 
OJ C 60 of 25.5.1974, p. 27 
OJ C 74 of 1.7.1974, p. 1 
Bull. EC 3-1974, point 2444 
Reports 1974, p. 51 
Reports 1974, p. 313 
OJ C 69 of 14.6.1974, p. 4 
Bull. EC 3-1974, point 2443 
Reports 1974, p. 223 
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Ruling (30 April 1974) 
in case 155/73: 
'Pubblico Ministero Italiano v Guiseppe Sacchi, Sala' 
(RAI-TV, Biella) 
Ruling (14 May 1974) 
in case 4/73: 
'Nold v Commission of the European Communities' 
Ruling (3 July 1974) 
in case 192/73: 
'Van Zuylen Freres v Hag AG' 
Ruling (11 July 1974) 
in case 8/74: 
'Fourcroy and Breuval, v Benoit and Gustave Dasson-
ville' 
Ruling (23 October 1974) 
in case 17/74: 
'Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission of 
the European Communities' 
Ruling (31 October 1974) 
in cases 15/74 and 16/74: 
'Centrafarm B.V. and De Peijper v Sterling Drug Inc.' 
'Centrafarm B.V. and De Peijper v Winthrop B.V.' 
Order of 11 October 1973, 
Order of 16 March 1974 
in Joined Cases 160, 161 and 170-73 R II: 
'Miles Druce v the Commission of the European Com-
munities' 
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OJ C 91 of 3.8.1974, p. 4 
Bull. EC 4-1974, point 2448 
Reports 1974, p. 409 
OJ C 114 of 27.9.1974, p. 23 
Reports 1974, p. 491 
OJ C 114 of 27.9.1974, p. 26 
Bull. EC 7/8-1974, point 2452 
Reports 1974,p.731 , 
OJ C 114 of 27.9.1974, p. 27 
Bull. EC 7/8-1974, point 2454 
Reports 1974, p. 837 
OJ C 158 of 17.12.1974, p. 15 
Bull. EC 10-1974, point 2439 
OJ C 158 of 17.12.1974, p. 13 and 14 
Bull. EC 10-1974, point 2438 . 
OJ C 105 of 4 December 1973, p. 8 
OJ C 52 of 7 May 1974, p. 3 
Reports 1973, p. 1049 
Reports 1974, p. 281 
Order of 15 October 1974, OJ C 159 of 21 December 1974, p. 4 
in case 71-74 Rand RR: 
'NederJandse Vereniging voor de Fruit en Groenten-
importhandel, NederJandse Bond van Grossiers in 
Zuidvruchten en < Ander Geimporteerd Fruit v Com-
mission of the European Communities' 
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REGULATION (EEC) No 2988/14 OF THE COUNCIL 
of 26 November 1974 
concerning limitation periods in proceedings and the enforcement of sanctions 
under the rules of the European Economic Community relating to transport and 
competltlon1 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular 
Articles 75, 79 and 87 thereof; 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission; 
Having regard to the Opinion of the European Parliament;2 
Having regard to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee;3 
Whereas under the rules of the European Economic Community relating to transport and competition 
the Commission has the power to impose fines, penalties and periodic penalty payments on under-
takings or associations of undertakings which infringe Community law relating to information or 
investigation, or to the prohibition on discrimination, restrictive practices and abuse of dominant 
position; whereas those rules make no provision for any limitation period; 
Whereas it is necessary in the interests oflegal certainty that the principle of limitation be introduced 
and that implementing rules be laid down; whereas, for the matter to be covered fully, it is necessary 
that provision for limitation be made not only as regards the power to impose fines or penalties, but 
also as regards the power to enforce decisions, imposing fines, penalties or periodic penalty payments; 
whereas such provisions should specify the length of limitation periods, the date on which time starts 
to run and the events which have the effect of interrupting or suspending the limitation period; 
whereas in this respect the interests of undertakings and associations of undertakings on the one hand, 
and the requirements imposed by administrative practice, on the other hand, should be taken into 
account; 
Whereas this Regulation must apply to the relevant provisions of Regulation No 11 concerning the 
abolition of discrimination in transport rates and conditions, in implementation of Article 79(3) of the 
Treaty4 establishing the European Economic Community, of Regulation No 17:5 first Regulation 
implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, and of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1017/686 of 
19 July 1968 applying rules of competition to transport by 'rail, road and inland waterway; whereas 
it must also apply to the relevant provisions of fu ture regulations in the fields of European Economic 
Community law relating to transport and competition, 
(1) OJ L 319 of 29. 11. 1974, p. 1. 
(I) OJ C 129 of 11. 12. 1972, p. 10. 
(3) OJ C 89 of 23. 8. 1972, p.21. 
(4) OJ 52 of 16. 8, 1960, p. 1121/60. 
(5) OJ 13 of :U. 2. 1962. p. 204/62. 
(6) OJ L 175 of 23. 7. 1968, p. I. 
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HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
Article 1 
Limitation periods in proceedings 
1. The power of the Commission to impose fines or penalties fo~ infringements of the rules of the 
European Economic Community relating to transport or competition shall be subject to the following 
limitation periods: 
(a) three years in the case of infringements of provisions concerning applications or notifications of 
, undertakings or associations of undertakings, requests for information, or the carrying out of 
investigations; 
(b) five years in the case of all other infringements. 
2. Time shall begin to run upon the day on which the infringement is committed. However, in the 
case of continuing or repeated infringements, time shall begin to run on the day on which the infrin-
gement ceases. 
Article 2 
Interruption of the limitation period in proceedings 
1. Any action taken by the Commission, or by any Member State, acting at the request of the 
Commission, for the purpose of the preliminary investigation or proceedings in respect of an infringe-
ment shall interrupt the limitation period in proceedings. The limitation period shall be interrupted 
with effect from the date on which the action is notified to at least one undertaking or association or 
undertakings which have participated in the infringement. 
Actions which interrupt the running of the period shall include in particular the following: 
;-
(a) 
(b) 
written requests for information by the Commission, or by the competent authority of a Member 
State acting at the request of the Commission; or a Commission decision requiring the requested 
information; 
written authorizations to carry out investigations issued to their officials by the Commission or 
,by the competent authority of any Member State at the request of the Commission; or a Com-
mission decision ordering an investigation; , 
(c) the commencement of proceedings by the Commission; 
. (d) notification of the Commission's statement of objections. 
2. The interruption of the limitation period shall apply for all the undertakings or associations of 
undertakings which have participated in the infringement. 
3. Each interruption shall start time running afresh. However, the limitation period shall expire' at 
the latest on the day on which a period equal to twice the limitation period has elapsed without the 
Commission having imposed a fine or a penalty; that period shall be extended by the time during 
which limitation is suspended pursuant.to Article 3. 
Article 3 
/ 
Suspension of the limitation period in proceedings 
The limitation period in proceedings shall be suspended for as long as'the decision of the Commis~ion 
is the subject of proceedings pending before the Court of Justice of the European Communities. 
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Article 4 
LimItation period for the enforcement of sanctions 
1. The power of the Commission to enrorce decisions imposing fines, penalties or periodic pay-
ments for infringements of the rules of the European Economic Community relating to transport or 
competition shall be subject to a limitation period of five years. 
2. Time shall begin to run on the day on which the decision becomes final. 
Article 5 
Interruption of the limitation period for the enforcement of sanctions 
1. The limitation period for the enforcement of sanctions shall be interrupted: 
(a) by notification of a decision varying the original amount of the fine, penalty or periodic penalty 
payments or refusing an application for variation; 
(b) by any action of the Commission, or of a Member State at the request of the Commission, for the 
purpose of enforcing payments of a fine, penalty or periodic penalty payment. 
2. Each interruption shall start time running afresh. 
Article 6 
Suspension of the limitation period for the enforcement of sanctions 
The limitation period for the enforcement of sanctions shall be suspended for so long as: 
(a) time to pay is allowed; or 
(b) enforcement of payment is suspended pursuant to a decision of the Court of Justice of 'the 
European Communities. 
Article 7 
Application to transitional cases 
This Regulation shall also apply in respect of infringements committed before it enters into force. 
Article 8 
Entry Into force 
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 January 1975. 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 
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